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Analysis of Two Strategies for Structuring Medicare Reimbursement to Maximize 
Profitability in Acute Care General Hospitals 
 
James Barrington 
ABSTRACT 
 
The healthcare literature sometimes cites Medicare as a negative determinant of 
hospital profitability. However, a review of Florida acute care short-term general hospital 
data revealed a subset of profitable hospitals with high percentages of their revenue 
structure comprised of Medicare reimbursements.  Some investigators might contend that 
these hospitals are just better managed; that hospital profitability is not related to patient 
mix or payer source.  Although good management enhances financial health, there are 
perhaps other reasons why certain hospitals can become profitable with Medicare as their 
primary revenue source.   
Research findings indicate there is wide geographic variability shown for per-
capita volumes of discretionary procedures reimbursed by Medicare, and broad variations 
in Medicare spending per enrollee for general acute care short-term hospitalizations.  It 
was also found that many of the hospitals performing higher rates of discretionary 
procedures and showing the ability to make a profit with Medicare are investor owned. 
The focus of this study, covering years 2000-2005, was to examine two strategies 
using discretionary procedures under Medicare that Florida investor owned hospitals may 
employ to increase profitability and maintain long-term financial health.   
 xi 
Part 1 of the study examined the association between long-term financial viability, 
measured by the total assets ÷ total liabilities (TATL) ratio (the reciprocal of the debt 
ratio) and percentages per hospital of two discretionary cardiac and orthopedic procedure 
variables, reimbursed by conventional Medicare.  A positive association was found 
between the TATL ratio and these variables, as well as significant marginal effects in the 
association between the TATL ratio and interaction terms for hospital ownership (where 
investor owned = 1 and not-for-profit = 0) and the discretionary cardiac procedure 
variable and ownership and the discretionary orthopedic procedure variable. 
Part 2 used total charges as the dependent variable for patient discharges 
reimbursed by Medicare HMO.  It was found that investor owned hospitals generally 
assess significantly higher charges than not-for-profits for discretionary CABG and valve 
replacement procedures for patients with equivalent levels of medical services and 
hospitalization.  It was also found that charges significantly increase for both investor-
owned and not-for-profit hospitals located in the southern region of Florida.   
 1 
 
 
 
Chapter 1 
Introduction / Statement of the Problem 
 
           Of the $2.0 trillion spent on health services in the United States in 2005, 16.0% of 
the Gross Domestic Product (GDP), $611 billion was spent on hospital services (Catlin, 
Cowan, Heffler et al 2007).  Of the amount spent on hospital services, Medicare paid 
close to $200 billion (CMS 2005). 
Since the Medicare Prospective Payment System (PPS) for hospitals was 
introduced in October 1983,  there have been reports in the media (and sometimes found 
in little-known government publications, trade publications, and newsletters published by 
professional associations, citizen groups, and law firms) documenting hospital Medicare 
fraud, e.g.,  DRG upcoding  (ACFE 2005-06, Psaty, Boineau, Kuller et al 1999, 
Rosenberg, Fryback & Katz 2000), misuse of the PPS  DRG outlier methodology (CMS 
2003, Darmiento 2002, Becker & Kessler 2005),  and the performance of unnecessary 
coronary artery bypass grafts (CABG), valve replacements, and percutaneous coronary 
interventions (PCI) (Darmiento 2002, Kesselheim & Brennan 2005). 
In the late 1980’s some hospitals increased their operating margins by upcoding 
medical procedures which they performed.  Upcoding involves billing for a higher level 
of service than was actually rendered via code manipulation; altering a diagnostic code to 
reflect greater patient severity and more intensive levels of medical services performed 
 2 
to, in turn, obtain higher reimbursement (ACFE 2005-06).  Although this method was 
effective in generating greater revenue in the short-term, Medicare eventually began to 
investigate and enforce sanctions against hospitals using the upcoding strategy,  causing 
these hospitals to be more cautious in gaming DRG codes  (Middleton 2002).  ―In 
practice, upcoding has run the gamut from questionable to outright fraud.  Ferreting out 
the fraudulent cases from the borderline ones is a delicate task‖ (Middleton 2002).   
In the mid and late 1990’s some hospitals began aggressively utilizing the 
Medicare outlier payment system as a source of additional revenue. CMS (2003) cited a 
number of hospitals that had been ―manipulating the outlier formula by aggressively 
increasing their charges compared to costs, costing taxpayers over $2 billion in 2002 and 
$1 billion to $2 billion a year in inappropriate overpayments for each of the last four 
years.‖  Despite these sporadic reports there have been no scientific studies documenting 
the annual amounts of Medicare funds lost to hospital Medicare fraud.   
In 2002 it was discovered that for several years Redding Medical Center, a 
subsidiary of Tenet Healthcare, Inc. had been submitting false billings to Medicare, 
abusing the Medicare outlier program, and even performing and charging for invasive 
surgeries that were medically unnecessary (Darmiento 2002, HHS OIG, December 11, 
2003, DOJ May 17, 2004).  
Increased Legal & Regulatory Provisions  
Increased strength of the Federal False Claims Act [31 USC § 3729, 3730 (1)] 
beginning in the late 1980’s provided Medicare with an imposing weapon to use against 
any organization engaging in fraudulent activities with federal funds (Zack 2001).  The 
1996 HIPAA legislation also gave federal investigators increased funding and a mandate 
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to root out Medicare fraud and abuse. ―The resulting crackdown prompted some hospitals 
to down-code hospital stays for fear of triggering an investigation‖ (Middleton 2002)  
In 2002 the Sarbanes-Oxley (SOX) act was passed into law in response to the 
corporate scandals of 2001 and 2002 (Bisk 2009).  In the context of healthcare, this act 
was passed in a political environment where rooting out fraud and abuse was paramount.  
―This law significantly changed the laws of corporate governance and the rules and 
regulations under which accounting firms and corporations must operate‖ (ACFE 2005-
06).   Additionally, certain provisions substantially increased the responsibilities of 
management and the accounting profession regarding financial reporting, design and 
operation of the internal control structure, and prevention and detection of fraud (ACFE 
2005-06).  SOX applied only to publically traded companies, but many of the provisions 
of SOX have been implemented as best practices by not-for-profit hospitals (Bisk 2009).   
Ubiquitous and Recurrent Nature of Gaming 
It seems that no matter what laws are enacted or how strictly regulatory actions 
are enforced, there will always be sectors of the healthcare industry involved in gaming. 
When one game becomes too risky, there is always another game that laws do not yet 
cover, or that regulators’ are not focusing upon. 
―Gaming‖ has always been part and parcel of the Federal Medicare program. At 
its inception, doctors discovered that by increasing their fees they would receive higher 
Medicare reimbursements in subsequent years‖ (Middleton 2002).   Historically, a 
―crackdown‖ in one area involving the misuse of Medicare funds has only resulted in 
more sophisticated ―gaming‖ strategies in other areas. 
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Gaming in this study is defined as a recurrent strategic maneuvering across legal 
and/or ethical thresholds of conduct for the purpose of acquiring additional unwarranted 
profit.  The recurrent nature of gaming in this context implies scienter, which means the 
gamer (i.e., offending party) has knowledge and willful intent of engaging in wrongful 
behavior (Convisor Duffy 1996).   
Listed below is a brief typology of gaming behaviors that are historically 
characteristic of the health care industry (ACFE 2005-06, Cleverly & Cameron 2002). 
 Kickbacks 
o Payment for referrals of patients 
o Payment for insurance contracts 
o Payment for vendor contracts 
 
 Inflated billings 
o Alterations – of claim forms, amounts charged, and financial ledgers 
o Adding services never rendered to actual services received by a patient  
o Upcoding  (defined above) 
o Experimentation with the Medicare outlier methodology  
 
 Unbundling Charges/Fragmentation 
o Submitting charges of a comprehensive code as well as one or more 
component codes 
o Billing for mutually exclusive procedures  
o Global service period violations – billing for a major procedure (e.g., 
surgery) as well as related procedures, when the fee for the major 
procedure already includes fees for related procedures within the global 
service period (pre-defined period of which all related services are covered 
following a major procedure) (ACFE 2005-06)  
 
Focus of the Investigation 
This study will investigate other types of gaming, ones that are not usually listed 
in a typology of gaming behaviors.  These include hospitals systematically increasing the 
numbers of certain types of discretionary procedures performed under conventional 
Medicare, and inflating charges under the Medicare HMO program.  The example cited 
above of fraud at Tenet’s Redding Medical Center initially inspired this research.   
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The study period for this project covers years 2000-2005 which begins soon after 
the passage of the Balanced Budget Act (BBA) of 1997.  This act was an omnibus 
legislative package designed to balance the federal budget by 2002, with expectations of 
savings from Medicare of $112 billion between 1998 through 2002 (Guterman 2000).  It 
introduced major Medicare reforms which included reduced payments to providers 
(Doherty, Date Unknown), though  payments were raised in subsequent legislation under 
the Balanced Budget Reform Act (BBRA) of 1999, and certain reimbursements were 
reinstated in 2000 (Doherty, Date Unknown, Guterman 2000).   
On the surface this would appear to be an era when Medicare may not be a 
profitable revenue source for hospitals. Despite this surface appearance there were some 
Florida short-term general hospitals that maintained unusually high profitability while at 
the same time deriving high percentages of their annual total revenue from Medicare 
during the years of this study, 2000-2005.  High profitability defined in this study (and 
attributed to the group of hospitals just mentioned) is based on operating margin as a 
short-term (≤ one year) indicator found on hospitals’ income statements and on the total 
assets ÷ total liabilities (TATL) ratio (the reciprocal of the debt ratio) as a long-term (> 
one year) indicator derived from hospitals’ balance sheets.   
In the dataset that will be used for part of this analysis (described on page 67) 
observations are provided for 891 Florida hospitals between 2000 and 2005.  The dataset 
shows amounts of net revenue derived from Medicare for each hospital as well as two 
important financial indicators, the operating margin and the TATL ratio, just mentioned.  
Preliminary analyses showed that certain short-term general hospitals with high 
percentages (≥ 60%) of their revenue derived from Medicare relative to other payers, had 
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operating margins ≥ 10%, and a few hospitals of this group even had margins ≥ 20%.  
These hospitals also showed TATL ratios ≥ 10.0, and a few even had ratios ≥ 15.0.  
The magnitudes of operating margins and TATL ratios in these hospitals can be 
better understood by a brief discussion of the scales of these financial indicators in the 
dataset.  The dataset showed that of the 891 hospitals the mean operating margin was 
2.25%, and the median is 3.30%.  The third quartile is 9.5% while the 95
th
 percentile is 
19.5%.  The mean average for the TATL ratio is 3.92 with a median of 1.94.  The third 
quartile for the TATL ratio is 4.33 and the 90
th
 percentile is 12.00.   Considering the 
scales of operating margin and the TATL ratio among total hospitals, it is clear that the 
subset of hospitals just mentioned with ≥ 60% of their revenue base derived from 
Medicare, are very profitable. 
The research question is what is different about certain hospitals, that they could 
realize inordinately high profitability when their largest revenue source, Medicare, is 
consistently identified in the healthcare industry and in the literature as unprofitable 
(Williams & Hadley 1992, Younis & Forgione 2005). 
One explanation for higher profitability and better financial health in these 
hospitals may be due to better management, which would entail prudent cost cutting and 
highly efficient service delivery.  Also because of sound strategic direction these 
hospitals may have structured their markets to offer a very profitable patient mix of DRG 
procedures and are extremely competent in delivering these services to maximize both 
efficiency and quality. 
Still another possible explanation, because their operating margins and TATL 
ratios are so high, would be that these hospitals (the physicians on staff there) are 
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performing higher volumes of certain procedures, some of which may be questionable or 
perhaps marginally necessary.  Additionally, these hospitals may be assessing monetary 
charges for certain procedures that exceed the extent of medical services performed.  
Because hospital administrators may be more cautious regarding Medicare’s continuing 
investigations for upcoding and excessive use of the outlier methodology, certain 
hospitals may be using a strategy of boosting profitability by overusing or overcharging 
of certain DRG codes. 
It was found that hospitals that are profitable and also have high percentages of 
their revenue base comprised of Medicare payments carry out high rates of surgical 
procedures described as “discretionary.”  The definition of discretionary procedure will 
be examined in detail in Chapter 3,  Research Methods – Data Structure & Identification 
of Variables, but in short it refers to a procedure for which there is a lack of full scientific 
agreement regarding its effectiveness.  Discretionary would also mean that the procedure 
is performed in variable per-capita rates per geographic area or region.  It is distinguished 
from a nondiscretionary procedure for which clinical agreement has been established and 
medical practice is statistically uniform regardless of the hospital or geographic area. 
If financial gaming occurs in connection with discretionary procedures, financial 
incentives and medical practice would differ depending on the type of Medicare payer.  
Conventional Medicare reimburses procedures on a fixed-rate per DRG code while 
Medicare HMO compensates hospitals on a charge basis.  The incentive for hospitals to 
make a profit with Medicare HMO would be to assess charges higher than are warranted 
by the extent of medical services provided.  Even if Medicare agrees to pay only a 
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fraction of patient charges the hospital may still financially benefit if reimbursement turns 
out being higher than it would have been had charges been at realistic levels. 
The incentive under conventional Medicare would be to increase volumes of 
certain types of procedures for which the costs of care would be, on the average, 
consistently less than the DRG reimbursement. 
Overcharging for medical services or overusing certain DRG codes may be two of 
the strategies used by certain hospitals that may allow them to be very profitable while 
depending so heavily on Medicare as their primary revenue base.   
As will be shown in the Research Methods sections (chapters 3-6), this study will 
be presented in two parts, Part 1 and Part 2.  Part 1 will test the association between 
financial performance and discretionary cardiac and orthopedic procedures carried out in 
investor owned hospitals.  The population in Part 1 will be confined to general acute care 
Florida hospitals, 2000-2005.   Explanatory variables will include percentages of certain 
cardiac and orthopedic procedures performed per hospital, reimbursed by conventional 
Medicare, 2000-2005.  The dependent (outcome) variable will be the TATL ratio, the 
reciprocal of the debt ratio. 
Part 2 will test the association between total patient charges and discretionary 
cardiac procedures carried out in investor owned hospitals.  The population will be 
confined to valve replacement and CABG procedures reimbursed by Medicare HMO, and 
the outcome variable will be total charges.  The explanatory variable will be hospital 
ownership. 
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Chapter 2  
Review of the Literature 
 
Introduction  
The Review of the Literature is intended to present rationale for carrying out this 
investigation and to provide a theoretical basis for setting research objectives, deriving 
hypotheses, and selecting variables.  
Brief Summary of the Literature Review 
The review begins with an overview of hospital financial performance indicators 
and a discussion of factors which may favorably or adversely affect these indicators.  
This will help determine which indicators might be useful as variables in the Research 
Methods section (Chapter 3) and will establish a foundation for the selection of certain 
control variables.  
One factor often adversely associated with financial performance indicators is a 
hospital’s volume of Medicare patients or percentage of revenue derived from Medicare 
(Younis & Forgione 2005).  A review of previous research will show that Medicare is 
often negatively associated with profitability, and as explained in the problem statement, 
it is counter intuitive that a group of Florida hospitals with high percentages of Medicare 
comprising their revenue structures to simultaneously have high operating margins and 
other favorable financial performance indicators. 
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The literature review then cites investigators that have concluded that a hospital’s 
percentage of Medicare revenue is irrelevant, that good management regardless of 
payment sources or patient mix is the key to profitability (Clarke 1991, Cleverly 2004).  
These investigators also conclude that, though there are inherent differences between 
investor owned and not-for-profit hospitals, ownership per se does not account for strong 
financial performance.  It is the characteristics of many investor owned hospitals that 
make them more profitable such as reduced labor costs, better long-term capital planning, 
etc. (Galloro 2004, Smith 2002).   These characteristics are often induced by boards of 
directors in investor owned hospitals that tend to pay closer attention to the bottom line 
(Smith 2002, HFMA 2004). 
Although profitability is positively associated with good management practices, 
there are also other mechanisms that may improve financial performance.  For example, 
certain Florida hospitals could be practicing gaming behaviors especially considering the 
excessively high operating margins that are characteristic of certain Florida hospitals with 
Medicare as their greatest revenue source.  Gaming has already been defined in the 
problem statement as recurrent maneuvering across legal and/or ethical thresholds of 
conduct for the purpose of ostensibly improving financial performance.   
Gaming behaviors in previous research have focused on upcoding and gaming the 
DRG outlier methodology, but no research has addressed performing inordinately high 
volumes of discretionary procedures, some of which may be unnecessary, as a gaming 
strategy.   
Also, very few previous studies have examined charges assessed by profitable 
hospitals to determine if these charges are significantly higher than other hospitals that 
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carry out the same medical treatments and perform the same extent of medical services.  
A good example of why such a study might be important is Redding Hospital, a 
subsidiary of Tenet Healthcare, which was found performing unnecessary heart surgeries, 
submitting false billings, and overcharging for services (Darmiento 2002). 
The literature review lays the theoretical groundwork for identifying potential 
DRG codes which may be subject to gaming behaviors.  As the literature review ensues it 
will be shown that DRG codes vulnerable to gaming tend to represent discretionary 
procedures.  The criteria to determine a procedure as discretionary in this study are based 
on lack of clinical consensus of effectiveness and variability in the performance of these 
procedures across geographic areas that are not linked to rates of disease (Wennberg 
2005, Dartmouth 1999). 
The literature review will then discuss an association between the rates of 
discretionary (and possibly gamed) procedures and geographic variations of medical 
practice patterns.  Numerous investigators are cited who provide evidence that rates of 
certain procedures and per capita Medicare expenditures vary widely depending on 
location.   Wide fluctuations are observed between states and selected cities in the nation 
and between cities and hospital referral regions (HRRs) in Florida. 
Wennberg’s (2005) surgical signature theory will be introduced in the literature 
review and referenced several times in this study.  The surgical signature is identified by 
wide geographic variability in federal spending and in the performance of discretionary 
procedures reimbursed by Medicare.  
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Indicators of Financial Performance 
Many studies use operating margin (operating income ÷ total operating revenues), 
the proportion of profit remaining after subtracting total operating expenditures from 
operating revenues (Cleverly & Cameron 2002), as a dependent variable because it is an 
excellent measure of financial performance.    Operating margin is a summary measure of 
an organization’s income statement reflecting profitability typically over a one year 
period.  It reflects ongoing revenue and expenses over a short-term (one year) period of 
time. 
The TATL ratio (total assets ÷ total liabilities) is a reliable summary indicator of 
the balance sheet reflecting long-term solvency, viability, and the risk of bankruptcy 
(Gardiner 1995).  In the composition of the TATL ratio, total liabilities include current 
and long-term liabilities and current and fixed assets as well as other assets such as 
goodwill if relevant.   
The TATL ratio is the reciprocal of the debt ratio.  The debt ratio may be 
expressed as (total liabilities ÷ total assets) or (total debt ÷ total assets).  It indicates the 
percentage of an organization’s assets that are provided by debt as opposed to equity (i.e., 
net assets or fund balance in a not-for-profit’s balance sheet) (Williams, Haka, Bettner et 
al 2008).  The ratio is an indicator of an organization’s overall debt load and its mix of 
equity and debt.  It can help diagnose the overall financial risk confronting an 
organization, as generally the greater amount of debt held by an organization the greater 
the financial risk of bankruptcy (Williams, Haka, Bettner et al 2008).  
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As the inverse to the debt ratio, the TATL ratio also is an indicator of liquidity vs. 
leverage and is a measure of both cash-flow and balance sheet solvency.   It reflects a 
snapshot of long-term financial condition at a given point in time (Plank & Plank 2000).   
Other long-term measures instead of the TATL ratio were considered, such as the 
debt to equity (fund balance) ratio and the total liabilities to net equity (fund balance) 
ratio.  But data generated for the TATL ratio was cleaner, had fewer missing values, and 
was determined to be more reliable for the analysis. 
One problem for the literature review was that, though there are many research 
findings using operating margin as well as total margin that can be cited, there are 
virtually none that use a TATL ratio.  For that matter there are very few studies in the 
healthcare literature that have used other financial ratios as dependent or independent 
variables.   Because so many studies use short-term measures of financial strength, such 
as operating margin or total margin as outcome variables, and this study uses the long-
term TATL ratio, it seemed necessary to present findings from the literature regarding 
other useful (long-term) financial indicators, which are provided in the following 
subsection.  This information may establish further rationale for using a long-term 
financial indicator such as the TATL ratio. 
Multiple Indicators of Financial Performance 
Despite the consistent use of operating margin or total margin as outcome 
variables in studies in the healthcare literature, these margins represent just one 
dimension of financial health and are just two among many indicators of financial 
performance.  Cleverly (2004) and Lee (1984) stress the importance of examining 
financial data representing multiple dimensions of the organization.  This means that the 
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assessment of financial performance necessitates a simultaneous understanding of a 
comprehensive set of indicators including liquidity, profitability, activity, and debt, as 
well as determining the interrelationships of these indicators (Lee 1984).  
Several financial indicators representing long-term dimensions are presented in 
the next few paragraphs, most of which are derived from items on the balance sheet and 
can be encapsulated within the TATL ratio. 
Langabeer (2008) stated ―true economic condition (of hospitals) is based on long-
term viability.‖ Threats to viability are best reflected by ―poor liquidity, a high degree of 
debt leverage, and significantly low fund balances (i.e., accumulated retained earnings).‖  
These indicators of long-term risk are derived from the balance sheet, as is the TATL 
ratio.  Operating margin or total margin derived from the income statement are not 
indicators of long term risk, but only of short-term (≤ one year) profitability.  
Schulman (2008) has explained that hospital financial performance must be 
examined via separate analyses using operating margin, liquidity ratios, debt leverage 
ratios, LOS/patient discharges, and average payment period ratios.  Each tool reflects a 
different aspect of the organization.  These separate assessments should be reviewed, 
with a comprehension of how they interrelate, over one and five year periods to be 
assured of gaining both short and long-term perspectives of financial health. 
Cleverly (2004) states that, though total margin is an excellent indicator of a 
hospital’s ability to generate income, return on investment (ROI) [(gain on investment – 
cost of investment) ÷ cost of investment] is the most reliable overall measure of long 
term profitability because financial performance is measured in terms of invested capital.   
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Management’s comprehension of the level of fixed asset intensity within a service 
line is also critical, as the ―revenue production associated with that service allows an 
organization to make informed capital allocation decisions‖ (Cleverly 2004).  Capital 
planning is dependent upon addressing questions of how capital requirements affect 
required margins by specialty area, and the level of capital that will be needed for future 
investment.  Healthcare organizations that practice systematic capital planning are better 
able to judiciously invest in long term assets to modernize plant operations while 
skillfully negotiating the most favorable terms to finance improvements (HFMA 2004, 
Cleverly 2004, Shattuck Hammond 1997).  This practice generally results in a high 
TATL ratio that is sustained for many years. 
Financial ratios and margins are the best indicators (on paper) of financial 
performance, but it must be remembered that even they do not always provide a 
completely clear representation of financial health because they are indicators that must 
be extracted from financial statements.  For example, off-balance sheet (risks) liabilities 
are items not reported in the body of financial statements as a liability, but represent that 
the organization may be required to incur severe future financial implications.   Off-
balance sheet liabilities often include litigation, guarantees of future performance, and 
renegotiations of claims under a government contract (Siegel & Shim 1995, Plank & 
Plank 2000).   
There is no way to reflect off-balance sheet liabilities in ratios or margins and no 
way to account for them in this study.  Fortunately, substantial off-balance sheet 
liabilities are not frequent, and their presence in connection with certain hospitals should 
not affect overall findings. 
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Medicare is Not a Profitable Revenue Base? 
Factors most often cited in connection with poor hospital profitability are aging of 
plant facilities, hospital location in economically disadvantaged areas (Brown 2001, 
Younis & Forgione 2005), high debt (Vogel, Langland-Orban & Gapenski 1993), too few 
or too many beds (Kim, Glover & Stoskopf et al 2002), low patient occupancy 
(Langland-Orban & Gapenski 1996, Younis & Forgione 2005), high LOS (Younis 2004), 
and high percentages of uncompensated care and delinquent accounts (Brown 2001).   
In addition to the factors mentioned above, a number of studies will be cited in the 
next few paragraphs that indicate that high volumes of Medicare (and Medicaid) patients 
are a negative determinant of hospital profitability, hospital administrators and physicians 
bemoaning declining revenue due to Medicare’s prospective payment system (and the 
Balanced Budget Amendment of 1997).  
Younis & Forgione (2005), sampling not-for-profit short term community 
hospitals and using total profit margin (i.e., margins including non-operating revenue and 
expenses net of taxes and extraordinary items) as the measure of profitability, found that 
profitability is adversely affected by low occupancy, hospital location in poor 
neighborhoods, and high volumes of Medicare and Medicaid patients. 
Williams, Hadley & Pettingill (1992) found that hospital profitability was 
adversely related to rural location as well as a high percentage of Medicare patients, 
while it was positively associated with larger hospital size, larger community population, 
and high patient case mix.   
Carpenter & McCue (2001) noted that investors lack confidence in hospitals with 
greater dependencies on either Medicare or Medicaid reimbursement because these 
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hospitals are perceived as being vulnerable to political uncertainty and budgetary 
retrenchment. Investors also perceive high percentages of Medicaid patients to be 
concomitant with serving a disproportionate share of uncompensated care patients. 
Jantzen & Loubeau (2003), using a sample of hospitals in the United States that 
issued fixed rate bonds in 1995 and 1996, found that LOS was one of the factors of 
concern by investors because of Medicare’s PPS.  They were mindful that hospitals had 
to keep LOS in check to make a profit with Medicare.  
Clarke (1991) examined behaviors that diverge between ―high performance 
hospitals,‖ which Clarke defined with ROI in the upper 25 percent of all hospitals and 
―low-performance hospitals,‖ those with ROI’s in the lower 25 percent.  High 
performance hospitals were also identified as having significantly higher operating 
margins than low-performance hospitals, as well as better liquidity and newer plants and 
equipment.   
As part of his discussion Clarke conceded there are factors beyond management’s 
control which may contribute to poor financial performance. Clarke found that low 
performance hospitals had higher Medicare and Medicaid caseloads and tended to be 
located in more highly regulated states, which limits management’s flexibility.  
Conversely, Silverman, Skinner & Fisher (1999) shed light on Medicare as a 
potentially profitable revenue source.  They studied hospital conversions between 1989 
and 1995 and found that not-for-profits recently converted to investor owned status tend 
to be the most aggressive in seeking profit and cutting costs.  The study entailed an 
examination of total per-capita Medicare spending in areas served by for-profit and not-
for-profit hospitals, as well as for-profit hospitals that had recently been converted from 
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not-for-profit.  Medicare expenditures were examined in 208 areas where all hospitals (in 
these areas) remained under for-profit ownership (i.e., all beds in the area were in for-
profit hospitals), 2,860 areas where all hospitals remained under not-for-profit ownership 
(i.e., all beds in the area were in not-for-profit hospitals), and 33 areas where all hospitals 
had been converted from not-for-profit to for-profit ownership.   
Federal spending was defined as Medicare expenditures per area and included 
hospital services, physician services, home healthcare, and services at other facilities. 
Expenditures for each health service category were examined separately.  It was found 
that per-capita Medicare spending was greater among all health services categories in 
areas containing for-profit hospitals vs. areas containing not-for-profits.  It was also 
found that per-capita Medicare spending grew more rapidly in the 33 areas containing 
recently converted hospitals relative to the 2,860 areas containing not-for-profits. 
This is an important finding because it shows that recently converted hospitals 
had perhaps identified effective strategies to make a profit with Medicare.  Recently 
converted hospitals would likely need to identify profitable revenue sources, as 
ownership conversion requires restructuring of the organization to satisfy new 
shareholders and to begin meeting a new liability, the tax burden.   
It may not be Medicare (volumes of Medicare patients or a hospital’s percentage 
of Medicare revenue to total revenue) per se that contributes adversely to financial 
performance.  Instead it may be the types of DRG codes that are emphasized (utilized 
with greatest frequency) by hospitals under Medicare that contribute to high or low 
financial performance.   Gapenski, Vogel & Langland-Orban (1993) found that patient 
mix variables are very useful predictors of profitability.  They also found that higher 
 19 
hospital profitability is associated to a higher case-mix index (CMI) (i.e., average DRG 
weight for all hospitals’ Medicare volume) (Midwest Healthcare Coding, 2008) and 
Medicare mix (Langland-Orban, Gapenski & Vogel 1996). 
Good Management is the Strongest Determinant of Profitability 
Some researchers contend that payer mix is irrelevant, as it is good management 
and sound strategic direction that results in profitability and long-term financial health for 
hospitals.  These researchers explain that the determinants of hospital profitability include 
market factors, operational efficiency, patient demographics, patient occupancy, cost-
control, structure of the labor mix, LOS, hospital-physician relationships, and recent 
changes in federal and state legislation.     
Determinants of financial health associated with the physical structure of the 
hospital include geographic location, aging of plant and equipment, and economies of 
scale (numbers of beds).  In the context of plant and equipment, a primary determinant 
affecting a hospital’s long term financial viability and survival is the organization’s 
ability to generate capital to invest in new technologies and upgrade aging facilities.   
The ability to simultaneously manage and strategically negotiate these 
determinants of hospital profitability (and long-term viability) listed above reflect what 
most researchers identify as good management practices. 
Clarke’s (1991) study comparing high and low performance hospitals was just 
mentioned in the discussion on Medicare.  Although Clarke conceded that high volumes 
of Medicare and Medicaid patients and tight regulatory requirements hampered 
management’s effectiveness, there were some hospitals under these constraints that still 
performed well.   Clarke found that high performance hospitals used 15 percent fewer 
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labor hours per case (adjusted for case mix and outpatient volume) than low performance 
hospitals.  ―Because labor-related expenses represent more than 60 percent of all 
operating expenses for hospitals, labor usage is an important factor in financial 
performance‖ (Clarke 1991). 
Cleverly (2004) supports Clarke’s findings, stating that effective hospital 
management is the key to successful financial performance regardless of ownership, 
patient mix, financing sources, etc. He buttresses this position by citing that payment 
mechanisms do not differ materially between profitable and unprofitable hospitals, but 
financial performance is related entirely to hospitals’ ability to enhance efficiency and 
control costs.   
Explaining how hospitals with high numbers of Medicare patients remain 
financially healthy, Cleverly (2004) cited findings from a sample of 3,076 hospitals, 
including 971 teaching hospitals and 2,105 non-teaching hospitals.  Cleverly reports. 
―The high profit group has a cost structure that is 42 percent lower than for the low profit 
group on a relative weight adjusted basis.‖    
Cleverly’s position is that investor owned hospitals are generally more profitable 
than not-for-profits not due to ownership status per se, but because of more efficient 
operations and better strategic direction.  Investor owned hospitals are generally more 
aggressive in optimizing their labor force, eliminating unprofitable services, and tailoring 
their mix of services with the intent of realizing highest reimbursements at lowest 
treatment costs (Galloro 2004).  
Sear (1991) reported findings, consistent with Cleverly’s, in examining a sample 
of 50 investor owned and 60 not-for-profit hospitals in Florida between 1982 and 1988.  
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Sear found that wages per adjusted patient day and LOS were the most important factors 
in explaining why investor owned hospitals are more profitable.  
Garrison & Wayne (2008) found that ongoing data examination by management 
of LOS, especially severity adjusted LOS, and disciplined efforts to reduce LOS are 
among several characteristics associated with successful hospitals.  Schulman (2008) 
found that hospitals are more likely to have higher operating margins if they have shorter 
LOS, lower personnel cost percentages, and higher outpatient gross revenue percentages. 
Schulman described LOS as an ―indicator in containing inpatient services costs.‖ 
Schulman (2008) also found that investor owned hospitals financially out-
performed not-for-profits.  Between 2003 & 2007 operating margins ranged from 5.45 to 
8.87 for investor owned hospitals while not-for-profit margins ranged from -1.86 to 0.54.  
The difference in financial performance was attributed in part to investor owned hospitals 
incurring 20 percent less in personnel costs than not-for-profits.  Investor owned hospitals 
also had lower accounts receivable days and wrote-off delinquent debt more rapidly.  
Average LOS was also found to be slightly less in investor owned vs. not-for-profit 
hospitals. 
Profitability after Regulatory Changes 
Sear (2004) demonstrated that good management can often transcend legal and 
regulatory changes that affect revenue, such as the BBA’s effects on Medicare and 
Medicaid.  Using a sample of 25 acute care hospitals, Sear examined operating margins 
before and after passage of the BBA, between 1990 and 1997 and between 1998 and 
2001.  Certain hospitals with negative margins, ostensibly caused by BBA, actually had 
negative margins for the entire 12 year period, before and after BBA.   
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Other hospitals experienced cyclical margins moving higher and lower and not 
concomitant with BBA.  Still other hospitals maintained strong operating margins over 
the entire 12 year study period regardless of BBA.  ―These hospitals established 
management strategies, to adapt to changes in the reimbursement and expense 
environments.‖ Sear concludes. ―In the 25 Florida acute care hospitals, the percentage of 
operating revenue derived from Medicare does not account for a significant amount of 
the variance in average operating margins in the post-BBA period‖ (Sear 2004). 
Sear showed that poor operating margins could not be attributed to BBA, but to 
poor management before and after its passage.  Sound management, cost control, and 
strategic direction may be the most important determinants of profitability and may 
assure adaptation to changes in federal reimbursement and market structures. 
Managing Assets to Raise Capital & Assure Future Profitability  
As already mentioned, the outcome variable for Part 1 of this study is the TATL 
Ratio.  A high TATL ratio often reflects sound strategic direction for long term 
investments and covering of long term liabilities.  For long-term viability hospitals 
should define and estimate their future available capital capacity, prioritize capital 
spending, and their capital capacity analysis should dovetail with strategic financing 
issues.  This should result in a systematic strategy for deriving capital for long term 
investments such as upgrading plant and equipment and restructuring debt.   
Gapenski Vogel, Langland-Orban (1993), for example, found that aging of plant 
facilities as well as high debt were both negative determinants of profitability.  These 
negative determinants can be many times mitigated or reversed by methodical long-term 
capital planning. But for many hospitals long-term planning is not systematic.  Shattuck-
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Hammond (1997) reported that large sectors of the health care industry plan only for the 
annual budget, and long-term investments are based on management or board intuition.   
As discussed in more detail later in the literature review boards of directors in 
investor owned hospitals may engender an environment that is more conducive to long- 
term systematic corporate planning than not-for-profits.  It would not be surprising for an 
organization guided by decisions that have a factual basis and long-tem perspective to be 
financially stronger than one that is guided by ambiguity and visceral perception.  
Management & Strategic Direction in Initial Location Decisions 
Geographic location is described in the Research Methods sections (chapters 3-6) 
as an important control variable.  Previous studies have found an association between 
profitability and geographic location and have found that many hospitals located in more 
affluent areas are investor owned.   
Investor owned hospitals tend to comprise about 15 percent of the hospitals in 
most areas, and they tend to concentrate in the most desirable and potentially lucrative 
locations, resulting in the exclusion of economically disadvantaged patients (Brown 
2001).  These areas often include elevated densities of highly reimbursed physician 
specialties.  However, this does not imply there are differences in objectives among 
ownership types. Not-for-profits do not necessarily locate in economically disadvantaged 
areas because it is part of their organizational mission.  In fact, not-for-profits would 
more often locate in higher income areas if they could.  Investor owned hospitals are 
generally more likely to possess the ability to shift capital to higher income, new-growth 
communities with greater celerity than not-for-profit hospitals.   
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Investor owned hospitals are not always able to avoid poor neighborhoods, as 
location is driven by market dynamics.  The ability to shift capital and locate hospitals in 
upper income areas diminishes in the presence of increased spatial competition.   When 
investor-owned hospitals are late entering the market they may find rigid densities of 
competition already ensconced in wealthier areas, circumventing their ability to shift 
capital for geographic preference (Brown 2001). 
In Nashville, Tennessee, for example, because about half the hospitals are 
investor-owned, spatial competition forces certain investor owned hospitals to locate in 
poor areas. In fact, though most maternity patients covered under Medicaid and 
TennCare, Tennessee’s indigent care program, seek care from public hospitals, more of 
them seek care from investor owned hospitals than not-for-profits (Brown 2001).  
Hospital Ownership  
 As will be discussed in Chapter 3, hospital ownership is one of the most important 
variables in model development of this study.  Ownership is discussed in the context of 
profitability in several other places in the literature review.  But because ownership is an 
important variable in this study, a separate discussion is devoted to it in this subsection. 
In general, investor owned hospitals have higher operating margins and TATL 
ratios than their not-for-profit counterparts and tend to be represented across the 
continuum by more favorable financial indicators.  Investor owned hospitals also tend to 
be more capable in raising essential long-term capital which allows them to more 
effectively modernize facilities, invest in the most current medical technology, and 
restructure debt.  These long-term capital investments, in turn, help investor owned 
hospitals to maintain favorable financial performance indicators.   
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Securing Ongoing Capital 
Long term investments, which assures long-term sustained profitability can be 
financed by investor owned hospitals via contributed capital, often through public stock 
issuances (Smith 2002).  For example, Triad Hospitals, Inc. accumulated $85.4 million 
shares which yielded $189 million in net proceeds in connection with a stock offering in 
March 2005.  The net proceeds were used for capital expenditures for expansion of 
Triad’s facilities and services, development and potential acquisitions of new facilities, 
working capital, and repayment of indebtedness (Triad Hospitals, Inc., Supplement to 
Prospectus March 31, 2005). 
Not-for-Profit Hospitals’ Tax Exemption 
Not-for-profit hospitals cannot issue stock to raise capital, but they do have the 
benefit of a tax exemption that may at least partly balance their disadvantage of not being 
able to make stock offerings (Smith 2002).  It warrants mentioning that just like investor 
owned hospitals not-for-profits can raise large amounts of capital via taxable and tax-
exempt bond issuances, bank loans, philanthropy, joint ventures, etc.  
It should also be pointed out that the tax exemption available to not-for-profit 
hospitals includes federal income taxes, Florida corporation income taxes, state sales 
taxes, local property taxes, etc.  The federal, state, and local tax exemptions aggregated 
together represent a very large monetary amount. 
Some researchers argue that the benefits accruing to not-for-profits from a tax 
exemption are depleted because they must absorb higher levels of uncompensated care 
and Medicaid patients, and they offer needed community services that are not induced by 
a profit motive. Younis (2004) found that not-for-profit hospitals had longer LOS for 
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Medicare patients, but concluded that this enhanced the quality of care for these patients, 
which was consistent with a more benevolent organizational mission of not-for-profit 
hospitals. 
Herzlinger & Krasker (1987) reached a different conclusion regarding community 
service and charitable care objectives exercised by not-for-profits which presumably 
serves to drain them of their tax exemption advantage.  Herzlinger & Krasker explained 
that, not-for-profits, though they have the advantage of a tax exemption, do not return 
greater investments in community service.  Therefore, not-for-profits’ inability to 
financially perform as well as investor owned hospitals could not be explained by their 
expenditure of resources to benefit the community. 
Herzlinger & Krasker  expressed that a serious question arises when not-for-
profits behave like investor owned hospitals in terms of abandoning a community 
purpose or systematically reducing services to less profitable patients, such as Medicaid 
and uninsured patients.  If a not-for-profit behaves like an investor owned hospital in this 
context, why should the not-for-profit continue to enjoy the advantages of tax exemption?  
Wolfson & Hopes (1994) reported. ―A survey of financial data for FY 1992 of hospitals 
in South Central Florida reveals that almost all institutions benefited financially from 
their tax exempt status and provide relatively little charity care in return.‖ 
If these conclusions are accurate, that (some) not-for-profits generally do not 
provide public service benefits in exchange for their tax exemption, then it could be 
concluded that not-for-profits have a financial advantage over investor-owned hospitals.  
The tax exemption may indeed help to balance certain disadvantageous incurred by not-
for-profits relative to investor owned hospitals, such as the inability to issue stock. 
 27 
Perhaps certain factors such as the ability to issue stock does not fully account 
for why investor owned hospitals tend to outperform not-for-profits.  Cleverly (2004) has 
expressed that it is not ownership status but characteristics that are often associated with 
investor owned hospitals, greater efficiency and sound strategic direction, that make them 
more profitable.   Streamlined decision making allows investor owned hospitals to 
quickly shift capital when necessary, subsequently incurring less costs of capital for 
investments. This gives them the ability to raise sufficient capital to invest in plant and 
equipment modernizations, restructure debt, organize the case mix to offer procedures 
that maximize profitability, and to market the most current treatments and procedures 
made possible through advances in medical research. 
The Inurement Principle & Pressures from Governing Boards 
A fundamental reason investor owned hospitals generally are more profitable 
than their not-for-profit counterparts is because of inherent differences in how these 
organizations relate to their governing boards. 
Not-for-profits, though they are allowed to make a profit, are bound by the 
“inurement” doctrine which prohibits them from distributing net earnings for the benefit 
of private shareholders [(IRC Section 501 (c) (3)].  They are governed by voluntary 
boards with diverse constituencies, which generally results in protracted decision making 
and less incentive to aggressively optimize the labor force, eliminate unprofitable 
services, and tailor their mix of services with the intent of realizing highest 
reimbursements at lowest treatment costs (Galloro 2004, Smith 2002).  
Investor owned hospitals distribute a portion of their profits back to their 
shareholders which stimulates focus on the bottom line and pressure for management to 
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continually adapt to market forces and streamline operations (Smith 2002).  The 
motivations of corporate boards can sometimes place exacting and even unrealistic profit 
goals upon management which results in very efficient operations but also can lead to 
financial statement misrepresentation and gaming payment systems (ACFE 2005-06).  
Pressure to increase earnings may obscure the line in management’s perception between 
aggressively pursuing revenue goals and gaming Medicare.   
But not-for-profit hospitals sometime also feel the pressure from governing 
boards to improve financial and operational performance, and they often respond by 
emulating behaviors of investor owned hospitals.  Galloro (2004) reported that behavioral 
differences between not-for-profit and investor owned hospitals diminish when tax 
exempt hospitals are confronted with increasing competition.  Not-for-profits in the 
1990’s affected by increasing  investor owned hospital competition began mimicking 
investor owned behaviors with respect to cost control, labor utilization, service mix, and 
even the likelihood of upcoding to maximize reimbursement through the use of 
diagnostic coding. 
Findings by Silverman, Skinner & Fisher (1999), discussed in a previous section, 
showed that hospitals recently converted from not-for-profit to investor owned status 
were much more aggressive in seeking profit than not-for-profits or even other long-term 
investor owned hospitals.   Needleman, Lamphere  & Choilet (1999) found that hospitals, 
formerly public or not-for-profit, recently converted to investor owned status tend to be 
the most aggressive in reducing uncompensated care, even more aggressive than hospitals 
that have been investor owned for a long time. 
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This shows that inherent behavioral differences between investor owned and not-
for-profit hospitals do not originate with ownership status per se but with the objectives 
of governing boards, rising competition, and how hospital administration is expected to 
respond to changes in hospital structure, healthcare markets, and the bottom line. 
Does Good Management Fully Explain Inordinately High Profitability  
There is no doubt that findings reported by researchers in the previous sections of 
this chapter regarding the association between profitability and good management are 
accurate.  Organizations that can be quickly and decisively aligned to changes in market 
and regulatory environments will be more profitable than hospitals without these 
characteristics, and more favorable measures of financial performance for well managed 
hospitals should be expected.   It should be anticipated that the ability to restructure debt 
and finance facility and equipment modernizations should result in long-term financial 
health and viability.  
The question is does good management alone account for financial indicators 
such as operating margins and TATL ratios being as inordinately high for certain investor 
owned hospitals as those described in the problem statement.  At what point does 
efficiency begin to encounter diminishing returns in its contribution to high profitability?  
Even if a hospital’s financial condition is made stronger by reductions in personnel or 
LOS, for example, there is a floor whereby certain resources cannot be reduced any 
further.  There may also be a ceiling of which financial indicators cannot climb beyond 
due only to sound management practices and fiscal discipline. 
Operating margins and TATL ratios that are higher than what would be 
explainable by good management may be due to gaming payment systems, either by 
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artificially increasing codes or charges and/or by driving up volumes of profitable 
procedures. But how prevalent is gaming in healthcare and how surprising should it be if 
gaming strategies are partly responsible for financial health in some hospitals?  The 
following two sections address these questions by providing a historical overview of 
healthcare fraud from academic and trade literature and real-world prosecutions.  
Investor-Owned Hospitals’ Propensity for Gaming Medicare 
Investor-owned hospitals have reportedly carried out gaming behaviors with 
greater frequency and at more egregious levels than not-for-profits.  Investor owned 
hospitals may be more aggressive or proficient in gaming payment systems than not-for-
profits in the hospital industry, and historically they have been particularly bold in 
gaming Medicare. 
This section provides an overview from studies done by Silverman & Skinner 
(2001) and Dafny (2003) on gaming procedures and payment systems in the context of 
investor owned hospitals. 
Silverman & Skinner  found that investor owned hospitals are more profitable 
than not-for-profits, but the greatest difference between the two was that investor owned 
hospitals were generally more involved in the shifting of patients’ DRG codes to those 
that yield higher reimbursements from the Medicare system, i.e., upcoding.  
Silverman & Skinner also cite a history of lawsuits in connection with upcoding 
against hospitals and hospital chains, explaining that these gaming behaviors provide a 
―valuable window for understanding how for-profit and non-profit hospitals make 
tradeoffs between pecuniary benefits and reputational or penalty costs‖ (Silverman & 
Skinner 2001). 
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Silverman & Skinner’s study focused on hospital admissions involving 
pneumonia and respiratory infections. These two diagnostic categories are often difficult 
to distinguish from each other, but a diagnosis for respiratory infection at that time paid 
about $2,000 more to the hospital.  Between 1989 and 1996, the incidence of the most 
expensive DRG codes for pneumonia and respiratory infection increased by ten percent 
among stable non-profit hospitals. Conversely, this same diagnosis increased by 23% 
among stable investor owned hospitals and rose by 37% for hospitals, formerly not-for-
profit that had been converted to investor owned status.  There was also evidence that 
not-for-profit hospitals operating in heavily investor owned markets were almost as likely 
to upcode as were investor owned hospitals. 
Silverman & Skinner conclude their discussion by stating that after 1996, the 
upcoding index had dropped significantly in response to adverse publicity and lawsuits.  
Nevertheless, other lucrative gaming strategies would likely evolve.  
Dafny (2003) examined a 20% sample of all hospitalizations of Medicare 
enrollees from the 1985-1991 Medicare Provider Analysis and Review data to assess 
responses by hospitals to relative price changes under Medicare PPS and other public and 
private insurers. 
Studies before Dafny’s had been unable to isolate price change responses because 
changes in reimbursement amounts are typically what Dafny defined as ―endogenous: 
adjusted to reflect changes in hospital costs.‖  Dafny ―exploited an exogenous 1988 
policy change that generated large price changes for 43 percent of all Medicare 
admissions.‖  This exogenous policy change involved the recalibration of DRG prices to 
eliminate age as a criterion as part of certain diagnostic categories.  
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At the time of Dafny’s study, about forty percent of DRG codes were paired for 
each diagnosis. For example, cardiac arrhythmia would have one code for patients aged 
70 and above, or with complications, and a second code was used for patients under 70 
without complications. Dafny’s findings suggested that costs for patients without 
complications were similar, regardless of age.  Dafny then recalibrated DRG prices to 
eliminate age as a criterion for data beyond 1988.  This resulted in an average 11 percent 
increase in DRG prices for the top codes in each pair (those with complications) and an 
average six percent decrease in DRG prices for the bottom codes.  
Dafny found that hospitals responded to these price changes by upcoding patients 
to diagnostic codes associated with larger reimbursements, resulting in an estimated 
additional reimbursement of $330-$425 million annually.  This response to price 
changes, as reported by Dafny, was sophisticated, with more upcoding in DRG codes 
where the spread between top and bottom codes had increased the greatest.  
Dafny also emphasized that responses to price changes were particularly strong 
among investor owned hospitals. With the exception of elective diagnoses, Dafny found 
―little evidence that hospitals increased the intensity of care in diagnoses subject to price 
increases, where intensity is measured by total costs, length of stay, number of surgical 
procedures, and number of intensive-care-unit days.‖ Hospitals also did not increase the 
volume of patients admitted to more remunerative diagnoses, notwithstanding the strong 
a priori expectation that such a response should prevail in fixed-price settings.  
Dafny concluded that hospitals, particularly investor owned, do not alter their 
treatment or admissions policies based on diagnostic-specific prices. Instead they employ 
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sophisticated coding strategies in order to maximize total reimbursement. It was 
concluded from this study that changes in DRG levels were unrelated to changes in costs.   
Prevalence of Health Care Fraud 
Uncovering gaming behavior in healthcare is not isolated to a few academic studies 
such as Silverman & Skinner’s and Dafny’s, as historically these behaviors cover the 
gamut of the health care industry.  According to a 1993 survey by the Health Insurance 
Association of America (CMS, September 2004) fraudulent activities in health care break 
down as follows in Table 1. 
Table 1 
Distribution of Fraudulent Activities in Healthcare, 1993 
Fraudulent Activity  Percentage 
Fraudulent Diagnosis  43% 
Billing for Services Not Rendered 34% 
False Reporting of Patient Deductibles and Co-Payments  21% 
Other  2% 
Source:  CMS, 2004 
   
Specifically for Medicare, CMS (September 2004) and Benson (2005) identified the 
most common forms of fraud which include: 
 Billing for services not furnished (or not furnished as billed – upcoding) 
 Misrepresenting the diagnosis to justify payment 
 Soliciting, offering, or receiving a kickback 
 Unbundling or ―exploding‖ charges 
 Carrying out plans of treatment and falsifying medical records to justify payment  
 Fraudulent cost reports 
 Kickbacks and self referrals 
 Grant or research fraud 
 
The following paragraphs present only a few cases of the numerous prosecutions each 
year, showing the magnitude of tax dollars lost for healthcare organizations caught 
gaming Medicare. 
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The U.S. Department of Health & Human Service’s Office of the Inspector General 
(OIG) reported on February 11, 2004 that under a settlement agreement Greenville, SC 
based St. Francis Hospital, Inc., agreed to pay almost $9.5 million to resolve Medicare 
improprieties from 1997-1999 in its home health, hospice, and durable medical 
equipment programs.  This represented one of the largest OIG settlements obtained under 
the Self-Disclosure Protocol (Compliance Monitor, February 18, 2004).  
The OIG and United States Attorney for the District of Maryland (HHS OIG 
February 14, 2003) reported a settlement agreement with John’s Hopkins University to 
resolve charges of fraudulent Medicare billings.  The settlement resolved a federal 
investigation under the False Claims Act (31 USC § 3729-3733) arising from alleged 
false and improper billings for services of teaching physicians to Medicare beneficiaries 
covering calendar year 1994 (HHS OIG February 14, 2003).    
In December 2000, HCA (formerly known as Columbia HCA), the largest investor 
owned hospital chain in the United States, pled guilty to criminal conduct and agreed to 
pay more than $840 million in criminal fines, civil penalties and damages for unlawful 
billing practices. Of this amount, $731,400,000 was recovered under the False Claims 
Act.  Under the settlement agreement, HCA's payment was to resolve several allegations 
regarding the manner in which it billed the federal government and certain states for 
health care costs (DOJ, December 14, 2000). 
The settlement for HCA was designed to resolve allegations for billing for lab  
tests that were medically unnecessary and not ordered by physicians, upcoding  patients’ 
medical problems in order to get higher reimbursements, billing Medicare for advertising 
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under the guise of "community education," and billing the federal government for non-
reimbursable costs incurred in the purchase of home health agencies around the country  
(DOJ, December 14, 2000). 
Other allegations for HCA were not resolved by the settlement which included 
HCA unlawfully charging the federal government costs for operating its hospitals and 
paying kickbacks to physicians to get Medicare and Medicaid business (DOJ, December 
14, 2000). 
Tenet’s Billing and Medical Malfeasance 
Cases of billing fraud, financial statement misrepresentation, defalcation, 
kickbacks, corruption, etc. have been shown to be abundant in the healthcare industry.  
But far more sinister types of fraud have also occurred which have had negative effects 
on patients’ lives in addition to over-billing payment systems (HHS OIG December 11, 
2006, DOJ May 17, 2004). 
On Oct. 31, 2002 Tenet Healthcare Corp., then the nation’s second largest 
investor owned hospital chain, disclosed that federal prosecutors were investigating 
allegations that two doctors at Tenet subsidiary Redding Medical Center in Redding, CA, 
conducted unnecessary heart procedures and billed falsely for them.   Later it was found 
that Tenet had been charged with medical malfeasance affecting at least 750 former 
patients, primarily recipients of CABG surgeries, valve replacements, and 
catheterizations, who subsequently pursued litigation for medical malpractice and fraud.   
Tenet’s actions resulted in Tenet divesting itself of most of its hospitals and 
healthcare entities and encountering legal damages that could amount to settlements in 
excess of $50 Million (DOJ May 17, 2004).  Tenet’s stock also went down by $20 (from 
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$49.31 down to $28.75 per share) on the trading day the information was released, 
representing a decline in market value greater than $10 billion (Darmiento 2002). 
It was also discovered in connection with allegations of unnecessary surgery that 
Tenet’s Medicare outlier payments were at much higher levels than those of its 
competitors. It was estimated that outlier payments comprised 16.7% or $418 million of 
Tenet’s total Medicare reimbursements for the year ended September 30, 2002.    
It was also found that Tenet inflated its prices to be able to claim larger outlier 
payments from Medicare, similar large "stop-loss" payments from managed care 
companies, and extra payments from Workers Compensation, DSH, and Medicaid. ―Its 
dramatic financial recovery from a low at the end of 1999, to a market darling in October 
2002, was largely due to a massive increase in these outlier, stop loss and related 
payments. Outlier and stop loss rates were 23%-26% in Tenet hospitals compared with an 
average of 3%-5% in other hospitals‖ (Middleton, 2002). 
The behavior of the managers and physicians at Redding may have been an example 
of possible inducements to carry out unnecessary invasive surgeries in order to adhere to 
exacting and unrealistic revenue projections, which are sometimes characteristic of 
investor owned hospitals.  Aggressive earnings goals motivate streamlined efficiency and 
sound financial policy which strengthen the hospital’s financial health without 
endangering patients.  But goals that are so high they are unrealistic can induce 
management to cross the line from an emphasis on productivity to behaviors that are 
unethical, even illegal, and dangerous to patients. 
Tenet’s problems were not just confined to California.  In 2005 the Florida Attorney 
General sued Tenet claiming it had repeatedly gamed and overcharged Medicare, inflated 
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its hospitals prices, and seriously abused the Medicare outlier program.  It was reported 
that Tenet’s actions violated Florida’s Racketeer Influenced Corrupt Organizations 
(RICO) Act (Davis 2005).  
Discretionary Versus Nondiscretionary Procedures 
Why did Tenet use CABG, valve replacements, and catheterizations as the most 
frequent procedures for gaming Medicare’s payment system?   Why not use another type 
of procedure to game such as organ transplantation, tracheotomies, craniotomies, or 
treatments for burn patients? The rationale for gaming patient volumes and payment 
systems using CABG, valve replacements, and catheterizations was their discretionary 
nature.  Perhaps gaming activities that include the performance of unnecessary medical 
procedures are carried out more easily when these procedures are discretionary. 
A discretionary procedure is subject to physician judgment and is not uniformly 
prescribed for all patients with the same condition.  ―The more scientific uncertainly there 
is about the usefulness of a procedure, the more likely it is that there will be substantial 
professional disagreement about its use.  Some physicians will be strongly in favor of 
using the procedure and others will be far less enthusiastic in their endorsement of 
surgery as a treatment choice‖ (Dartmouth 1999). 
Rates of performance for nondiscretionary procedures tend to be fairly uniform 
per 1,000 Medicare enrollees across geographic boundaries, mirroring rates of disease 
rather than medical practice style.  But the rates of performance for discretionary 
procedures show wide geographic variability with less or sometimes little association to 
disease rates.  Sometimes whether or not a patient has a particular procedure may depend 
on where treatment is sought for a given set of symptoms.  A male diagnosed with early 
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stage prostate cancer in one part of Florida could likely wind up having a radical 
prostatectomy, but if this same patient had sought treatment in another part of Florida 
other remedies, including ―watchful waiting,‖ may have been prescribed with far less 
likelihood of radical surgery (Dartmouth 1999, Luther & Studnicki 2003). 
Perhaps it is unfair and unfounded to conclude that discretionary procedures are 
unnecessary because they occur in geographic areas where rates of these procedures are 
high.  But it does invoke questions, for example, when per capita rates for certain 
discretionary procedures are much higher in certain Florida cities, counties, or hospital 
referral regions (HRR) relative to the state average (Weinstein, Bronner, Morgan et al 
2004, Weinstein, Lurie, Olson, et al 2006, Dartmouth 2005).  
 A discussion of discretionary versus nondiscretionary procedures follows in the 
next few paragraphs.  Distinctions between these two types of procedures are very 
important, as they lay down the theoretical basis to determine the DRG codes that are 
susceptible to gaming and will be chosen as potential variables in the Research Methods 
section (Chapter 3).   
Nondiscretionary Procedures 
If discretionary procedures are subject to physician discretion and carried out with 
per-capita geographic variability (Dartmouth 1999), then it is reasonable to assume that a 
nondiscretionary procedure would be less subject to physician discretion. Less physician 
discretion should then be reflected in per-capita rates with much more geographic 
uniformity (Dartmouth 1999).   For example, a patient with colon cancer in Phoenix, AR 
is likely to receive the same surgical approach as a patient with the same condition in 
Tampa, FL given the type and level of progression of the disease is the same. 
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Later in the Review of the Literature a number of medical procedures are 
discussed that are cited often in the literature as discretionary.  Listed below are just a 
few procedures that are never defined as discretionary in the literature.  These procedures 
were selected by the author based on their nondiscretionary nature to demonstrate a 
contrast between discretionary and non-discretionary procedures.  A brief discussion of 
each of these nondiscretionary procedures may give insights as to why they may be less 
profitable and why they would be less subject to gaming. 
Heart transplantation (DRG 103), along with many other types of transplantation 
(e.g., lung, pancreas, bone marrow, etc.), usually follows a long adverse medical history 
accompanied by the patient waiting for a donor. Although heart and other 
transplantations are highly reimbursed Medicare procedures (CMS 2004), they are often 
associated with factors such as costly post-operative complications that make them less 
profitable.  
“Full Thickness Burn with Skin Graft (DRG 506)‖ is a procedure of which there 
is absolute scientific agreement on its application, and the procedure is used for patients 
uniformly who have suffered burns of similar severity.  But hospitals do not routinely 
profit from burn procedures, as patient care and general operation of a burn facility are 
very cost intensive. 
“Tracheostomy  (tracheotomy) with Mechanical Ventilation 96+Hours for Face, 
Mouth & Neck Diagnosis” (DRG 483) is a highly reimbursed DRG, but this procedure is 
carried out with little margin for miscalculation or medical opinion, is done usually in 
connection with end-of-life care, and is associated with high treatment costs.   
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Discretionary Procedures & Efficacy of Alternative Treatments  
Several discretionary procedures are described in the next few paragraphs with 
discussions regarding perceptions by some physicians that alternative treatments, often 
less invasive, may sometimes be preferable. 
Life Expectancy for CABG Patients vs. Those Who Do Not Elect CABG  
After more than 20 years of clinical trials and health outcomes research, it has 
been found that there is no difference in life expectancy for patients electing as opposed 
to not electing CABG surgery.  CABG does not provide greater life expectancy, though 
that may be the perception of many CABG patients as well as the public.    For many 
patients CABG is recommended to improve angina symptoms, better breathing capacity, 
and generally better quality of life, and the decision for surgery is presumably based on 
physician opinion and patient preference.  But the variation in rates of CABG across 
geographic regions suggests that physicians may have different symptom thresholds for 
recommending surgery and may not interpret patient preferences in a uniform manner 
(Luther & Studnicky 2003).  
Mastectomy vs. Lumpectomy 
As of early 2000 despite evidence that the survival rate is identical for breast 
sparing surgery (lumpectomy) and for mastectomy, there continued to be wide variation 
in surgical rates indicating that perhaps surgery was based more on practice patterns and 
physician preference instead of disease incidence and preferences of patients. 
In some cases, patients may choose traditional mastectomy over breast conserving 
therapy (BCT) due to fears of radiation therapy, especially when radiation oncology 
counseling is not offered in connection with treatment options.  It has also been found 
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that BCT rates have been highest in hospitals with radiation oncology facilities on the 
hospital grounds (Elward, Penberthy, Bear et al 1998).  The use of BCT decreases when 
the patient must be sent to an outside facility for radiation treatment.  In other words, 
certain patients may have been advised to forego BCT for more radical surgery because 
of medical logistics as opposed to disease status. 
Benign Prostatic Hyperplasia (BPH) & Radical Prostatectomy 
Although prostatectomy has been shown to improve urinary symptoms, slightly 
more effective than pharmaceutical regimens, the surgery is accompanied by significant 
risk of side effects including retrograde ejaculation and a small risk of incontinence.  
There are striking geographic variations in rates for this procedure which indicate 
differing medical opinions among physicians concerning the necessity and benefits of 
surgery.   
Widespread accessibility of prostate cancer screening has disclosed many early 
stage cancers especially among older males. Efficacy of different treatment regimens has 
not been established, but side effects, incontinence and impotence have been well 
established for surgery and radiation.  Many patients, when informed of the alternatives, 
may elect to avoid the harmful side effects and forego the possibility that active treatment 
may be more effective. 
Joint Replacement & Revision 
The prevalence of joint replacement and revision (i.e., surgical replacement of an 
artificial worn-out joint) for degeneration of the knee joint has shown high degrees of 
variation even among neighboring regions.  Elderly people experience joint stiffness and 
pain due to osteoarthritis (i.e., chronic deterioration of joint surfaces).  Most physicians 
 42 
agree that joint replacement or revision is effective for improving patients’ ability to 
function, though clinical trial findings are still limited to support this, and the risks and 
side effects associated with this type of surgery have been well established and include 
post-operative infection and mortality, prosthesis related complications, and long periods 
of rehabilitation and recovery.  Also, joint revisions are more complex than replacements 
with less predictable results. 
It is likely that differences in joint replacement rates are driven by physicians’ 
assessments of the risks and potential benefits of this type of surgery.  These assessments 
are likely driven by the level of pain and difficulty in functioning communicated to the 
physician by the patient. 
Back Surgery 
Many patients experience back pain due to spinal stenosis or herniated discs, 
though the precise cause for some patients is never fully established.  There is evidence 
that back surgery results in immediate improvement, but there is much disagreement 
among researchers about the long term benefits of back surgery, chiefly because there is 
little research on the natural history of these conditions treated without surgery.  As with 
knee replacement, back surgery may be driven by physician preference as well as 
perception of the patient’s level of pain and ability to function. 
Geographic Variability of Discretionary Procedures 
Dartmouth (2003) identified wide geographic variability in connection with the 
discretionary procedures just discussed.  Table 2 below shows minimum and maximum 
rates for each procedure between states in the nation and cities in Florida.   
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Table 2 
Range of Rates of Discretionary Procedures Per 1,000 Medicare Enrollees, Highest 
& Lowest State Rates in US and Highest & Lowest City Rates in Florida, 1999 
 
Procedures 
Minimum & Maximum Rates of  
Procedure per 1,000 Medicare Enrollees 
 States in US Cities in Florida 
Coronary Artery Bypass Grafting 3.1 – 11.3 5.4 - 9.5 
Mastectomy for Breast Cancer 0.8 – 3.3 0.9 - 2.7 
Surgery for Benign Prostatic Hyperplasia  2.6 – 14.6 2.9 - 10.1 
Joint Replacement for Degeneration of the Knee 
Joint 
1.6 – 10.0 3.7 - 7.1 
Surgery for Back Pain (including spinal fusion) 
 
1.3 – 9.0 2.7 - 7.1 
Radical Prostatectomy for Prostate Cancer 
 
0.5 – 5.0 0.8 - 3.9 
 Source: Dartmouth, www.dartmouthatlas.org  
 
Table 2 shows CABG, BPH, knee joint replacement, and back pain surgery each 
with a large range between the lowest and highest rates, both for Florida and the United 
States.  BPH shows a very wide range of seven points (10.1-2.9) for Florida with a range 
of 12 points (14.6-2.6) for the nation.  CABG and back pain surgery for Florida show 
ranges > 4 points, respectively 9.5-5.4 and 7.1-2.7 and > 3, respectively, 7.1-3.7 & 3.9-
0.8, for joint replacement and radical prostatectomy.  The national ranges for these 
procedures are even much broader.  
Medicare Rates for Certain Short-Term Inpatient Hospital Stays in Florida, 2005 
Table 2 provided examples of geographic variability for procedures carried out 
per 1,000 Medicare enrollees in Florida and the United States in 1999.  Figures 1-3 
provide 2005 data per 1,000 Medicare enrollees for percutaneous coronary intervention 
(PCI), knee replacement, and back surgery.  Each of these figures depicts the broad 
variation between HRRs in Florida in carrying out these procedures. 
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Figure 1 showing PCI procedures per 1,000 Medicare enrollees per HRR is shown 
below. 
PCI Discharges per 1,000 Medicare Enrollees
All Florida Hospital Referral Regions, 2005
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Figure 1 
Source: 2005 Dartmouth Surgical Discharges, www.dartmouthatlas.org  
 
The horizontal dashed line on the chart represents the mean average rate of 12.67 
of PCI procedures for all 18 Florida HRRs.  The figure shows much variation around the 
mean with a standard deviation of 2.75 and range of 8.44 (17.94 – 9.50). 
According to Figure 1 Miami has the lowest number of PCI procedures per 1,000 
Medicare enrollees. This low rate in Miami is not exclusive to PCI, but is also shown for 
back surgery and knee replacements shown in figures 2 & 3.  Close to Miami in low rates 
of PCI, also shown in Figure 1, are Ormond Beach and Tallahassee with rates at 9.60 and 
9.57 per 1,000 Medicare enrollees. 
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 As will be seen in Table 4 shown in a subsequent section, Miami has the highest 
dollar figure in Florida for Medicare reimbursements per Medicare enrollee for short-
term inpatient discharges as well as for total Medicare spending.  Yet it has the lowest 
number of overall surgical discharges per 1,000 Medicare enrollees in Florida, 2005 
(Dartmouth Surgical Discharges, 2005).   
 Ocala and Clearwater show the highest numbers of PCI in Figure 1 with more 
than 17 per 1,000 Medicare enrollees. Gainesville and Panama City show over 15.   
  Figure 2 shows discharges for knee replacements by HRR per 1,000 Medicare 
enrollees, 2005.   
Discharges for Knee Replacement per 1,000 Medicare 
Enrollees, All Florida Hospital Referral Regions, 2005
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Figure 2 
Source: 2005 Dartmouth Surgical Discharges, www.dartmouthatlas.org  
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The horizontal dashed line shown in Figure 2 represents mean average knee 
procedures of 8.14 for all 18 Florida HRRs per 1,000 Medicare enrollees.  With a mean 
of 8.14 there is a broad range of 6.26 (11.14 – 4.88).   
As depicted in Figure 2, Miami again shows the lowest rate at 4.88 for knee 
replacements with the highest rate at 11.14 in Fort Myers.  The assorted heights of the 
histogram show the broad variation around the mean in the performance of knee 
replacements between HRRs in Florida. 
A similar scenario is shown in Figure 3 which shows back surgery per 1,000 
Medicare enrollees for each Florida HRR, 2005.  Again there is a broad range of rates 
reflecting dissimilar practice patterns for back surgery between HRRs.  
Discharges for Back Surgery per 1,000 Medicare Enrollees, 
All Florida Hospital Referral Regions, 2005
6
.7
0
4
.7
2
4
.0
0
6
.9
9
6
.1
3
3
.2
3 3
.6
7
2
.7
1
2
.4
2
6
.6
5
4
.6
8
4
.5
1 5
.3
8 6
.1
3
6
.3
6
3
.7
9 4
.5
1
3
.5
2
-
1.00
2.00
3.00
4.00
5.00
6.00
7.00
8.00
B
ra
d
en
to
n
C
le
ar
w
at
er
F
o
rt
 L
au
d
F
o
rt
 M
y
er
s
G
ai
n
es
v
il
le
H
u
d
so
n
Ja
ck
so
n
v
il
le
L
ak
el
an
d
M
ia
m
i
O
ca
la
O
rl
an
d
o
O
rm
o
n
d
 B
ch
P
an
am
a 
C
it
y
P
en
sa
co
la
S
ar
as
o
ta
S
t 
P
et
e
T
al
la
h
as
se
e
T
am
p
a
 
Figure 3 
Source: 2005 Dartmouth Surgical Discharges, www.dartmouthatlas.org  
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 As with figures 1&2, the horizontal dashed line on Figure 3 represents the mean 
average of 4.78 for back surgery discharges for all Florida HRRs per 1,000 Medicare 
enrollees.  There is also a broad range for back surgery discharges of 4.57 (6.99 – 2.42). 
Miami shows the lowest rate of back surgeries per 1,000 Medicare enrollees with 
2.42.  Lakeland is slightly higher with 2.71.  At the other end of the spectrum are Fort 
Myers, Bradenton, Ocala, and Sarasota respectively with 6.99, 6.70, 6.65, and 6.36. 
Broad differences in practice patterns are observed in figures 1-3 for PCI, knee 
replacement, and back surgery.  The final section in the literature review’s (Chapter 2) 
discussion on geographic variation of discretionary procedures features Wennberg’s 
(2005) surgical signature theory.  The signature theory is introduced as a potential 
explanation of geographic disparities in medical practice patterns in the performance of 
certain types of discretionary procedures. 
Further Literature Findings of Geographic Variation of Discretionary Procedures 
In 1999, a Dartmouth report (Dartmouth Atlas Quick Report for Florida – 
Discretionary Surgery, 1999) identified several procedures as discretionary based on 
criteria of scientific uncertainty and geographic variability.  These procedures include 
CABG, mastectomy, BPH, joint replacement for degeneration of the knee joint, surgery 
for back pain, endarterectomy for carotid artery disease, lower extremety bypass surgery, 
and radical prostatectomy for prostate cancer.  These procedures and a few others are 
shown in Appendix 1, and they will be used in subsequent phases of the analysis.  
A subsequent Dartmouth report (Studies of Surgical Variation: Cardiac Surgery 
Report 2005) defined certain cardiac procedures as discretionary, again based on grounds 
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of clinical uncertainty and geographic disparity.  These procedures included CABG, 
aortic and mitral valve replacements, and PCI. 
Wennberg, Brownlee, Fisher et al (2008) identified ―ten common conditions with 
widely varying use of discretionary surgery.‖  These include early stage cancer of the 
prostate, enlarged prostate, early stage cancer of the breast, osteoarthritis of the knee, 
osteoarthritis of the hip, osteoarthritis of the spine, chest pain due to coronary artery 
disease, stroke threat from carotid artery disease, ischemia due to peripheral artery 
disease, and gall stones. 
Birkmeyer, Sharp, Finlayson, et al (1998) partially support Dartmouth’s findings 
in Florida using 1995 hospital patient discharge data for Medicare patients, aged 65-99 
years, to test variability of surgical rates across national HRRs.  It was found that rates of 
―hip fracture repair, resection for colorectal cancer, and cholecystectomy‖ showed low 
variability, only 1.9-2.9-fold across HRRs.  CABG, transurethral prostatectomy, 
mastectomy, and total hip replacement had ―intermediate variation profiles, varying 3.5-
4.7-fold across regions.‖ Lower extremity revascularization, carotid endarterectomy, back 
surgery, and radical prostatectomy had the ―highest variation profiles, varying 6.5-10.1-
fold across HRRs.‖ 
The American College of Physicians (2001) also found low regional variation 
with treatments for hip fractures and colectomies.  In contrast, regional rates of CABG, 
back surgery, radical prostatectomy, and peripheral angioplasty showed high variability.    
Fisher, Goodman, Skinner et al (2009) reported that Medicare spending in 2006 
varied more than threefold across national HRRs.  ―Research has shown that some of the 
variation is due to differences in the prices paid for similar services, and some is due to 
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differences in illness; but even after accounting for these factors, twofold differences 
remain.  In other words, the differences in spending are almost entirely explained by 
differences in the volume of health care services received by similar patients.‖ 
Tenet’s Choice of Discretionary Procedures 
Tenet’s choice of procedures for gaming is consistent with the types of 
discretionary surgeries described earlier by Wennberg (2008) and Dartmouth (2005) 
which have included CABG, valve replacements and catheterizations.  Catheterizations 
include coronary angiography, coronary arteriography, and PCI (American Heart 
Association 2009). 
Weinstein, Lurie, Olson et al (2006) identified hip replacement, lumbar 
discectomy/laminectomy and lumbar fusion as discretionary based on a lack of scientific 
consensus and unwarranted geographic variations.  But they stated the ―rates of spine 
surgery are among the most variable of all surgeries.  The underlying causes of 
international and regional variations found in rates of spine surgery include lack of 
scientific evidence, financial incentives and disincentives to surgical intervention, and 
differences in clinical training and professional opinion.‖ 
 Burns, Moskowitz, Ash et al (1997) studied geographic variations in the 
performance of hip procedures in Houston, Pittsburg, and Minneapolis.  They found 
―despite an absence of evidence supporting its appropriateness and a much higher cost, 
hip replacement is used to treat non-displaced fractures much more frequently in Houston 
and Pittsburgh than in Minneapolis.‖ 
Among heart procedures discussed in this study pacemaker implants and 
implantable cardioverter defibrillators (ICD) appear to have the greatest medical 
 50 
consensus regarding efficacy.  But geographic variations were still found with these 
procedures the determinants of which were economic and demographic factors 
(Ovsyshcher & Furman 2003).  Essentially, pacemaker implants were less likely to occur 
among patients residing in economically disadvantaged communities. 
Carlisle, Valdez, Shapiro et al (1995) examined geographic variations in Los 
Angeles, CA for CABG, carotid endarterectomy, hysterectomy, artery angioplasty, 
permanent pacemaker insertion, mastectomy, and transurethral prostate resection 
(TURP).  Large geographic variation was found for all cardiac procedures with the 
exception of pacemaker implants.  In fact, out of all procedures studied, pacemaker 
implants and hysterectomies had the smallest geographic variation, though even these 
procedures showed variation with respect to race and ethnicity and socioeconomic status. 
Spencer, Fung, Wang et al (2004) investigated a sample of 16,352 cases from 
Veteran’s Affairs Central Cancer Registry that were diagnosed between 1997 and 1999 
with stage I or II prostate cancer.  They found that patients (veterans) in the western part 
of the U.S. had a higher likelihood of undergoing surgery than radiation compared to the 
northeast, south, or Midwest.  They also found that African American men with lower 
grade and higher stage tumors as well as unmarried men of all races were more likely to 
undergo radiation rather than curative treatment or surgery. 
 The discussion in the Research Methods section (Chapter 3) will show that many 
of the discretionary procedures discussed above are a good theoretical starting point for 
selecting DRG codes as variables that contribute to hospital profitability and may be 
subject to gaming.  
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The Effects of Geographic Disparities in Medicare Spending 
 
 It is plausible that Medicare spending would be roughly similar per capita 
between regions accounting for differences with respect to health status, age, etc. But 
Medicare spending is as geographically variable as volumes of discretionary procedures. 
After adjusting for clinical, demographic, hospital, and regional characteristics 
Cowper, DeLong, Peterson et al (1997) found wide variability among states in patient-
level cost and LOS for CABG surgery.   They suggest there is no association between 
higher medical costs and lower rates of readmission or mortality.  
Fisher, Wennberg, Stukel et al (2003) have noted that Medicare spending 
increases in areas with high rates of discretionary procedures.  But they conclude. 
―Medicare enrollees in higher-spending regions receive more care than those in lower-
spending regions but do not have better health outcomes or satisfaction with care.‖  
Dartmouth (1999) concluded that differences in Medicare spending cannot be 
explained by ―local differences in population age, sex, race, illness or prices. In fact, 
adjustment for these factors has almost no effect on the range of variation in Medicare 
spending‖ (Dartmouth 1999). 
Higher Medicare spending in certain areas, and more specifically for certain 
hospitals, induced by profitable DRG codes results in higher total revenue for a hospital.   
If these DRG codes represent highly reimbursed discretionary procedures then the direct 
effect is inordinate Medicare spending when perhaps more affordable alternatives are 
available, as well as subjecting patients to procedures, often more invasive, that may not 
be in their best interest.  But the effect for the hospital, whether intentional or inadvertent, 
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is greater operating revenue, which will, in turn, increase profitability, all other things 
being equal. 
Baicker & Chandra (2004) found that geographic disparities for Medicare 
spending are correlated with the number of practicing physicians in different areas of the 
country.  A similar scenario may exist between hospitals with high operating margins and 
those with modest to poor margins. Operating margins may be affected by the mix of 
physician specialties found in certain hospitals.  A higher concentration of specialists 
may result in the performance of higher Medicare reimbursement procedures which 
would increase spending in certain geographic areas while also improving the bottom line 
in the hospitals where an excessive number of highly reimbursed procedures are 
performed. 
Areas populated with a substantial number of general practitioners experience 
lower Medicare spending levels than areas with concentrations of certain types of 
specialists. According to Baicker & Chandra, this explains wide disparities between 
Medicare reimbursements per capita between geographic areas.  
Baiker & Chandra concluded that additional spending for Medicare does not 
result in more effective care for the geographic areas with the highest spending rates. 
―States that spend more per Medicare beneficiary are not states that provide higher 
quality care.‖ Medicare dollars are ―spent on expensive health care that has not been 
shown to have a positive effect on patient satisfaction or health outcomes‖ (Baicker & 
Chandra 2004).  
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Higher & Lower Levels of Medicare Spending Between States 
Table 3 shows Medicare reimbursements per enrollee for short-term inpatient 
hospital stays for several different HRRs across the nation. Regions shown at the top of 
Table 3 represent the top ten highest Medicare per enrollee reimbursements for short-
term stays.  The bottom of the table represents the top ten lowest levels of per enrollee 
Medicare reimbursement for short-term stays. 
Table-3 
Medicare Spending by City, State & Hospital Referral Region, Higher & 
Lower Levels of Medicare Reimbursements Per Medicare Enrollee, 2003 
City Name  State  Hospital Referral 
Region 
Per Enrollee  
Reimbursements*   
Top 10 Cities with Highest Levels of Medicare Reimbursements Per Medicare Enrollee for 
Short-Term Inpatient Stays, 2003  
Baltimore MD 223 3,776 
Miami FL 127 3,792 
Philadelphia PA 356 3,871 
Los Angeles CA 56 3,991 
Chalmette LA 19014 4,072 
East Long Island NY 301 4,176 
McAllen TX 402 4,211 
Covington LA 19018 4,361 
Manhattan NY 303 5,386 
Bronx NY 297 6,395 
    
Top 10 Cities with Lowest Levels of Medicare Reimbursements Per Medicare Enrollee for 
Short-Term Inpatient Stays, 2003 
Mason City IA 195 1,603 
Appleton WI 446 1,607 
Neenah WI 452 1,685 
South Bend IN 187 1,738 
Sioux City IA 196 1,746 
Cedar Rapids IA 190 1,783 
La Crosse WI 448 1,792 
Dubuque IA 193 1,795 
Fort Collins CO 104 1,807 
Salt Lake City UT 423 1,842 
* Reimbursements are not adjusted for inflation 
* Reimbursements are sorted in ascending order both top-10 lowest & highest level Medicare 
reimbursement groups 
Source:  Dartmouth Atlas of Healthcare, dartmouthatlas.org 
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The Bronx and Manhattan, NY, represent the highest per Medicare enrollee 
reimbursements in the nation for short-term hospitals stays at $6,395 and $5,386 
respectively.  Three other cities in the northeast in the top 10 highest per enrollee 
Medicare spending group are also in the northeast and include Baltimore, Philadelphia, 
and East Long Island.  Two cities from Louisiana, Covington & Chalmette, have 
reimbursement levels $4,361 & $4,072. McAllen, Texas, has the forth highest Medicare 
reimbursement level at $4,211.  Miami is shown to have the ninth highest Medicare 
reimbursement level in the nation with $3,792.  Subsequent review will show that Miami 
has the highest levels of Medicare spending in Florida. 
At the other end of the continuum listed in Table 3 are ten top cities with the 
lowest levels of per enrollee Medicare reimbursements for short-term hospitals stays.  
Four cities in Iowa are listed in this group including Mason City, Sioux City, Cedar 
Rapids, and Dubuque which show per enrollee spending of $1,603, $1,746 $1,783 and 
$1,795.  Three cities in Wisconsin, Appleton, Neenah, and La Crosse, are also shown at 
$1,607, 1,685, and $1,792.   
What is the difference between short-term inpatient treatments in Mason City, 
Iowa per Medicare enrollee and spending in The Bronx or Manhattan, New York?  Why 
are spending levels higher in the Northeast and certain cities in Louisiana and Texas, but 
so much lower in Iowa and Wisconsin? 
The most probable reasons for these differences in spending are unionized labor 
in the northeast and high concentrations of investor owned hospitals in southern states 
such as Louisiana and Texas.  High ratios of specialist physicians per 1,000 Medicare 
enrollees may also help explain higher Medicare spending in certain areas. 
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With a few exceptions it was found that mean Medicare reimbursements for 
inpatient hospital care were generally lower in western and mountain states and higher in 
southern and eastern states.  It was also not uncommon for substantially different levels 
of Medicare per capita spending even among contiguous states. 
 It has been suggested that geographic differences in volumes of procedures and 
Medicare spending can be partially explained by patients’ culture, upbringing, and 
psycho-social factors which would result in varying preferences with regard to the 
number of visits to physicians, the perception of personal medical need, and the 
willingness to undergo surgery.  However, there is ―no evidence that illness or informed 
patient preferences vary as sharply according to boundaries of health care markets as 
does surgery‖ (Wennberg, 2005).   
Although patients are consumers they do not have the same objectivity and 
latitude in their decision making as they would in the purchase of other commodities. 
Patients tend to follow the recommendations of their physicians because they trust the 
expertise of the medical profession and tend to question much less the competency or 
motivation of their physician as they would the providers of other types of services.  
Fisher, Bynum & Skinner (2009) found that between 1992 and 2006 per capita 
inflation-adjusted spending in Miami, Florida grew at an annual rate of 5.0%, relative to 
2.3% in Salem, Oregon, and 2.4% in San Francisco.  Per capita growth in Medicare 
expenditures between 1992 and 2006 in Miami was $8,085 per Medicare enrollee.  It was 
also found that 26 HRRs across the nation had more rapid spending than Miami and 18 
regions had slower growth in Medicare expenditures than Salem. 
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As already mentioned, what may account for differences in surgical volumes and 
Medicare spending is what Wennberg (2005) has labeled the “surgical signature.”  
Wennberg’s signature theory is explained in this chapter beginning on page 60, after the 
discussion on ―Geographic Differences in per Capita Medicare Spending in Florida.‖  
Wennberg argues that geographic variability in Medicare spending between national 
regions as well as cities in Florida can be explained by the surgical signature. 
Geographic Differences in Per Capita Medicare Spending in Florida 
Florida is a very important state for the Medicare program. In 2001 Florida had 
1,803,422 Medicare enrollees which exceeded the number of enrollees in New York and 
was second only to California, which had the highest number of Medicare enrollees in the 
nation.  By 2005 the number of Medicare enrollees in Florida had grown to 2,115,397, an 
increase of 17.3% (Dartmouth Surgical Discharges 2005). 
Medicare spending in Florida occurs with similar variability between cities as was 
shown between states in the previous section.  Considering Florida’s large Medicare 
enrollment, if variability indicates that more spending occurs in certain areas than is 
warranted, then there is a sizeable misplacement of federal tax dollars.  
Medicare Reimbursements for Short-Term Inpatient Hospital Stays 
Table 4 shows 2005 Medicare reimbursements for short-term inpatient hospital  
stays per Medicare enrollee for 18 different HRRs in Florida.  The second column of this 
table converts reimbursements to z-scores to ascertain how many standard deviations a 
reimbursement level may be away from the mean. 
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Table 4 
Medicare Reimbursements for Short-Term  Inpatient Hospital Stays Per 1,000 
Medicare Enrollees, 2005 
City Name HRR 2005 Reimbursements  Z-Score 
2005 Reimbursements  
Bradenton 115 2,110 (1.19) 
Clearwater 116 2,824 0.37 
Fort Lauderdale 118 2,687 0.07 
Fort Myers 119 2,328 (0.71) 
Gainesville 120 2,989 0.73 
Hudson 122 2,431 (0.49) 
Jacksonville 123 2,956 0.66 
Lakeland 124 2,758 0.23 
Miami 127 3,905 2.74 
Ocala 129 2,411 (0.53) 
Orlando 130 2,900 0.54 
Ormond Beach 131 2,428 (0.49) 
Panama City 133 3,007 0.77 
Pensacola 134 2,491 (0.35) 
Sarasota 137 1,720 (2.04) 
St. Petersburg 139 2,707 0.12 
Tallahassee 140 2,351 (0.66) 
Tampa 141 2,756 0.22 
National Average 2,955  
Adjusted State Average 2,743  
Unadjusted State Mean Average 2,653  
Standard Deviation 458  
Coefficient of Variation 0.17  
HRR: Hospital Referral Region 
Z = (Observation – Mean) / Standard Deviation = (Observation – 2,653) / 458 
Source: The Dartmouth Atlas of Healthcare, http://www.dartmouthatlas.org 
 
Table 4 above shows that Miami is an outlier compared to the other cities in the 
table.  Z-scores were calculated for each of the cities to determine how many standard 
deviations each city is from the unadjusted mean of $2,653 for Florida. Miami is almost 
three standard deviations above the mean for the state and is significantly above the 
national average of $2,955 shown also in Table 4.  Keep in mind that in figures 1-3 
Miami showed the lowest rates of PCI, back surgery, and knee replacement per 1,000 
Medicare enrollees. 
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Panama City and Gainesville are each about ¾ of one standard deviation above 
the mean at 0.77 & 0.73.  Jacksonville is not far behind at 0.66. 
The question arises as to why there is so much regional fluctuation for Medicare 
spending.  Why is Miami’s spending per enrollee for short-term inpatient stays so much 
higher than other HRRs?  What are the differences between areas with high 
reimbursements per enrollee and those with lower levels?  As already mentioned one 
explanation is the surgical signature theory which is discussed in the next section.   
Appendix 2 provides a more thorough review of Medicare reimbursements for 
short-term inpatient stays per Medicare enrollee.  The appendix also presents 
comparisons between 2000 & 2005 including growth in spending in the five year period. 
Total Medicare Spending in Florida 
 Medicare reimbursements shown in Table 4 referred exclusively to short-term 
inpatient hospital stays.  Table 5 shows inflation adjusted total Medicare spending per 
enrollee by Florida HRR for 1992 & 2006.  Some but not all HRRs follow similar 
patterns in total Medicare spending across Florida HRRs as they did in spending for 
short-term inpatient care.  The point is that what might be expected would be comparable 
levels of spending per Medicare enrollee, but instead the table shows geographic 
variation between HRRs. 
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Table 5 
Inflation Adjusted Total Medicare Spending Per Enrollee by Hospital Referral 
Region(HRR) in Florida, 1992 & 2006, Actual & Percentage Growth 
 
HRR Place 
 
#HRR 
*Medicare 
Spending  
Per Enrollee, 
1992 
*Medicare 
Spending  
Per Enrollee, 
2006 
Growth in 
spending 
1992-2006 
Annual growth 
rate  
1992-2006 
Bradenton 115 4,442 7,640 3,197 3.95% 
Clearwater 116 5,432 8,697 3,266 3.42% 
Fort Lauderdale 118 6,321 9,816 3,495 3.19% 
Fort Myers 119 5,401 8,243 2,842 3.07% 
Gainesville 120 5,235 8,357 3,122 3.40% 
Hudson 122 5,356 9,058 3,701 3.82% 
Jacksonville 123 5,610 8,733 3,123 3.21% 
Lakeland 124 4,487 8,799 4,313 4.93% 
Miami 127 8,266 16,351 8,085 4.99% 
Ocala 129 4,614 8,097 3,483 4.10% 
Orlando 130 5,408 8,588 3,179 3.36% 
Ormond Beach 131 5,010 8,298 3,288 3.67% 
Panama City 133 5,413 9,678 4,265 4.24% 
Pensacola 134 5,477 7,946 2,468 2.69% 
Sarasota 137 4,983 7,466 2,484 2.93% 
St. Petersburg 139 5,801 9,103 3,301 3.27% 
Tallahassee 140 5,140 7,257 2,117 2.49% 
Tampa 141 5,368 8,991 3,624 3.75% 
Florida Mean (all 18 HRRs) 5,431 8,951 3,520 3.58% 
Florida Std. Dev. (all 18 HRRs) 842 1,973 1,269 0.68% 
Florida CV (all 18 HRRs)  0.155 0.220 0.361 19.02% 
*Inflation adjusted Medicare spending 
Source: The Dartmouth Atlas of Healthcare, http://www.dartmouthatlas.org 
 
 The most noticeable HRR in Table 5 is HRR 127, Miami which shows $16,351 of 
2006 inflation adjusted total Medicare spending per enrollee.  Miami also showed the 
highest level of short term inpatient spending in Table 4.  As already mentioned under 
Table 4 and in figures 1-3, Miami had shown the lowest rate of PCI, back surgery, and 
knee replacements of all Florida HRRs.  Miami also shows the lowest overall surgical 
rate for all HRRs in Florida. 
Fort Lauderdale, Panama City, St Petersburg, and Hudson show 2006 
reimbursements per enrollee of over $9,000.  In fact, Fort Lauderdale shows over $9,800 
 60 
and Panama City close to $9,700.  Bradenton, Pensacola, and Sarasota each show 
reimbursements per enrollee under $8,000. 
The 2006 rate of growth, inflation adjusted between 1992 & 2006, is $3,520 with 
a large standard deviation of $1,269 with a comparably large coefficient of variation of 
0.361.  There is also a high coefficient of variation at 19% for the annual percentage 
growth rate. 
The “Surgical Signature” as a Theory to Account for Differences in Prevalence of 
Procedures and Levels of Medicare Expenditures 
 
Broad variations in certain types of surgical rates per 1,000 Medicare enrollees 
and in Medicare per capita spending may be explained by what Wennberg (2005) refers 
to as the ―surgical signature” theory.  Wennberg describes the surgical signature in the 
context of orthopedic surgery as the ―propensity of local surgeons to specialize in a 
particular subset of the orthopedic surgical workload and in the workforce’s ability to 
find candidates that meet clinical appropriateness criteria.  Surgical specialists tend to 
become expert in a subset of the procedures that their specialty performs and to orient 
their workload toward patients eligible for the procedure‖ (Wennberg 2005).  Wennberg 
tested this theory by reviewing rates of several orthopedic procedures among cities in 
Florida.  
Particularly in cases of hip and knee replacements decisions regarding surgery 
tend to be made by small groups of surgeons.  This evolves practice patterns that result in 
steady increases in these types of surgeries until available surgeons can no longer 
accommodate further increases. Numbers of surgeries for the community then stabilize at 
a high level and remain there for long periods of time.   
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Wennberg reported that the number of per-capita orthopedic surgeons show 
variations of four-to-seven fold among regions with no correlation between the numbers 
of surgeons and the performance of surgeries.  Wennberg explains the surgical signature 
by showing comparisons between Manhattan, New York with four cities in Florida 
including Miami, Fort Lauderdale, Fort Myers, and Sarasota, discussed below.  
Wennberg concludes that the surgical signature accounts for differences in surgical rates, 
discharges, and medical expenditures more than any other factor.  
Surgical Signature in Several Florida Cities  
Between 2000 and 2001, Medicare per capita rates for knee surgery in Fort Myers 
were three times higher than the rate in Manhattan.  The rate in Sarasota was 2.5 times 
higher, and the rate in Fort Lauderdale was 1.8 times higher. The rate of hip replacement 
in these three cities was twice the rate for Manhattan.  Back surgeries were more than 
three times higher for Fort Myers and Sarasota compared to Manhattan, and Fort 
Lauderdale showed a back surgery rate that was five times higher.  Oddly, hip 
replacements were lower in Miami than Manhattan. 
Within a decade surgeons in Fort Myers performed 7,250 more back operations, 
7,000 more knee replacements, and 2,600 more hip replacements than would have been 
done had the Manhattan rate per 1,000 Medicare enrollees prevailed in those 
communities. Miami surgeons carried out 870 more back surgeries, 1,400 more knee 
surgeries, but 56 fewer hip replacements if the Manhattan rate had been applied to Miami 
over the same ten-year period.  
In 2005, surgical discharges for back surgery in Manhattan were 1.94 per 1,000 
Medicare enrollees.  Fort Myers and Sarasota, on the other hand, had, respectively, 6.99 
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and 6.36 back surgery discharges per 1,000 Medicare enrollees.  Recall from Figure 3 
that Miami had the lowest per capita rate of back surgeries with 2.42 per 1,000 Medicare 
enrollees.  But even Miami, with the lowest per capita back surgery rate among all HRRs 
in Florida showed a higher rate than Manhattan which was 1.94 (Dartmouth 2005). 
This is also found for knee replacements in 2005.  Although the Miami HRR has 
the lowest per capita knee replacement rate in Florida with a rate of 4.88 per 1,000 
Medicare enrollees (see Figure 2), Manhattan has a per capita rate of 3.72.  Fort Myers, 
Sarasota, and Bradenton have per capita rates of 11.14, 9.16, and 9.42 (see Figure 2) 
(Dartmouth 2005).  
Per capita discharges for CABG surgeries in 2005 were 3.48 in Manhattan 
relative to 5.51 in Sarasota. Per capita rates were also 4.27 and 4.28 for Fort Lauderdale 
and Fort Myers, respectively (Dartmouth 2005).   
Per capita PCI discharges in Manhattan were 12.99 in 2005.  Contrast this rate to 
those of Ocala and Clearwater which showed rates of 17.94 and 17.54 (Dartmouth 2005) 
Commonly cited reasons for these geographic variations in Medicare expenditures 
related to back surgeries include the incidence of osteoarthritis and herniated discs, but 
considering such wide disparities between communities it is doubtful that these 
differences in expenditures were completely dictated by medical need. 
Dartmouth (Date Unknown) found a positive correlation between physician visits 
and density of cardiologists per capita 100,000 residents.  For example, patient visits to 
cardiologists were five times higher in areas with 12 cardiologists per 100,000 residents 
relative to two per capita 100,000. 
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Dartmouth also found that rates of procedures, which are lower in central and 
Midwestern states, are concomitant with lower density of specialists per 100,000 
residents relative to east and west coast states.  In 1995-1996 Dartmouth also found 
positive correlations between the density of hospital beds and discharges for all medical 
conditions per 1,000 Medicare enrollees.  
Geographic location 
 Findings from the literature regarding geographic variations in medical practice 
patterns, particularly those in Florida, provided the impetus to create two variables for 
geographic location.  In Part 1 of the study, geographic location is based on median 
income levels for 67 counties in Florida and is dichotomized according to high vs. low 
income levels.  In Part 2 of the study geographic location is based on north, central, and 
south geographic regions in Florida.  This variable is a dichotomy with the combined 
northern and central regions as the base level. 
Research Summary 
The Literature Review up to this point has examined several financial 
performance indicators and how they may be influenced by a hospital’s percentage of 
Medicare revenue or amount of Medicare patients, good management and prudent 
strategic direction, possible gaming of payment systems, and overuse or overcharging of 
certain discretionary medical procedures.  The Literature Review has also assessed what 
constitutes a discretionary procedure based on scientific uncertainty and geographic 
variability and cited several studies that reached similar conclusions on what type of 
procedures should be considered discretionary. 
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The investigation will now proceed to first define and operationalize the term 
discretionary procedure for purposes of this study (Chapter 3).  The investigation will 
then go on to test the association between the TATL ratio and certain types of 
discretionary heart and orthopedic procedures reimbursed by conventional Medicare 
(chapters 5 & 7).    
The analysis will also focus on the interaction between these two discretionary 
procedure variables and hospital ownership.  This will help to address the question if the 
performance of higher rates of certain types of discretionary procedures relates to 
stronger balance sheets (i.e., higher TATL ratios) in investor owned vs. not-for-profit 
hospitals.  It may also help to shed light on fluctuating rates in performing these 
discretionary procedures with respect to hospital ownership and geographic location. 
The analysis will then switch from an investigation of rates of discretionary 
procedures under conventional Medicare to an analysis of total patient charges under 
Medicare HMO (chapters 6 & 8).  This will address large disparities in patient charges, 
unrelated to patient disease severity or the extent of medical services provided, with 
respect to hospital ownership and Florida geographic region.   
This summary is expressed in more detail under Research Goals & Objectives, 
shown in Chapter 3, Research Methods - Data Structure & Identification of Variables, 
which is next. 
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Chapter 3 
Research Methods – Data Structure & Identification of Variables 
 
Research Goals & Objectives 
The intent of this research is to determine which DRG codes are associated with 
investor owned hospitals with high TATL ratios, if these codes represent discretionary 
procedures, how these DRG codes differ from codes associated with TATL ratios of less 
profitable hospitals, if these DRG codes are being used with inordinate frequency 
considering the medical needs of the patient population, and to determine if charges are 
commensurate with other hospitals that perform the same procedures.  
Two broad goals and several objectives for parts 1 & 2 have been formulated to 
address the research questions.  The two goals are listed as follows in connection with 
parts 1 & 2 of this study.   
Goal for Part 1 
 
Determine if investor owned hospitals with high TATL ratios are using 
conventional Medicare to perform discretionary procedures at significantly higher 
rates than their not-for-profit counterparts. 
 
It is important to distinguish that the context is a positive association between the 
TATL ratio and percentages of discretionary procedures, not higher volumes. It 
was shown in the preliminary analyses that not-for-profits performed higher 
overall volumes of discretionary procedures during the study period, 2000-2005 
(See Table 9).  However, preliminary analyses also indicated that percentages per 
hospital of certain discretionary procedures, reimbursed by conventional 
Medicare, increased concomitantly with rising TATL ratios in investor owned 
hospitals.    
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Objectives for Part 1 
 
1) To operationalize a definition for “discretionary procedure,” 
2) To identify DRG codes which represent discretionary procedures  
3) To determine if hospitals’ TATL ratios increase corresponding to increases in 
percentages per hospital of certain discretionary procedures reimbursed by 
conventional Medicare  
4) To determine if the association between the TATL ratio and percentages of 
certain discretionary procedures, reimbursed by conventional Medicare, differ 
according to hospital ownership 
5) To determine if the association between the TATL ratio and percentages of 
certain discretionary procedures, reimbursed by conventional Medicare, differ 
according to geographic location 
 
Goal for Part 2 
 
Determine if investor owned hospitals are charging significantly higher amounts 
for the same extent of medical services than their not-for-profit counterparts using 
Medicare HMO to perform certain discretionary procedures. 
 
Objectives for Part 2 
 
1) To operationalize a definition for “discretionary procedure,” 
2) To identify DRG codes which represent discretionary procedures  
3) To determine if mean charges for these discretionary procedures reimbursed 
by Medicare HMO are significantly greater for investor owned hospitals than 
mean charges for not-for-profit Florida general short term acute care hospitals. 
4) To determine if mean charges for these discretionary procedures reimbursed 
by Medicare HMO differ according to geographic region 
 
The goals differ for parts 1 & 2 because incentives under conventional Medicare 
and Medicare HMO also differ.  As already mentioned, since conventional Medicare is 
based on a fixed rate per DRG code there is no incentive for hospitals to artificially 
increase charges.  Their incentive would be to increase volumes of certain procedures that 
make them profitable, while attempting to minimize other types of procedures.  Inflating 
charges would be an incentive for hospitals reimbursed by Medicare HMO, since it is 
similar to an insurance charge-based payment system. 
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It should also be observed that references to geographic location in Part 1 and 
geographic region (or sector) in Part 2 are consistent with Wennberg’s theory of the 
surgical signature, as discussed in the literature review in Chapter 2. 
Data Sources 
 Hypotheses will be addressed using four datasets that provide clinical, 
demographic, operational, and financial data.  These datasets include the Florida Agency 
for Health Care Administration (AHCA) Discharge Data for all patients treated in Florida 
hospitals over a six year period, 2000-2005, AHCA Financial data (hardcopy), 2000-
2005, AHCA Financial data (electronic file) for the same time period, and median 
income data for each county in Florida for each year, 2000-2005, available from the U.S. 
Department of Housing & Urban Development (www.hud.gov). 
AHCA hardcopy and electronic financial data are considered two different 
datasets because though they overlap in some areas they report on different financial 
items in others.  For example the hardcopy dataset provides some income statement data 
including operating margins, as well as operating revenues and expenses that comprise 
these margins for all Florida hospitals, but it does not report balance sheet data. The 
electronic data does not provide income statement data with the exception of total 
margins, but it does provide data on hospital balance sheets, including items that 
comprise total assets and total liabilities, of which the TATL was constructed. 
Structure of the Datasets 
Datasets for parts 1 & 2 will be composites of respectively four and three of the 
datasets listed above.   
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Selection of Hospitals 
 The selection of hospitals to be used in the analysis were derived from the AHCA 
Financial data and included only acute care general investor owned (C-corporation) 
hospitals, religious and other not-for-profit [501(c)(3)] hospitals, and governmental 
hospital district facilities.  Excluded from the data-set were rehabilitation and psychiatric 
facilities, certain government owned hospitals (e.g., state and county hospitals, etc.), 
teaching hospitals, specialty hospitals, limited liability companies (LLCs), and 
partnerships.   
 A total of 891 hospital observations were comprised of roughly 150 hospitals 
from each year, 2000-2005.  For example, of the 281 health facilities listed in the 2005 
AHCA Financial Data,  151 facilities were used and were comprised of 69 investor 
owned hospitals, 20 religious not-for-profit hospitals, 46 other not-for-profit hospitals, 
and 16 hospital district facilities.  Discharge and financial data were segmented to include 
only patients discharged from these general acute care short-term hospitals. 
Data Structure for Part 1  
Total observations for Part 1 included the entire 891 observations representing 
repeated measures of approximately 150 acute care general hospitals for each year, 2000-
2005.  
For Part 1 this means that a large AHCA dataset of 4 million conventional 
Medicare patient observations must be merged with a much smaller AHCA hospital 
financial data set comprised of 891 observations.   
 The structure of the models must be driven by the dependent variable which for 
Part 1 is the TATL ratio.  This means that because the TATL ratio is specific to each 
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hospital, each observation must represent an individual hospital in a given year.  This 
allows each observation of the dependent variable to be unique. 
Individual patient data used in the analysis for Part 1 were downloaded from the 
AHCA Discharge Data and aggregated into data specific to each hospital.  For example, 
conventional Medicare CABG patient observations are aggregated into specific hospitals 
in which they occurred.  These aggregated totals then become total CABG procedures 
performed within each specific hospital in a given year.  Procedures are then converted to 
percentages per hospital by dividing total CABG procedures reimbursed by conventional 
Medicare by total discharges performed by each hospital. 
Part 1 of the study uses geographic location as a covariate.  HUD promulgated 
median household income data is used as a proxy for geographic location to distinguish 
hospitals located in higher vs. lower income counties.  HUD assigns annual median 
household income levels for each of the 67 counties in Florida.  
Data Structure for Part 2 
Part 2 of the study features total Medicare HMO charges for valve replacements 
and CABG procedures as the dependent variable.  The dependent variable, total charges, 
is the driver in structuring the model.  AHCA Discharge data reports a unique 
observation for total charges for each patient.  This allows population parameters to be 
defined as patients treated with CABG or valve replacement procedures (DRG codes 104, 
105, 106, 107,109, 547, 548, 549, 550) financed by Medicare HMO, 2000-2005.  This 
resulted in 12,972 patient observations. 
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The variable hospital ownership was then coded for each patient observation to 
represent whether the hospital of which the CABG or valve replacement procedure 
occurred was either investor owned or not-for-profit. 
Not all hospitals within the 891 hospital selection perform CABG or valve 
replacement procedures reimbursed by Medicare HMO.  Only 360 hospitals 
(approximately 60 hospitals per year, 2000-2005) perform these types of procedures and 
are the hospitals used in the analysis for Part 2. 
Length of stay (LOS) and geographic region are covariates in the models for Part 
2.   With LOS as a covariate, the objective was to examine increasing charges 
corresponding to increases in days of hospitalization.  The association between charges 
and the number of days of hospitalization may differ for patients who are discharged due 
to death as opposed to patients discharged under other conditions.  Therefore, it was 
determined that observations representing patients whose discharge status was due to 
death should be eliminated from the dataset. This resulted in 12,420 total observations 
used for the analysis. 
Deriving an Operational Definition of Discretionary Procedures 
Recall that the first two objectives listed under Research Goals & Objectives in 
this chapter pertain to operationalizing the concept of discretionary procedure in the 
context of this investigation.  This concept of discretionary procedure is a critical feature 
in both parts 1 & 2.  Part 1 contains two variables representing discretionary procedures, 
and Part 2’s population parameters are defined, in part, by two discretionary procedures.  
Before moving forward with a discussion of the variables used in this analysis, it would 
be useful to define and operationalize the concept of discretionary procedure.  
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As already discussed in the literature review in Chapter 2, a discretionary 
procedure is defined as a medical procedure which lacks scientific consensus regarding 
efficacy and per-capita geographic uniformity in practice patterns. 
Criteria for Identifying Discretionary Procedures  
Wennberg (2005) and Dartmouth (1999) defined discretionary procedures as 
those used to treat chronic as opposed to acute illnesses, medical uncertainty regarding 
efficacy, and geographic variability in how these procedures are prescribed.  Of these 
three criteria the most useful for efficiently identifying discretionary procedures is 
geographic variability.  In fact, geographic variability is an indicator for medical 
uncertainty because it is the lack of scientific consensus that results in regionally non-
uniform rates of procedures that are inconsistent with disease patterns.  By contrast, 
because medical consensus exists for nondiscretionary procedures they tend to mirror 
disease patterns and occur with more predictable uniformity per 1,000 Medicare enrollees 
across geographic regions (Fisher, Bynum & Skinner 2009). 
Using a Nondiscretionary Procedure as a Benchmark 
Wennberg (2005) used geographic variability to identify discretionary procedures 
by using the geographic uniformity of a nondiscretionary procedure as a benchmark. Hip 
fracture was used as a benchmark reference because it is acute, painful, and motivates the 
patient to seek care immediately. It is ―almost always correctly diagnosed, and all 
physicians, irrespective of their specialty or geographic location, agree uniformly on the 
need for hospitalization, so the rate of hospitalizations mirrors the pattern of disease.‖   
Wennberg calculated rates for hip fracture and several other types of procedures, 
for all national HRRs, 2002-2003, using the incidence of procedures for prescribed 
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geographic areas as the numerator and the resident population as the denominator.  These 
rates were then expressed as ratios to the national average for each procedure.  Wennberg 
then averaged these ratios to derive a ―systematic component of variation, a measure that 
allows comparisons of variation among procedures with different mean rates‖ to measure 
geographic variability (Vitale, Krant, Gelijns et al 1999, Weinstein, Goodman & 
Wennberg 1998, Keller, Soule, Wennberg et al 1990).   
Hip fracture showed ratios of 0.9 and 1.3 depending on location, 10% below and 
30% above the national average with rates stable over time and consistently the highest in 
the southwest and Texas regions.  The systematic component of variation for hip fracture 
was 13.8, which was used as the benchmark to make comparisons with other procedures.   
The hip fracture benchmark was compared with many procedures, three of which 
were knee surgery, back surgery, and hip replacement.  The component of variation for 
knee surgery was 55.0, more than four times that of the hip fracture benchmark of 13.8.  
Hip replacement and back surgery had components of variation of 67.2 and 93.6, five and 
seven times greater, respectively, than that of hip fracture. 
Using the Coefficient of Variation as an Indicator of Geographic Variability 
Wennberg’s approach will be followed to measure geographic variability for 
surgical procedures in Florida, but a different technique will be used.  Wennberg’s 
method showed variability by examining differences in mean ratios for certain 
procedures between geographic areas.  But Wennberg’s mean of ratios method can be 
skewed due to a few very high or very low ratios.  This is not as much of a problem in 
Wennberg’s research because of a large sample of HRRs.  To derive a measure of 
variability for procedures in Florida, which has only 18 HRRs, a more conservative test, 
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the coefficient of variation (CV) is needed.   The CV, also known as unitized risk, is 
expressed as the relationship between the standard deviation and the mean for the data 
distribution (Garson 2006, Rajaram 2004). 
Appendix 1, which was referenced in Chapter 1, shows rates per 1,000 Medicare 
enrollees of surgical procedures for each of the 18 Florida HRRs, 2003.  Below the tables 
containing these rates in the appendix are descriptive statistics including the CV.   The 
CV for all Florida surgical discharges is 0.07 which is consistent with two 
nondiscretionary procedures which are used as benchmarks, hip fracture repair and 
resection for colon cancer, which have CVs of 0.09 and 0.08 respectively.  
The CV indicates wide geographic variation, based on the association of the 
standard deviation to the mean for each rate, for each of these procedures in comparison 
to the benchmarks.  CABG and coronary angiography show CVs of 0.17 and 0.18 
respectively.  Back surgery has a CV of 0.28 and mastectomy 0.24.  Hip and knee 
replacements show 0.19 and 0.18, and benign prostatic hyperplasia (BPH) shows a CV of 
0.37.   
Based on the broad distance between the CVs of each procedure and the 
benchmarks, as shown in Appendix 1, several procedures are determined to qualify under 
the geographic variability criterion as discretionary and are eligible to be used as 
variables in the study.  Table 6 shows these procedures with their respective DRG codes. 
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Table 6 
Procedures Defined as Discretionary Based on Clinical & Geographic 
Variability Criteria 
Procedure DRG Codes 
Valve Replacement 104, 105 
Coronary Artery Bypass  106, 107, 109, 547, 548, 549, 550  
Percutaneous Cardiovascular Intervention  
     (PCI)  (with & without stents) 
112, 516, 517, 518, 526, 527, 555, 
556, 557, 558 
Major Joint & Limb Reattachment 209 
Hip & Femur Procedures 210, 211 
Back Surgery - Spinal Fusion 496, 497, 498, 519, 520, 546 
Knee Procedures 501, 502, 503, 544, 545 
Prostatectomy  306, 307, 336, 337 
Mastectomy 257 258 259 260 
 
Discretionary procedures were identified under four major diagnostic categories 
(MDC).  Cardiac procedures are represented under MDC 5, Diseases and Disorders of 
the Circulatory System, and orthopedic procedures are under MDC 8, Diseases and 
Disorders of the Musculoskeletal System and Connective Tissue.  Mastectomy is 
classified under MDC 9, Diseases and Disorders of the Skin, Subcutaneous Tissue and 
Breast, and BPH and radical prostatectomy fall under MDC 11, Diseases and Disorders 
of the Kidney and Urinary Tract (Ingenix 2003, Utah DOH 2008). 
 The procedures identified in Table 6 will now be explored for potential statistical 
usefulness in model development. 
Selecting Discretionary Procedures for Further Investigation 
To begin a selection process, the procedures listed in Table 6 were initially tested 
using a Pearson and Spearman correlation matrix shown in Appendix 3.  Variables used 
in the matrices included the TATL ratio and percentages of discretionary procedures 
including CABG, PCI, valve replacement, spinal fusion, hip & femur procedures, joint & 
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limb procedures, knee, mastectomy, and prostate procedures.  Using CABG as an 
example of how percentages of procedures are calculated, the percentage of CABG 
procedures equals the number of CABG procedures performed in a particular hospital 
and reimbursed by conventional Medicare divided by the total number of procedures 
from all payers in that hospital in a given year.  
In the correlation matrix in Appendix 3, associations are observed between the 
TATL and each medical procedure tested in the matrix.  With the exception of 
mastectomies, coefficients between the TATL ratio and each procedure (e.g., CABG, 
PCI, etc.) are in excess of 0.20 (p < 0.0001).  This means that a significantly positive 
association exists between the TATL ratio and each procedure.  
What is also noticed are significant and high correlations between different types 
of heart procedures.  There is a Pearson correlation of 0.93 between valve replacements 
and CABG procedures. There is also a Pearson correlation of 0.65 between PCI and valve 
procedures and 0.68 between PCI and CABG.  There is a Spearman correlation of 0.87 
between valve replacements and PCI and 0.88 between PCI and CABG.   
Similar associations, though not as high, are also observed between certain 
orthopedic procedures.  There is a Pearson correlation of 0.75 (p < 0.0001) and Spearman 
correlation of 0.81 (p < 0.0001) between hip & femur procedures and joint & limb 
procedures. There were also Pearson and Spearman coefficients of 0.50 (p < 0.0001) and 
0.62 (p < 0.0001), respectively, between joint & limb procedures and knee procedures.  
These high correlations between certain types of medical procedures indicate 
problems of multicollinearity if each procedure was to be used as an individual variable. 
After a review of the matrices it was determined that several medical procedures could be 
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efficiently and coherently packaged into two independent variables.  Although 
prostatectomy showed significant and high associations with the TATL ratio it was 
dropped from further consideration because the remaining procedures fall into either 
MDC 5 or MDC 8.  It was determined that they could be grouped together to form two 
variables representing cardiac group procedures and orthopedic group procedures.  
Grouping these procedures into two variables will reduce the number of terms used in 
model development which will add statistical power and help assure validity and will also 
allow several DRG codes to be tested at one time.   
The two newly created groups, cardiac group procedures and orthopedic group 
procedures, and the patient populations that comprise them are shown in tables 7 and 8. 
 
Table 7 
Cardiac Group Procedures Variable, Florida Short-Term Acute Care General 
Hospitals, 2000-2005 
Procedures (Reimbursed by Conventional Medicare) Total  Procedure Volumes 
Valve Replacement 20,551 
Coronary Artery Bypass  50,158 
Percutaneous Cardiovascular Procedures 114,894 
Total 185,603 
 
Table 8 
Orthopedic Group Procedures Variable, Florida Short-Term Acute Care General 
Hospitals, 2000-2005 
Procedures (Reimbursed by Conventional Medicare) Total Procedures Volumes 
Major Joint & Limb Reattachment 136,121 
Back Surgery - Spinal Fusion 25,432 
Knee Procedures  9,583 
Hip & Femur Procedures 51,389 
Total 222,525 
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 The cardiac and orthopedic group procedure variables will be discussed further 
under the next subsection.  It will explain how these groups of procedures will be 
structured and used as variables. 
Listed below in Table 9 is a breakdown of volumes of procedures stratified by 
ownership for the time period 2000-2005.  This table reports volume data for the newly 
created variables, cardiac group procedures and orthopedic group procedures and for total 
procedures reimbursed by conventional Medicare and total procedures performed in 
Florida hospitals.   Also listed are percentages of cardiac and orthopedic group 
procedures relative to total procedures and procedures reimbursed by conventional 
Medicare. 
 
Table 9 
Raw Data & Percentage Breakdown of Cardiac & Orthopedic Group Procedures 
by Ownership, 2000-2005  
Procedures  Investor Owned Not-for-Profit 
Total Procedures  3,492,321 6,788,961 
Conventional Medicare Procedures 1,475,156 2,507,551 
Cardiac Group Procedures  63,064 122,539 
Orthopedic Group Procedures  76,471 146,054 
(Cardiac Group ÷ Total Procedures) x 100  1.81% 1.80% 
(Orthopedic Group ÷ Total Procedures) x 100 2.19% 2.15% 
(Cardiac Group ÷ Convention Medicare) x 100 4.28% 4.89% 
(Orthopedic Group ÷ Conventional Medicare) x 100  5.18% 5.82% 
* Totals for cardiac group procedures and orthopedic group procedures in Table 9 represent 
procedures reimbursed by Conventional Medicare.  Total procedures represent procedures 
reimbursed by conventional Medicare and all other payers.  
 
 
The dataset shows, as depicted in Table 9, that investor owned hospitals 
performed a total of 63,064 cardiac group procedures and 76,471 orthopedic group 
procedures reimbursed by conventional Medicare between 2000 and 2005.  Not-for-
profits performed about twice the volume of investor owned hospitals, carrying out 
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122,539 cardiac group procedures and 146,054 orthopedic procedures during the same 
time period. 
Between 2000 and 2005, investor owned hospitals performed 3,492,321 total 
procedures (total payers) and 1,475,156 procedures reimbursed by conventional 
Medicare.  Not-for-profits performed 6,788,961 total procedures (total payers) with 
2,507,551 reimbursed by conventional Medicare.   
Investor owned hospitals do not exceed that of not-for-profits in terms of volumes 
or percentages.  In fact, percentages of cardiac and orthopedic group procedures relative 
to total conventional Medicare procedures are slightly higher in not-for-profit hospitals 
with 4.89% and 5.82% respectively, compared to 4.28% and 5.18% in investor owned 
hospitals.  Percentages of cardiac group procedures and orthopedic group procedures 
relative to total procedures (total payers) are almost even between not-for-profit and 
investor owned hospitals showing respectively 1.80% and 1.81% for cardiac group 
procedures and 2.15% and 2.19% for orthopedic group procedures. 
As will be discussed more fully in Chapter 5, Research Methods - Model 
Development for Part 1, the difference between investor owned hospitals and not-for-
profits in this context is that there is a positive association between the TATL ratio and 
the cardiac group procedure and orthopedic group procedure variables in investor owned 
hospitals; that the TATL ratio increases corresponding to percentage increases in the 
cardiac group procedure and orthopedic group procedure variables.  This association was 
not observed among not-for-profits. 
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Dependent & Independent Variables for Part 1 
Following is a discussion of dependent and independent variables used in Part 1 
and Part 2 of this study.  Specific variables under Part 1 are discussed in the following 
paragraphs.  This will be followed by a discussion of dependent and independent 
variables used in Part 2.  These variables will be used in model development and will be 
discussed again in chapters 5 & 7 for Part 1 and chapters 6 & 8 for Part 2. 
Selection of Variables for Part 1 
TATL Ratio:  The literature is rife with researchers using operating margin as the 
outcome variable to operationalize hospital profitability.  Operating margin is an income 
statement item and is a measure of short-term (one year) hospital profitability.   The focus 
of this study was a trend of long term (multi-year) financial health and solvency which 
was better reflected by the TATL ratio.   
The TATL ratio is defined as the ratio of (current + long-term assets) / (current + 
long term liabilities).  The TATL ratio is a comprehensive long-term indicator of 
financial solvency and viability, and is derived from the balance sheet.  The TATL ratio 
reflects an organization’s ability to manage debt, as the greatest portion of liabilities is 
usually comprised of long term debt.   It also reflects investments in plant improvements 
and equipment, as the greatest portion of assets is usually derived from long term assets 
including property, plant, and equipment.   Based on the objectives of this study the 
TATL ratio as the outcome variable was selected as an appropriate measure of long term 
financial strength and solvency for Part 1.   
The TATL ratio was used in the modeling phase of the study as a continuous 
variable.  But in some of the preliminary, especially nonparametric analyses the TATL 
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ratio was examined as a categorical variable.  Several descriptive statistical techniques 
were used to summarize the TATL distribution and to determine a breakpoint needed to 
convert the TATL ratio to a dichotomy.  After examining the TATL ratio’s quartile 
distribution it was determined that the breakpoint for a high vs. low TATL ratio would be 
≥ 5/8 quartile (5/8 Q) (half the distance between the median and third quartile).   
The 5/8 TATL quartile was selected because it could be used as a demarcation 
between hospitals with high levels of financial strength and solvency vs. hospitals with 
low levels. The third quartile, as well as the sixth and seventh quintiles, were also 
examined as potential breakpoints and generated results similar to those when the 5/8 
quartile was used.   It was determined that results of nonparametric tests used in this 
analysis would be reported using the 5/8 quartile of the TATL distribution, though any of 
the other quartile breakpoints would have been acceptable. 
Ownership: Represented as a dichotomous variable where investor owned 
hospitals equal 1.0 and all other hospitals equal zero.  All other hospitals in this case 
include religious not-for-profit hospitals, other not-for-profit hospitals, and hospital 
district hospitals. 
 Geographic location – County Median Income:  As cited in the literature review 
hospital profitability is associated with geographic location.  Preliminary analyses 
showed that hospitals located in higher income areas tend to have higher TATL ratios 
than hospitals in economically disadvantaged areas.   
It often reflects sound strategic direction for management, if it has the flexibility, 
to seek out and locate hospitals in more affluent areas.  It is also investor owned hospitals 
that tend to be able to exercise greater flexibility in geographic location. The association 
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between geographic location, as a strategy for sound management, and the TATL ratio 
makes geographic location a very good control variable. 
The rationale for selecting geographic location as an independent variable is 
consistent with discussions in the literature review regarding Wennberg’s (2005) surgical 
signature theory.  As already discussed, this theory posits that the geographic variability 
of per capita rates and Medicare spending for discretionary procedures are more related 
to geographic location than disease status of populations. 
The best indicator for geographic location, for which data was available, was a 
proxy measure of HUD promulgated median income levels for each of 67 Florida 
counties, 2000-2005 (www.hud.gov).  High income geographic locations were defined as 
hospitals located in Florida counties with high median income levels.  
This variable worked well as a continuous, but even better as a categorical 
variable.  The high vs. low median income breakpoint is based on quartiles using 
annualized distributions for county median income.  It was determined that the optimum 
breakpoint to distinguish a high income vs. low income county was 5/8Q (half the 
distance between the third and fourth quartile).  A list of breakpoints for each year at 
5/8Q as well as all quartiles is found in Appendix 4.  
Discretionary cardiac group procedures:  This variable was identified previously 
in Table 7 and was developed in conjunction with the definition and operationalization of 
discretionary procedure.  
It was impractical to make a variable out of every DRG code or even out of every 
procedure.  Instead, a number of DRG codes were grouped together to comprise a 
composite variable titled discretionary cardiac group procedures.  This variable is 
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comprised of procedures reimbursed by conventional Medicare under MDC 5 (heart 
procedures) and include valve replacements (DRG codes 104 & 105) CABG procedures 
(DRG codes 106, 107, 109, 547, 548, 549 & 550), and PCI (DRG codes 112, 516, 517, 
518 526, 527, 555, 556, 557 & 558).   
Observations for the cardiac group procedures variable were expressed as 
percentages for each hospital.  Percentages of discretionary cardiac procedures were 
calculated via the frequency of discretionary cardiac group procedures reimbursed by 
conventional Medicare for a given hospital divided by total discharges carried out by that 
hospital.  Percentages for each hospital are also calculated each year, 2000-2005. 
Of the hospitals that perform cardiac group procedures reimbursed by 
conventional Medicare, 2000-2005, percentages per hospital range from 0.0% to 
15.408%.  The mean percentage per hospital is 1.127% and standard deviation is 2.208%. 
Discretionary orthopedic group procedures:  This variable was identified in Table 
8 and was developed in connection with the definition and operationalization of the 
concept of discretionary procedure.  
Just as with discretionary cardiac group procedures, this variable includes several 
orthopedic group procedures reimbursed by conventional Medicare under MDC 8 
(orthopedic procedures) and include major hip and femur procedures (DRG code 209), 
back surgery (spinal fusion) (DRG codes 496, 497, 519, 520 & 546), and knee procedures 
(DRG codes 501, 502, 503, 544 & 545). 
Frequencies of the above listed DRG codes were downloaded from the ACHA 
discharge data for each hospital and year. Percentages were then calculated by dividing 
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the frequencies of these procedures by total procedures for each hospital for each year, 
2000-2005. 
Of the hospitals that perform orthopedic group procedures reimbursed by 
conventional Medicare, 2000-2005, the percentages per hospital range between 0.0% and 
11.75%. The mean percentage is 2.126% with a standard deviation of 1.772%. 
In the final models of this study, rates of cardiac group procedures and orthopedic 
group procedures were transformed to z-scores.  This was done to manage problems of 
multicollinearity and is discussed further in the discussion on model development in 
Chapter 5. 
Measuring 1Z in Model Development 
As just mentioned, standard deviations for cardiac group procedures and 
orthopedic group procedures, respectively, are 2.208% and 1.772%.  Later in the 
development of regression models and results (chapters 5 & 7), cardiac and orthopedic 
group procedures will be described as increasing by 1Z.  An increase by 1Z for cardiac 
group procedures will mean that the percentage per hospital increases by 2.208%.  An 
increase of 1Z for orthopedic group procedures will mean that the percentage per hospital 
will increase by 1.772%. 
Selection Criteria for DRG Codes to be used in Model Development 
Observations derived from a DRG code that was discontinued by Medicare during 
the study period, but was replaced by a code(s) representing the same procedure were 
allowed to remain eligible as observations in either the cardiac group procedures or 
orthopedic group procedures variable. 
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For example, a code in the cardiac group procedures variable, DRG 112, was 
discontinued in October 2001, but was replaced at the same time by DRG codes 516, 517 
& 518, and these codes remained active through 2005 (Utah DOH 2008).   
DRG 112 represented PCI (i.e., angioplasty) while code 516 also represents a 
PCI, but includes myocardial infarction (MI).  DRG code 517 represents PCI without MI 
but with an artery stent implant. DRG code 518 represents PCI without MI and without a 
stent implant (Utah DOH 2008).   
DRG codes 516, 517 & 518 were discontinued and replaced in October 2005 with 
codes 555 (PCI with MCV diagnosis), 556 (PCI with non-drug-eluting stent without 
MCV diagnosis), 557 (PCI with non drug-eluting stent with MCV diagnosis) & 558 (PCI 
with non drug eluting stent without MCV diagnosis) (Utah DOH 2008).   
The newer codes are expanded to provide greater detail on the surgical procedure. 
But all of these codes still represent roughly the same procedure for purposes of this 
investigation. 
Selection of Variables for Part 2 
Total Patient Charges:  The identification of an outcome variable for Part 2 was 
not difficult.  Since the research question is whether charges are significantly different 
with respect to ownership (i.e., do investor owned hospitals charge significantly more for 
providing the same procedures and extent of medical services), a sound and evident 
choice for an outcome variable was total patient charges.   
Total patient charges are defined as the aggregate amount of charges for all 
procedures performed for each specific patient prior to discounts.  Total charges in the 
AHCA discharge database include each revenue code including room charges, intensive 
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care, coronary care, cardiology, anesthesia, emergency room, anesthesia, intensive care, 
etc. (AHCA 2005).  As already mentioned, total charges in Part 2 of this study apply only 
to Medicare HMO patients, as there is no impetus for hospitals to increase charges under 
the fixed rate per DRG code conventional Medicare program. 
Total charges are used in this study as a continuous variable in model 
development and as a dichotomous (high vs. low charges) variable in preliminary 
categorical analyses.  As a dichotomy the breakpoint for high vs. low charges is at 5/8Q 
(half the distance between the median and third quartile).  A special provision is made for 
this variable because total charges increase each year.  To adjust for these increases the 
5/8Q breakpoint had to be annualized, where the 5/8Q breakpoint equals a different 
amount specific to each year. For example, ≥ 5/8Q for total charges in 2000 was ≥ 
75,369; ≥ 5/8Q for total charges in 2001 was ≥ 86,006; etc.  A table is provided in 
Appendix 5 with a breakdown of total charges by year and quartile. 
Ownership: Hospital ownership is the only independent variable that will be used 
in both parts 1 and 2 of the analysis.  This variable is critical to both parts since the focus 
of the study is about investor owned vs. not-for-profit hospitals. 
Just as in Part 1, hospital ownership is represented as a dichotomous variable 
where investor owed hospitals equal 1.0 and all other hospitals equal zero.  All other 
hospitals in this case include religious not-for-profit hospitals, other not-for-profit 
hospitals, and hospital district hospitals. 
Geographic Region (Florida Inspection Area):  Geographic location was used in 
Part 2 of the analysis, but was not based on median income as it was in Part 1.  As a state 
regulatory agency, AHCA oversees 11 inspection regions that are divided into north, 
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central, and south Florida geographic sectors.  These inspection regions are not relevant 
to general, acute care hospitals.  Instead the inspection regions are used to aid the state of 
Florida in conducting regulatory compliance inspections of nursing homes that accept 
Medicare and Medicaid payments.  But as it turned out these regions were found to be 
suitable proxies for geographic location, as Medicare HMO total patient charges differed 
considerably by geographic region.  A listing of Florida counties within each inspection 
region by north, central, and south geographic sectors is shown in Appendix 6.  
It should also be observed that disproportionately fewer CABG or valve 
replacement procedures occurred in the north Florida region by investor owned hospitals.  
One of the reasons for this was that there are fewer investor owned hospitals that perform 
CABG and valve replacement procedures in the northern sector.  As a result, the north 
and central regions were collapsed into one level, and the variable geographic region was 
reduced from a three level categorical variable to a dichotomy where south = 1 and north 
& central = 0.  
Disease Severity:  The preferred variable to adjust for disease severity was APR-
DRG codes, but this was unavailable in the AHCA dataset.  Other variables included 
LOS and multiple diagnoses. 
LOS is defined as the number of days elapsed from a patient’s admission date to 
discharge date (AHCA 2005).  Higher LOS indicates patients being treated are very ill 
and require greater numbers of days for recovery (Chen 1994).  Increasing patient days 
subsequently generates rising treatment costs (Rivers, Tsai & Munchus 2005) which will 
drive up hospital charges.  This makes LOS a sound control variable in its relationship to 
charges in Part 2.   
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Multiple diagnoses are derived from nine secondary clinical diagnostic categories, 
recorded for all Florida patients. Each additional secondary diagnosis may indicate a 
higher level of severity, and in turn, a higher level of costs and charges.  The number of 
secondary procedures was added for each patient to form a continuous variable, which 
ranged from zero, reflecting least severity, to nine, reflecting greatest severity. 
Although multiple diagnoses provided valuable information in preliminary 
analyses, LOS was determined to be a better variable in model development.  
Valve Procedure:  Since patient charges in Part 2 are derived from both CABG 
and valve replacement procedures, and because the data shows that charges for valve 
replacements tend to be higher than CABG procedures, a dichotomous variable was 
needed to differentiate between the two.  This variable uses CABG as the base level. 
Therefore, coding for this variable is valve replacements = 1, CABG procedures = 0. 
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Chapter 4 
Research Methods - Plan of Analysis for Parts 1 & 2 
 
 As described in the problem statement in Chapter 1, the literature repeatedly 
provides evidence that hospitals cannot make a profit with Medicare.  Yet as this research 
unfolded it became apparent that many financially strong hospitals had Medicare as a 
majority portion of their revenue base.   It was also noticeable that many of these 
hospitals were investor owned and performed higher percentages of discretionary 
procedures covered by Medicare. 
The intent of this research is to understand two strategies certain investor owned 
hospitals may use to remain financially strong with Medicare as an appreciable portion of 
their revenue base.     
Part 1 in chapters 5 & 7 will examine utilizations of certain DRG codes, 
representing discretionary procedures that are reimbursed by conventional Medicare to 
investor owned hospitals.  The purpose of Part 1 is to determine if selected discretionary 
procedures reimbursed by conventional Medicare are being utilized at significantly 
higher rates by investor owned hospitals with high TATL ratios.   
As discussed in previous sections the TATL ratio was selected to be the outcome 
variable for Part 1.  The population includes 891 investor owned, religious not-for-profit, 
other not-for-profit and hospital district acute care general hospitals, 2000-2005. 
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As discussed in model development and model results for Part 2 in chapters 6 & 
8, the outcome variable for Part 2 is total charges, and the population includes all CABG 
and valve replacement patient discharges reimbursed by Medicare HMO that occurred in 
acute care general hospitals, 2000-2005.  The purpose of Part 2 is to determine if investor 
owned hospitals are charging significantly higher amounts than not-for-profit hospitals 
under the same DRG codes reimbursed by Medicare HMO.   
Rules for Interaction Models, Model 1-B in Part 1 & Model 2-B in Part 2 
Part 1 and Part 2 of this study present both main effects and interaction models.  
A few ground rules must be established for the interaction models entailing the use of 
constitutive terms and methods of managing multicollinearity due to the inclusion of 
interacting variables. 
Constitutive Terms 
It must be expressed that interaction models in this study include all constitutive 
terms.  Constitutive terms are ―the elements that constitute the interaction term‖ 
(Brambor, Clark & Golder 2006).  This means that in a model Ŷ = β0 + β1X1 + β2X2 + 
β3X1X 2, if interaction is found for β3X1X 2 then both β1X1 and β2X2 must remain in 
the model even if these constitutive terms are not statistically significant (Cortina 1993, 
Sincich 2004, Jaccard & Turrisi 2003, Brambor, Clark & Golder 2006).   
Managing Multicollinearity in Interaction Models 
Numerous studies have been done where multicollinearity was incorrectly 
managed by excluding certain constitutive terms in interaction models.  Brambor, Clark 
& Golder (2006) have admonished researchers that constitutive terms must always be 
included in regression models except in very rare circumstances. 
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As will be shown under model results for Part 1 (Chapter 7), multicollinearity, 
though not a problem in the main effects models in this study, had to be managed in the 
interaction model in Part 1, Model 1-B.  Multicollinearity often accompanies interacting 
variables even when it is not problematic in the main effects model (Cortina 1993).  ―The 
product term (X1X2) is an exact nonlinear function of the constituent variables (X1 and 
X2), thus correlations of the constituent variables with the product term are usually high‖ 
(Cortina 1993).   
As just mentioned it is unsound to manage multicollinearity by eliminating 
constitutive terms or by avoiding interaction altogether (Brambor, Clark & Golder 2006).  
―High multicollinearity simply means that there is not enough information in the data to 
estimate the model parameters accurately, and the standard errors accurately reflect this‖ 
(Brambor, Clark & Golder 2006).  In a multiplicative interaction model what is of direct 
interest is not the significance of the model parameters per se, but the marginal effect of 
X on Y.  So the standard error of interest corresponds to the marginal effect also, not the 
standard error of the parameter estimate (Brambor, Clark & Golder 2006, Jaccard & 
Turrisi 2003). 
For interaction models affected by multicollinearity, Brambor, Clark & Golder 
(2006) have recommended certain data transformations that may be helpful in model 
interpretation.  For the models in this study several transformations were used, such as 
natural logs and centering variables, but z-scores were found to be the most useful.  The 
use of z-scores helped to deflate variance inflation and provided better comprehension of 
interacting variables and marginal effects.  The use of z-score transformations for certain 
continuous variables in Part 1 are discussed in chapters 5 & 7. 
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Variance inflation factors (VIF) are an effective and convenient method for 
assessing multicollinearity and is reported with each model in this study.  Other methods 
were also used in evaluating multicollinearity and are presented in parts 1 & 2 in the 
discussion on regression diagnostics in chapters 7 & 8. 
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Chapter 5 
Research Methods - Model Development for Part 1  
 
Descriptive Statistics for Continuous Variables Used in Part 1 
The preliminary analysis begins with a review of descriptive statistics of the 
continuous variables to be used in model development for Part 1.  Listed in Table 10 are 
the dependent variable, the TATL ratio, and independent variables, orthopedic and 
cardiac group procedure percentages per hospital. 
Table 10 
Descriptive Statistics for Continuous Variables used in Part 1, Models 1-A & 1-B 
Variable  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
TATL Ratio 4.000 4.530 0.263 31.569 
Cardiac Group Procedures 1.127% 2.208% 0.00% 15.408% 
Orthopedic Group Procedures 2.126% 1.772% 0.00% 11.750% 
  
According to Table 10, the TATL ratio has a mean of 4.000 with a standard 
deviation of 4.530.  The TATL ratio has a minimum value of 0.263 and a maximum 
value of 31.569.   The percentage of cardiac group procedures shows a mean average of 
1.127% with a standard deviation of 2.208%.  The percentages of cardiac group 
procedures performed in Florida hospitals range from zero percent (no cardiac group 
procedures performed in the hospital) to 15.408%.   Orthopedic group procedures show a 
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mean of 2.126% and standard deviation of 1.772% and range from zero percent (no 
orthopedic group procedures performed in the hospital) to 11.750%.   
Preliminary Analysis for Part 1 
A major criticism of many studies levied by Bagley White & Golomb (2001) was 
the lack of preliminary analyses preceding model development such as nonparametric 
and bivariate tests to determine the directions and magnitudes of variables.  The problem 
with insufficient preliminary analyses is that variables may be employed in models based 
on the visceral intuition of the researcher rather than a factual comprehension of the data. 
In an effort to avoid this type of criticism, several preliminary tests were used as 
precursors to the development of a regression model.  These tests were used to establish a 
secure foundation for selecting independent variables, assuring model validity, and 
generating more confidence in the findings from the models.  The preliminary analysis 
began with a review of contingency tables. 
Before contingency tables could be created certain continuous variables had to be 
converted to dichotomies.  This required the assignment of breakpoints to identify high 
vs. low levels.  As already discussed, the breakpoint for the TATL ratio was set at 5/8Q.   
Breakpoints for both cardiac and orthopedic group procedures were determined to be at 
0.75Z (three quarters of one standard deviation above the mean of z = 0).  Recall that 
earlier it was discussed that these variables had been converted to percentages per 
hospital which had then been transformed to z-scores. 
Table 11 shows results of contingency tables testing the association between the 
TATL ratio and the two chief explanatory variables, cardiac group procedures and 
orthopedic group procedures.    
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Table 11 
 2x2 Contingency Tables for TATL Ratio & Discretionary Procedures Reimbursed 
by Conventional Medicare, 2000-2005 
Variables Odds Ratio & CI 
Chi-Square 
(p-value) 
Cardiac Procedures Group (0.75Z) x TATL (5/8Q) 1.41≤ 2.03 ≤2.92 
15.09  
(0.0001) 
Orthopedic Procedures Group (0.75Z) x TATL (5/8Q) 1.08 ≤ 1.51 ≤ 2.12 
5.72  
(0.017) 
 TATL (5/8Q):  TATL breakpoint ≥ 5/8Q for the TATL distribution for all hospitals. 
 Orthopedic Procedures Group (0.75Z):  Orthopedic Procedures Group Z-Score ≥ 0.75 = 1;  else = 0 
 Cardiac Procedures Group (0.75Z):  Cardiac Procedures Group Z-Score ≥ 0.75 = 1; else = 0 
 
The association between the TATL ratio and cardiac group procedures is 
indicated via an odds ratio of 2.03 (p < 0.0001).  The odds ratio for orthopedic group 
procedures is 1.51 (p < 0.0017) with the lower end of the confidence limit down to 1.08, 
indicating fairly weak association.   Although the magnitude of association between the 
TATL ratio and orthopedic group procedures is shown to be low in Table 11, association 
was later shown to be higher between the TATL ratio and the interacting variable of 
ownership and orthopedic group procedures. 
Examinations of Potential Control Variables for Part 1 
Other factors aside from cardiac & orthopedic group procedures may help explain 
rises or declines in the TATL ratio.  The literature review cites several authors who argue 
that profitability and long term financial strength represented by high TATL ratios should 
be credited to good management more than any other factor.  Two factors that are 
associated with both good management and long term financial health are hospital 
ownership and geographic location (defined as ≥ 5/8Q median-county income in the 
distribution of 67 Florida counties). 
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Contingency table analysis was used to test each control variable and its 
association to the TATL ratio.   Results of the analyses are shown in Table 12. 
Table 12 
2x2 Contingency Tables for TATL Ratio & Hospital Ownership, Geographic 
Location, 2000-2005 
Variables Odds Ratio & CI 
Chi-Square 
(p-value) 
Ownership x TATL (5/8Q) 5.42 ≤ 7.50 ≤ 10.40 
165.96 
(0.0001) 
Geographic location (county  
median income ≥ 5/8Q) x TATL (5/8Q) 
1.06≤ 1.42 ≤ 1.90 
5.55 
(0.0194) 
 TATL (5/8Q):  TATL breakpoint ≥ 5/8 Q for the TATL distribution for all hospitals. 
 Ownership:  Investor Owned Hospital = 1; else = 0 
 Geographic location (5/8Q):  County Median Income Breakpoint ≥ 5/8Q for the median income 
distribution for 67 Florida counties; County Median Income ≥ 5/8Q = 1; else = 0.    
 
Ownership shows the greatest association with the TATL ratio demonstrated by 
an odds ratio = 7.50 (p < 0.0001).  The odds ratio for geographic location, represented by 
high (≥ 5/8Q) vs. low Florida county median income levels, shows a lower odds ratio of 
1.42 with the lower bounds of the CI at 1.06.  Geographic location is not as strong of a 
variable as ownership, but later the analysis will show it to be more useful as an 
interacting variable. 
Pretesting for Interaction Using the Breslow-Day Test 
In this study potential interaction was assessed in preliminary analyses and then 
incorporated into hypotheses preceding model development.  This practice adhered partly 
to criticisms imposed by Bagley White & Golomb (2001) and warnings by Louis (2008).   
Bagley White & Golomb have been critical of researchers who do not test for 
interaction in their models, even when such testing is warranted.  Louis warned against 
the cavalier addition of interaction terms to final models and strongly recommends that 
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interacting variables should be represented in hypotheses after being detected in 
preliminary analyses. 
Louis’ (2008) rationale to include interacting variables judiciously and based on 
careful preliminary examination is because interacting variables have less power than 
main effects variables, and as already mentioned often result in problems with 
multicollinearity.  Interactions are also vulnerable to outlier effects, and the higher-order 
the interaction the more distorting the outlier can be.   
To circumvent possible criticisms that could be levied against the methods 
employed in this investigation, the potential presence of interaction was explored 
thoroughly before incorporating interacting variables in hypotheses and placing them in 
regression models. 
Breslow Day tests were examined for stratified tables to test the potential 
presence of interaction between variables in their association with the TATL ratio.   The 
Breslow-Day test is used to assess homogeneity between the odds ratios in stratified 
contingency tests (Agresti 1999, Stokes, Davis & Kock 2003).  Interacting variables 
identified by the Breslow Day test may be used to generate hypotheses for interaction 
occurring in model development (Schwartz 2004). 
Results of the Breslow-Day tests and Cochran Mantell Henzell (CMH) odds ratios 
are shown in Table 13.  Bear in mind that the most useful information on the table is the 
results of the Breslow Day tests.  The CMH odds ratio is not so useful because it is 
usually recommended to calculate odds ratios for separate tables when the Breslow Day 
test indicates that interaction is present. 
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Table 13 
 Breslow Day Tests to Assess Interaction using 2x2 Contingency Tables & Stratified 
Analysis, 2000-2005 
Variables CMH & CI 
Chi-Square 
(p-value) 
Breslow 
Day  
(p-value) 
Ownership x TATL (2.5Q) controlling for 
Geographic location (5/8Q) 
5.25 ≤  7.24 ≤ 10.01 
165.54 
(0.0001) 
13.81 
(0.0002) 
Orthopedic Group Procedures x TATL (5/8Q) 
controlling for ownership  
1.12 ≤ 1.68 ≤ 2.49 
6.01  
(0.0142) 
21.92 
(0.0001) 
Cardiac Group Procedures x TATL (5/8Q) 
controlling for Ownership 
1.42 ≤ 2.18 ≤ 3.32 
12.32 
(0.0004) 
8.46 
(0.0036) 
 Ownership:  Investor Owned Hospital = 1; else = 0 
Orthopedic Group Procedures (0.75Z):  Orthopedic Group Procedures Z-Score ≥ 0.75 = 1; else = 0. 
Cardiac Group Procedures (0.75Z):  Cardiac Group Procedures Z-Score ≥ 0.75 = 1; else = 0. 
Geographic location (5/8Q):  County Median Income Breakpoint ≥ 5/8Q for the median income distribution for 
67 Florida counties; County Median Income ≥ 5/8Q = 1; else = 0. 
 
 Results in Table 13 indicate a low p-value (0.0002) for the Breslow-Day test for 
ownership and TATL ratio controlling for geographic location. This may indicate two-
way interaction between ownership and geographic location.   
Findings also suggest there is interaction between orthopedic group procedures 
and ownership in their association with the TATL ratio (Breslow-Day = 21.92, p < 
0.0001) as well as cardiac group procedures and ownership (Breslow-Day = 8.46, p < 
0.0036). 
These findings present a sound basis to incorporate these interacting terms in 
model development. 
Correlation Matrices  
A follow-up method is used to buttress findings from contingency tables 
regarding the variable ownership and orthopedic and cardiac group procedure variables.  
A correlation matrix to determine magnitudes of association between the TATL ratio and 
each variable, stratified by ownership is shown in Table 14.   
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Table 14 
Pearson & Spearman Correlation Coefficients for the Association between the TATL 
Ratio and Discretionary Procedures, Stratified by Ownership, 2000-2005 
 
 
Pearson Coefficients-Association  
with TATL 
 
Spearman Coefficients-Association 
 with TATL 
TATL Investor Owned Not-for-Profit Investor Owned Not-for-Profit 
Cardiac Group 
Procedures 
0.331 
<.0001 
-0.00298 
0.9474 
0.442 
0.0001 
0.04714 
0.2957 
Orthopedic 
Group Procedures 
0.466 
<.0001 
-0.02875 
0.5238 
0.497 
0.0001 
-0.00122 
0.9783 
 
 For each variable listed, whether the association is assessed by Pearson linear or 
Spearman ordinal (via rankings) correlations, the coefficients show a significant 
association under the investor owned stratum.  A Pearson coefficient of 0.331 (p < 
0.0001) and Spearman coefficient of 0.442 (p < 0.0001) are shown for the association 
between the TATL ratio and cardiac group procedures.  Pearson and Spearman show, 
respectively, coefficients of 0.466 (p < 0.0001) and 0.497 (p < 0.0001) for the association 
between the TATL ratio and orthopedic group procedures. 
No significant association is found using the Pearson or Spearman correlation 
matrices between the TATL ratio and either of the cardiac or orthopedic group procedure 
variables in the not-for-profit category. 
Comparison of Discretionary Procedure Mean Percentages 
 Cardiac and orthopedic group procedures, reimbursed by conventional Medicare 
represent small percentages per hospital.  Keep in mind that the denominator in the 
percentage calculation is total procedures per hospital under all payment sources.  This is 
very large compared to the numerator of cardiac or orthopedic group procedures 
reimbursed only by conventional Medicare. 
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But even though percentages of cardiac and orthopedic procedures are small, they 
are still significantly different with respect to hospital ownership and TATL ratio. 
An additional test was performed to compare the mean percentages of cardiac and 
orthopedic procedures based on ownership and TATL ratio. 
The ownership variable and TATL variable were combined to form a special 
variable to represent investor owned hospitals with TATL ratios ≥ 5/8Q.  This variable 
was formed so t-tests could be carried out to compare the means of cardiac group 
procedure percentages and orthopedic group procedure percentages between investor 
owned hospitals with TATL ratios ≥ 5/8Q vs. all other hospitals (i.e., all not-for-profit 
hospitals and investor owned hospitals with TATL ratios < 5/8Q).   
The results of the tests are shown in Table 15 
Table 15  
Mean Percentage Differences between Investor Owned Hospitals with High TATL 
Ratios and All Other Hospitals, Cardiac & Orthopedic Group Procedures, 
Reimbursed by Conventional Medicare, 2000-2005  
Discretionary Procedures 
Investor Owned, 
TATL ratios ≥ 5/8Q 
All Other 
Hospitals 
t-test 
(p-value) 
Cardiac Group Procedures 1.6% 0.9% 
3.48 
(0.0006) 
Orthopedic Group Procedures 2.67% 1.95% 
5.23 
(0.0001) 
 
Means for cardiac group procedures for investor owned hospitals with TATL 
ratios ≥ 5/8Q vs. all other hospitals is 1.6% and 0.9%, respectively.  A Swaitherwhite t-
test was performed (i.e., the folded F-test indicated unequal variances, p < 0.0001, so a 
pooled t-test was not used) and yielded t = 3.48 (p = 0.0006).   
This indicates that mean percentages of cardiac group procedures are significantly 
higher in investor owned hospitals with high TATL ratios vs. all other hospitals (not-for-
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profit hospitals with high and low TATL ratios and investor owned hospitals with 
TATL< 5/8Q). 
Mean percentages of orthopedic group procedures for investor owned hospitals 
with TATL ratios ≥ 5/8Q vs. all other hospitals were 2.67% and 1.95%.  A pooled t-test 
was performed (i.e., the folded F-test did not indicate unequal variances, p < 0.8858) and 
yielded t = 5.23 (p < 0.0001).  This indicates that mean percentages of orthopedic group 
procedures are significantly higher in investor owned hospitals with high TATL ratios vs. 
all other hospitals (total not-for-profit hospitals with high and low TATL ratios and 
investor owned hospitals with TATL< 5/8Q). 
Statements of Hypotheses for Part 1 
Now that the data structure, parameters, variables, DRG selection criteria, and 
preliminary analyses have been described, hypotheses can be delineated.   
Several hypotheses were formulated in connection with the research objectives 
and preliminary analyses presented in Part 1.  Hypotheses for Part 1 addressing the 
association between the TATL ratio and cardiac and orthopedic group procedures 
financed by conventional Medicare are written as follows: 
1) There is a statistically significant positive association between the continuous 
dependent variable TATL ratio and ownership, controlling for other variables 
which may also be associated with the TATL ratio.   
2) There is a statistically significant positive association between the continuous 
dependent variable TATL ratio and the two-way interaction term of ownership 
and cardiac group procedures, controlling for other variables which may also be 
associated with the TATL ratio.   
3) There is a statistically significant positive association between the continuous 
dependent variable TATL ratio and the two-way interaction term of ownership 
and orthopedic group procedures, controlling for other variables which may also 
be associated with the TATL ratio.   
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4) There is a statistically significant positive association between the continuous 
dependent variable TATL ratio and the two-way interaction term of ownership 
and geographic location, controlling for other variables which may also be 
associated with the TATL ratio.   
 
These hypotheses include interacting variables, so it is assumed that all pertinent 
main effects and constitutive terms will remain in the model. 
 
Now that hypotheses for Part 1 have been delineated they will be tested via 
regression models which are reported in a discussion on model results for Part 1 in 
Chapter 7.  Preceding the testing of hypotheses and model results for Part 1 is a 
discussion on model development for Part 2 which is provided in Chapter 6. 
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Chapter 6 
Research Methods - Model Development for Part 2 
 
Preliminary Analysis for Part 2 
The discussion of research methods now shifts from an examination of volumes 
and percentages of discretionary procedures reimbursed by conventional Medicare to an 
investigation of total charges for certain discretionary procedures reimbursed by 
Medicare HMO.   
The population parameter for Part 1 was investor owned and not-for-profit Florida 
acute care general hospitals reimbursed by conventional Medicare, 2000-2005.  One of 
two population parameters for Part 2 is patient discharge cases in acute care general 
hospitals reimbursed by Medicare HMO, 2000-2005.  A second population parameter in 
Part 2 is defined by two discretionary procedures, CABG and valve replacements, of 
which are discussed more fully later in this chapter.   
Part 2 of the analysis will test the association between total charges, as a 
continuous dependent variable and the dichotomous independent variable hospital 
ownership.  The analysis will address the question as to whether investor owned hospitals 
charge significantly greater amounts for the same DRG codes and extent of medical 
services than their not-for-profit counterparts. 
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Wennberg’s surgical signature theory was discussed in the literature review and 
refers to the geographic variability not only of the prevalence of Medicare reimbursed 
discretionary procedures, but also of Medicare spending levels that cannot be explained 
by the disease status of the population or the extent of medical services provided. 
One of the objectives of Part 2 is to determine if investor owned hospitals, as well 
as not-for-profits, assess significantly higher charges under the Medicare HMO program 
in the context of Wennberg’s surgical signature theory.   This should address the question 
if investor owned hospitals charge more for the same services, and if these charges 
increase disproportionately by geographic area. 
The analysis of total charges in Part 2 began, just as it had in Part 1, with a review 
of discretionary procedures represented by DRG codes from Appendix 1. Part 2 imposed 
the same criteria of selecting DRG codes that could be defined as discretionary based on 
clinical and geographic (variability) grounds.  As it turned out the same DRG codes that 
were determined to be important for the study under conventional Medicare in Part 1 
were also found to be useful in the study of total charges under Medicare HMO in Part 2.  
Just as it was in Part 1, model development in Part 2 is preceded by a review of 
descriptive statistics and extensive bivariate and nonparametric analyses to develop 
strong groundwork for the selection of variables and structuring of models.   
Descriptive Statistics for Continuous Variables Used in Part 2 
The preliminary analysis for Part 2 begins with a review of descriptive statistics 
of the continuous variables that will be used in model development for Part 2.  Listed in 
Table 16 is the dependent variable, patient charges, and independent variable LOS. 
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Table 16 
Descriptive Statistics for Continuous Variables used in Part 2 
Variable  Mean 
Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Patient Charges  $102,488 63,696 3,744 810,610 
Length of Stay (LOS) 10.327 6.360 1.0 92.0 
 
The table shows that mean patient charges are $102,488 with a standard deviation 
of $63,696.   This variable has a very broad range with a minimum of $3,744 and 
maximum of $810,610.  Mean days of hospitalization is 10.327 days with a standard 
deviation of 6.360 days.  Minimum LOS is one day with a maximum of 92.0 days.   
It was surprising that the minimum value for LOS was one day, as it was thought 
that the minimum value may be higher.  Upon closer examination it was found that 33 
observations had LOS equal to one day.  Of these observations, three were discharged to 
home care under the supervision of a home healthcare organization while the others were 
discharged to home without further supervision. 
As the preliminary analysis ensues more information will be provided about these 
two variables.   Additional information forthcoming will be even more meaningful 
because it will show patient charges and LOS stratified by hospital ownership and 
procedures (i.e., CABG vs. valve replacements). 
Selection of DRG Codes for Part 2 
Analysis of Mean Charges for DRG Codes Reimbursed by Medicare HMO 
The selection of DRG codes entailed a review of differences of mean total 
charges between investor owned and not-for-profit facilities.  An examination of these 
differences in mean charges is shown in Table 17 using percentage changes and t-tests.  
Two of the t-tests shown in the table are pooled t-tests, but all others are Satterthwaite t-
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tests.  The Satterthwaite t-test was used for tests where the significant folded F-test 
indicated unequal variances.   
Before reviewing the table, it should be pointed out that any reader familiar with 
hospital reimbursement amounts under Medicare (conventional or HMO) will find these 
amounts excessive.  What is actually reimbursed under Medicare HMO tends to be only a 
fraction of total patient charges.  Reimbursement levels are also important because they, 
not charges, represent actual amounts of federal spending.  Therefore, levels of 
reimbursement under Medicare HMO will be addressed in model development for Part 2 
in Chapter 8.  But keep in mind that the focus of Part 2’s investigation is on total patient 
charges, and the inconsistencies in charging patterns based on hospital ownership and 
geography.  Table 17 is now presented below. 
Table 17 
Analysis of Mean Total Charges for Selected Medicare HMO Procedures by 
Ownership, 2000-2005 
Procedure Investor Owned Not-for-Profit Differences 
Actual (%) 
t-test 
(P values) 
Valve Replacement 168,685 114,004 54,681 
(48.0%) 
17.89 
(0.0001) 
CABG  126,402 81,734 44,668 
(54.7%) 
33.01 
(0.0001) 
PCI 57,233 42,980 14,253 
(33.2%) 
32.27 
(0.0001) 
Joint & Limb  47,134 34,899 12,235 
(35.1%) 
35.85 
(0.0001) 
Hip & Femur  39,324 29,216 10,108 
(34.6%) 
20.63 
(0.0001) 
Spinal Fusion 62,567 58,861 3,706 
(6.3%) 
1.77 
(0.0764) 
Knee Procedures 53,734 43,727 10,007 
(22.9%) 
5.86* 
(0.0001) 
Prostatectomy  20,317 14,935 5,382 
(36.0%) 
10.73 
(0.0001) 
Mastectomy 21,408 15,439 5,969 
(38.7%) 
10.50* 
(0.0001) 
Pooled t-tests where variances are equal.  All other tests were Swaitherwaite t-tests, as Folded F-
tests showed that variances of total charges between investor owned and not-for-profit hospitals 
were found to be unequal. 
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With the exception of spinal fusion (t = 1.77, p = 0.0764), results of t-tests 
indicate that investor owned facilities assess total charges for each procedure 
significantly higher than their not-for-profit counterparts.  Percentage differences for each 
of the means of CABG and valve procedures respectively are approximately 48.0% & 
54.7% greater.  For PCI, investor owned hospitals charge about 33.2% more than not-for-
profits.   
Investor owned hospitals charge between 34% & 39% more for joint & limb 
procedures, hip & femur procedures, prostitectomies, and mastectomies, and 23% more 
for knee procedures. 
Large as well as statistically significant differences for mean charges between 
investor owned and not-for-profit facilities provide a strong basis for using these 
procedures in model development for total charges. 
Selection of CABG & Valve Replacements as Population Parameters 
It has already been stated that population parameters for models in Part 2 are 
patients treated with CABG and valve replacement procedures under Medicare HMO, 
2000-2005. 
It should be addressed why CABG and valve procedures were selected as 
population parameters and not the other discretionary procedures listed back on Table 17.   
These procedures were chosen because they best adhered to research criteria regarding 
DRG code selection. They show the highest dollar amounts for total patient charges, and 
the highest percentage differences between investor owned and not-for-profit hospitals.  
Consequently, CABG (DRG codes 106, 107, 109, 547, 548, 549, 550) and valve 
replacement procedures (DRG codes 104, 105), reimbursed by Medicare HMO, 2000-
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2005, represent population parameters, and procedures performed under these DRG 
codes will populate the dataset for analyses in Part 2. 
Review & Selection of Potential Covariates 
Model development will feature ownership as the explanatory variable.  Just as in  
Part 1, models in Part 2 need to control for factors that in addition to ownership are 
associated with the dependent variable, total charges.   
After a review of preliminary analyses, the selection of covariates included LOS 
and geographic sector.  LOS is a continuous variable while geographic sector is a 
dichotomy representing the south region vs. the combined north & central regions, with 
north and central regions as the base level. 
Controlling for Patient Disease Severity 
LOS and multiple diagnoses were both considered as covariates because they 
represent measures of patient severity.  Total patient charges will increase corresponding 
to additional days of hospitalization or in connection with greater numbers of secondary 
diagnoses.  There was a problem using both variables in the same model because they are 
each associated with charges and with each other.  Because these variables are related 
and redundant, a determination had to be made to select the variable that had the 
strongest correlation with total charges.   
To do this, a correlation matrix was created using total charges, LOS, and 
multiple diagnoses.  The results are shown below in Table 18. 
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Table 18 
 Pearson & Spearman Correlation Coefficients, Associations between Total Charges & Potential 
Variables for Model Development, 2000-2005 
 Total Patient Charges 
Pearson (p-value) 
Spearman (p-value) 
LOS 
Pearson (p-value) 
Spearman (p-value) 
Multiple Diagnoses 
Pearson (p-value) 
Spearman (p-value) 
Total Patient Charges 
Pearson (p-value) 
Spearman (p-value) 
 
1.00 
1.00 
 
0.648 (0.0001) 
0.550 (0.0001) 
 
0.331 (0.0001) 
0.390 (0.0001) 
LOS 
Pearson (p-value) 
Spearman (p-value) 
 
0.648 (0.0001) 
0.550 (0.0001) 
 
1.00 
1.00 
 
0.376 (0.0001) 
0.482 (0.0001) 
Multiple Diagnoses 
Pearson (p-value) 
Spearman (p-value) 
 
0.331 (0.0001) 
0.390 (0.0001) 
 
0.376 (0.0001) 
0.482 (0.0001) 
 
1.00 
1.00 
 
Not surprisingly, the Pearson correlation coefficient for LOS is very high at 0.648 
(p < 0.0001) for the linear association between charges and LOS.  The association 
between ordinal rankings using the Spearman correlation coefficient is 0.550 (p < 
0.0001). 
The linear association between charges and multiple diagnoses is also fairly high 
at 0.331 with ordinal (rankings) association even higher at 0.390(p < 0.0001).  Although 
the coefficients for multiple diagnoses are high, they are still not nearly as high as LOS. 
 What is also noticeable, and as previously discussed, is the association between 
LOS and multiple diagnoses, Pearson = 0.376 (p < 0.0001) and Spearman = 0.482 (p < 
0.0001) indicating high association between these two covariates.   
Ultimately, LOS was selected as the covariate in model development because it 
demonstrated much higher correlation with total patient charges. 
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Charges per Hospital Day  
The mean average LOS for CABG procedures is 9.907 days with a standard 
deviation of 5.816 days.  There is a minimum of two days and a maximum of 92 days.  
Valve procedures show a mean average of 11.404 days with a standard deviation of 7.47 
days, a minimum of one day and a maximum of 71 days. 
Investor owned hospitals show a higher mean LOS for CABG procedures of 
10.113 days, while not-for-profits show a mean of 9.806 days.  Investor owned hospitals 
also show slightly higher mean average LOS for valve replacement procedures.  Not-for-
profits show a mean of 11.308 days, and investor owned hospitals show a mean of 11.644 
days. 
What is different between investor owned hospitals and not-for-profits with 
respect to LOS is charges per day of hospitalization.  LOS and total charges were used to 
calculate total charges per patient day for valve replacements and CABG procedures, 
stratified by ownership (i.e., total charges ÷ total days of hospitalization), which is 
presented in Table 19.   
Table 19  
Charges Per Patient Day - Valve Replacement & CABG Procedures, Investor 
Owned vs. Not-for-Profit Hospitals, Medicare HMO, 2000-2005   
 Valve Replacements CABG 
 
Charges/LOS 
Investor 
Owned 
Not-for-
Profit 
Investor 
Owned 
Not-for-
Profit 
Mean Charges/LOS  $18,143 $12,515 $13,526 $9,246 
Standard Deviation $17,730 $11,529 $5,820 $6,129 
Coefficient of Variation 0.98 0.92 0.43 0.66 
 
 
Mean charges per patient day for valve replacements in investor-owned hospitals 
is $18,143 compared to $12,515 in not-for-profits.  Average charges per patient day in 
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investor owned hospitals are $13,526 for CABG procedures compared to $9,246 in not-
for-profit hospitals. 
The preliminary findings in Table 19 indicate that higher mean total patient 
charges by investor owned hospitals are not due to higher average LOS.  A similar table 
(not shown) was constructed for mean total patient charges by numbers of secondary 
diagnoses.  It was found that mean total patient charges were also much higher for each 
diagnostic level for investor owned hospitals.  This indicates that mean higher charges are 
not due to investor owned hospitals caring for sicker patients (i.e., those with higher 
numbers of secondary diagnoses). 
Geographic Region (Florida Inspection Area) 
As already mentioned, the geographic region variable was collapsed from a three-
level to a dichotomous variable where combined north and central regions represent the 
base level.  However, it is still useful to review the disparities in charges between each 
region.   
Geographic region turned out to be a very important variable because it was found 
that total charges for valve replacement and CABG procedures differ significantly with 
respect to geographic sector.  Figure 4 is a Pareto chart showing mean charges on the left 
y-axis and volumes on the right y-axis.    
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Figure 4 
Source: AHCA Patient Discharge Dataset, 2000-2005 
 
Mean charges, covering years 2000-2005, for valve replacement and CABG 
procedures run $72,834 in North Florida while they are $100,021 in central Florida and 
over 120,000 in south Florida.   
Volumes also differ with respect to geographic sector, as there are around 2,000 
valve replacement and CABG procedures performed in north Florida, over 5,000 in 
central, and a little over 6,000 in south Florida. 
Figures 5 and 6 are also Pareto charts showing mean charges and volumes by 
sector for each individual procedure.  These two charts report the same information as 
Figure 4, but charges are broken down separately for CABG and valve procedures. 
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Figure 5      Figure 6 
Source: AHCA Patient Discharge Dataset, 2000-2005  Source: AHCA Patient Discharge Dataset, 2000-2005 
 
 
 Differences in mean charges as well as volumes by geographic sector are 
consistent with Wennberg’s surgical signature theory.  Recall that a certain aspect of this 
theory, discussed in the literature review, is that certain types of discretionary procedures 
and related federal spending significantly differ by geographic region with no link to 
disease status of the population.  It is possible that differences in volumes and patient 
charges, shown in figures 5 and 6, are consistent with the surgical signature theory. 
 It has been demonstrated so far that patient charges are broadly variable with 
respect to hospital ownership and geography.  Figure 7 now shows a comparison of 
Medicare HMO total patient CABG and valve replacement charges by geographic region, 
stratified by ownership.   
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Figure 7 
Source: AHCA Discharge Dataset, 2000-2005 
 
It appears from this chart that investor owned hospitals are not the only ones 
increasing Medicare HMO charges in certain regions of Florida.  Though not as high as 
investor owned hospitals, southern Florida not-for-profits also assess higher CABG and 
valve replacement charges relative to not-for-profits in the north and central regions. 
Total patient charges increase by approximately $14,000 (10.8%) between the 
south geographic region and other regions for investor owned hospitals.  But not-for-
profits increase charges in general by almost $30,000 (37.5%) for procedures occurring in 
hospitals located in the southern regions vs. those in the central and northern regions. 
Contingency Tables 
 Similar to methods used in Part 1, covariates were also tested using contingency 
tables in Part 2. For total charges to be used in the contingency table it had to be 
converted from a continuous to a categorical variable.   As discussed under ―Independent 
& Dependent Variables for Part 2,‖ the breakpoint to dichotomize high vs. low total 
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patient charges is 5/8Q, half the distance between the second and third quartile in the 
distribution of total charges. Results of the first contingency table analyses are shown in 
Table 20.  These tables are used to test the association between total charges and 
ownership and total charges and south geographic region. 
Table 20 
2x2 Contingency Table Analysis for Total Charges and Ownership & 
Geographic Region, Medicare HMO Financed Valve Replacement & CABG 
Procedures, 2000-2005 
Variables Odds Ratio & CI Chi-Square (p-value) 
Ownership x Total Patient Charges 3.35 ≤ 3.67 ≤ 3.99 913.94 (< 0.0001) 
South Geographic Region x Total Patient 
Charges 
1.67  ≤ 1.83 ≤ 1.99 201.53 (< 0.0001) 
 Ownership:  Investor owned hospital = 1; Not-for-profit= 0. 
 Total Patient Charges:  High total charges ≥ 5/8Q; Low total Charges <  5/8Q 
 South Geographic Sector:  South = 1;  Central or North = 0 
 
The association between ownership and total charges shows an odds ratio of 3.67 
(p < 0.0001) indicating that the odds of total charges amounting to ≥ 5/8Q is 3.67 times 
greater in investor owned hospitals relative to not-for-profits.  Another odds ratio, 1.83 (p 
< 0.0001) is then observed between total patient charges and south geographic region.  
The odds of a south county hospital assessing charges ≥ 5/8Q is 1.83 times the odds of 
charges being assessed at ≥ 5/8Q for hospitals in a north or central region. 
These odds ratios demonstrate a positive association between total charges and 
ownership and total charges and south geographic region.  This indicates that ownership 
and geographic region will be sound variables in model development. 
Homogeneity of the Odds Ratios 
 As in Part 1, contingency tables are again used to pre-test the presence of 
interaction for the model development stage.  This is done via stratifying the analysis and 
then testing for the homogeneity of the odds ratio via a Breslow-Day test.  Table 21 
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presents results of stratified contingency table analysis.  As stated in Part 1, it is the 
Breslow Day test that is the most meaningful information on the table, as it is often 
advisable to calculate a separate odds ratio for each table when interaction is present. 
Table 21 
Breslow Day Test to Assess Interaction using a 2x2 Contingency Stratified Table, 
CABG & Valve Replacements Financed by Medicare HMO, 2000-2005 
Variables CMH & CI 
Chi-Square 
(p-value) 
Breslow Day 
(p-value) 
Ownership  x Total Charges controlling for 
South Geographic Sector 
3.26 ≤ 3.56 ≤ 3.86 
872.46 
(< 0.0001) 
36.98 
( 0.0001) 
 
 The table shows results of the contingency table testing the association between 
total patient charges and south geographic sector controlling for ownership.  A Breslow 
Day test value of 36.98 (p = 0.0001) indicates the presence of interaction between 
ownership and south geographic region.  It provides sound rationale to test the interaction 
of these two variables in model development. 
Statements Hypotheses for Part 2 
Now that the preliminary analyses have been completed, hypotheses will be stated 
for Part 2 which addresses charges for CABG and valve replacement procedures financed 
by Medicare HMO.  These hypotheses are written as follows.   
1) There is a statistically significant positive relationship between the continuous 
dependent variable, total patient charges and LOS for CABG and valve 
replacement procedures reimbursed by Medicare HMO, 2000-2005, 
controlling for other variables which may also be associated with total patient 
charges. 
2) There is a statistically significant positive relationship between the continuous 
dependent variable, total patient charges and ownership for CABG and valve 
replacement procedures reimbursed by Medicare HMO, 2000-2005, 
controlling for other variables which may also be associated with total patient 
charges. 
3) There is a statistically significant positive relationship between the continuous 
dependent variable, total patient charges and geographic sector for CABG and 
valve replacement procedures reimbursed by Medicare HMO, 2000-2005, 
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controlling for other variables which may also be associated with total patient 
charges. 
4) There is a statistically significant positive relationship between the continuous 
dependent variable, total patient charges and the two-way interaction term for 
ownership and geographic sector for CABG and valve replacement 
procedures reimbursed by Medicare HMO, 2000-2005, controlling for other 
variables which may also be associated with total patient charges. 
 
Now that hypotheses for Part 2 have been delineated they will be tested via 
regression models of which will be presented in Chapter 8.  Prior to the discussion on 
model results for Part 2 is a presentation on model results for Part 1 which is provided 
in Chapter 7. 
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Chapter 7 
Model Results for Part 1 
Testing the Association between the TATL Ratio and Discretionary Procedures 
(Reimbursed by Conventional Medicare) 
 
Organization of Model Findings 
Model results for Part 1 will feature Model 1-A, a main effects model and Model 
1-B, an interaction model.  The presentation of model findings is followed by a 
discussion on regression diagnostics for Model 1-B. 
Model 1-A: Main Effects Model 
Crude estimates indicated that investor owned hospitals with high TATL ratios 
carry out certain discretionary cardiac and orthopedic group procedures reimbursed by 
conventional Medicare at higher rates (not volumes) than other hospitals.  This will now 
be further tested in the development of Model 1-A which contains the covariates 
discussed in Chapter 3.  Model 1-A, a main effects MLS model is expressed as follows: 
Regression Equation for Model 1-A 
ŷTATL =  β0 + β1X  + β2P + β3C + β4R  + є 
Where: X = Ownership 
  P = Geographic location 
  C = Z-Cardiac Group Procedures  
  R = Z-Orthopedic Group Procedures  
Model 1-A was employed, and an examination of initial findings is shown below 
in Table 22.  
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Table 22  
Model 1-A: Main Effects Model  
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F-Value Pr>F 
Model 4 5,647 1,411.8 91.28 <0.0001 
Error 886 13,703 15.46   
Corrected Total 890 19,351    
Root MSE 3.93     
Dependent Mean 3.93  R
2
 0.2918  
CV  100.12  Adjusted R
2
 0.2886  
 
The main effects model shows a global F test of 91.28 (p < 0.0001) indicating that 
the parameter estimate of at least one variable in the model is significant. 
Findings also show a dependent mean, 3.93 equaling the mean average of the 
TATL ratio for all observations of the dependent variable.  The (textbook) ideal for the 
CV in the regression output is 10.0 (Sincich 2004).  Regressions using real world data 
rarely derive a CV of 10.0, but Model 1-A’s CV of 100.12 is high even for real world 
data. 
There is an R
2
 of 0.2918 and adjusted R
2 
of 0.2886 which is fairly low regarding 
linearity and model fit.  It should be pointed out that the R
2
 is very close to the adjusted 
R
2
.  This may be important in model results because a large distance between the R
2
 and 
the adjusted R
2
 sometimes indicates there are too many variables in the model, and 
perhaps one or more of them should be excluded (Sincich 2005).   
Table 23 presents parameter estimates, p-values, and VIF for Model 1-A. At the 
bottom of this table there is documentation provided on the coding of variables in Model 
1-A. 
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Table 23 
Model 1-A:  Main Effects Model Parameter Estimates 
Variables 
Parameter 
Estimates 
Standard 
Errors 
t-Values Pr > |t| 
 
VIF 
Intercept 1.55623 0.23721 6.56 <.0001 0 
Ownership 4.03304 0.26578 15.17 <.0001 1.00531 
Geographic location  0.99093 0.27618 3.59 0.0004 1.07026 
Z-Cardiac Procedures Group 0.80545 0.13447 5.99 <.0001 1.04047 
Z-Orthopedic Procedures Group 0.85122 0.13738 6.20 <.0001 1.08599 
Coding for Variables: 
 Ownership:  Investor owned hospital = 1; Not-for-Profit = 0 
 Cardio Group Procedures: Z-score transformed percent of patients per hospital treated under a 
DRG code identified as a cardiac group procedure in this study. 
 Orthopedic Group Procedures:  Z-score transformed percent of patients per hospital treated 
under a DRG code identified as an orthopedic procedure in this study. 
 Geographic location:  Median income ≥ 5/8Q = 1; Else = 0 
 
VIF, was very low in Model 1-A, ranging roughly between 1.0 and 1.08 for all 
independent variables, indicating no problem with multicollinearity.   
Parameter estimates for ownership and geographic location, shown in Table 23, 
are significant and very high.  Ownership shows a parameter estimate of 4.03 indicating 
that investor owned hospitals on the average have TATL ratios that are four points above 
the average TATL ratio of not-for-profits. 
Hospitals located in higher income counties (≥ 5/8Q of the median income 
distribution for all Florida counties), on the average, have TATL ratios that are almost 
one (0.99) point higher than facilities located in lower income counties.   
Cardiac and orthopedic group procedures have significant but lower betas of 0.81 
& 0.75 respectively.  Bear in mind that cardiac and orthopedic group procedures are 
coded as z-scores.  So in the interpretation of the betas, hospitals that perform these 
procedures at a rate of 1Z higher than the mean (z = 0) are shown to have TATL ratios 
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respectively 4/5 of a point and 3/4 of a point higher than hospitals that perform these 
procedures at a rate of z = 0. 
Model 1-B: Interaction Model  
The main effects model was very useful in evaluating variables and gaining 
further insights into the workings of the data, but beyond this it became less relevant in 
light of the findings in the subsequent interaction model, 1-B.  Thus, Model 1-B is the 
model used to test the hypotheses delineated for Part 1 of this investigation. 
The MLS regression equation for Model 1-B is shown as follows. 
Regression Equation for Model 1-B 
ŷTATL =  β0 + β1X  + β2P + β3C + β4R  + β5XP + β6XC + β7XR   
 
Where: X = Ownership 
  P = Geographic location 
  C = Z-Cardiac Group Procedures  
  R = Z-Orthopedic Group Procedures  
Partial F-tests were very helpful in evaluating the inclusion and usefulness of 
certain interactive variables.  The use of partial residuals helped evaluate and determine 
unnecessary the inclusion of a quadratic term(s) in the model.  
Initial findings of Model 1-B are shown below. 
Table 24 
Model 1-B: Interaction Model 
Source DF Sum of Squares Mean Square F-Value Pr>F 
Model 7 7,867.30 1,123.90 86.42 <0.0001 
Error 883 11,483 13.00   
Corrected Total 890 19,351    
Root MSE 3.61     
Dependent Mean 3.93  R
2
 0.4066  
Coefficient of  
Variation (CV) 
91.80  Adjusted R
2
 0.4019  
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 Table 24 shows that the interaction model 1-B has seven degrees of freedom (i.e., 
seven variables) due to interaction terms added in the model compared to the main effects 
model which had four.  The dependent (TATL ratio) mean in the interaction model is of 
course identical to that of the main effects model at 3.93.   
 The interaction model is a better fitting model than the main effects model.  The 
root MSE and CV are slightly smaller in the interaction model at 3.61 and 91.80 
compared to 3.93 and 100.12 in the main effects model.  Likewise the adjusted R
2
 is 
0.4019 in the interaction model compared to 0.2886 in the main effects model, reflecting 
better goodness of fit and a higher percentage of explanation of the variance in the data 
by the model.  
Significance of the Interaction Model Using the F-Test 
Before proceeding with a review of parameter estimates, it should first be 
determined if the interaction model is significant relative to the main effects model. A 
method to test the significance of the interaction model is the general F-test.   
The formula for the F-test is as follows: 
 
Sources:  Aichen & West 1991, Young 2006, Jaccard & Turrisi 2003   
 
The test was calculated yielding a very high F value of 55.76 (p < 0.0001) with 
R1
2 
= 0.2886 and R2
2 
= 0.4019; df1 = k2 – k1 (7 – 4) = 3 and df2 = N – k2 – 1 (891 – 7 – 1) 
= 883.   
The F-test indicates that Model 1-B is significant relative to Model 1-A. 
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Parameter Estimates  
Now that the significance of the interaction model 1-B has been established the 
parameter estimates for this model are shown in Table 25.  
Table 25  
Model 1-B:  Interaction Model Parameter Estimates 
 Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
t-Value P<| t | VIF 
Β0 Intercept 2.03691 0.25435 8.01 <.0001 0 
Β1X Ownership 2.766 0.38406 7.2 <.0001 2.49652 
Β2P Geographic location  0.0957 0.34185 0.28 0.7796 1.95004 
Β3C Z-Cardiac Group Procedures 0.0004 0.20616 0 0.9984 2.90873 
Β4R Z-Orthopedic Group Procedures -0.0779 0.16577 -0.47 0.6385 1.88050 
Β5XP Ownership x Geographic location 2.2326 0.50934 4.38 <.0001 3.45155 
Β6XC Ownership x  Z-Cardiac Group 
Procedures 
1.1402 0.25742 4.43 <.0001 2.90506 
Β6XR Ownership x Z-Orthopedic 
Procedures Group 
2.3385 0.25543 9.16 <.0001 1.85193 
Coding for Variables: 
 Ownership:  Investor owned hospital = 1; Not-for-Profit = 0 
 Cardio Group Procedures: Z-score transformed percent of patients per hospital treated under a 
DRG code identified as a cardiac group procedure in this study. 
 Orthopedic Group Procedures:  Z-score transformed percent of patients per hospital treated 
under a DRG code identified as an orthopedic procedure in this study. 
 Geographic location:  Median income ≥ 5/8Q = 1; Else = 0 
 
Table 25 shows that VIF is very low, less than the (conservative) rule-of-thumb of 
5.0, indicating that the conversion to z-scores for cardiac and orthopedic group 
procedures was effective in managing multicollinearity. 
Table 25 shows a parameter estimate for ownership of 2.77.  Recall that the beta 
for ownership in the main effects model, 1-A was 4.06.  The smaller beta for ownership 
in the interaction model is due to a more thorough explanation of the relationship 
between the TATL ratio and ownership by the inclusion of variables that interact with 
ownership. 
 123 
Parameter estimates for z-orthopedic group procedures and z-cardiac group 
procedures are very low and not significant.  But they still must remain in the model 
because they are constitutive terms in connection with interaction variables, ownership x 
z-orthopedic group procedures and ownership x z-cardiac group procedures.  The same is 
true for the variable geographic location.  Marginal effects for interacting variables will 
be discussed in the following section. 
Interpreting Marginal Effects of Interaction Terms in Model 1-B 
 
Marginal Effects of the Interaction Term Orthopedic 
Group Procedures x Ownership 
 
Brambor, Clark & Golder (2006) have pointed out that many researchers establish 
interaction models, but then do not go on to calculate the marginal effects of the 
interaction terms.  To avoid this type of shortcoming in the investigation, marginal effects 
were calculated for the interaction terms in Model 1-B.   
In examining the interaction terms, the models can be presented according to four 
conditions in connection with the interaction of orthopedic group procedures and 
ownership:  R = 1Z, X = 1; R = 0Z, X = 0; R = 1Z, X = 0; R = 0Z, X = 1 (where R = 
orthopedic group procedures and X = ownership).  
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Table 26 shows marginal effects of each condition. 
Table 26 
Marginal Effects for the Interaction Term Orthopedic Group Procedures x Ownership, 
Four Conditions 
 Variable R=1Z, X=1 R=0Z, X=0 R=1Z, X=0 R=0Z, X=1 
Β0 Intercept 2.037 2.037 2.037 2.037 
Β1X Ownership 2.766   2.766 
Β2P Geographic location  0.096 0.096 0.096 0.096 
Β3C Z-Cardiac Group Procedures 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
Β4R Z-Orthopedic Group Procedures -0.0779  -0.078  
Β5XP Ownership x Geographic location 2.233   2.233 
Β6XC 
Ownership x  Z-Cardiac Group 
Procedures 
1.140   1.140 
Β7XR 
Ownership x Z-Orthopedic 
Procedures Group 
2.339    
 Totals 10.533 2.133 2.055 8.272 
Where R =  Z-Orthopedic Group Procedures and X = Ownership 
 
The marginal effect of each condition is as follows: R = 1Z, X = 1 = 10.533; R = 
0Z, X = 0 = 2.133; R = 1Z, X = 0 = 2.055; and R = 0Z, X = 1 = 8.272. 
An important difference is found between models where X = 1, R = 1 and X = 0, 
R = 0, which is shown below. 
β0 + β1 + β2P + β3C + β4 + β5P + β6C + β7 
 
− β0 + β2P + β3C = 10.533 – 2.133 = 8.40 
 
The true difference between the models, where z-orthopedic group procedures = 
1Z and ownership = 1 vs. z-orthopedic group procedures = 0Z and ownership = 0 
amounts to 8.40 TATL ratio points.  This is a very large difference between TATL ratios 
which is due chiefly to ownership. 
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Marginal Effect of Orthopedic Group Procedures When Ownership = 1 
To determine the contribution of orthopedic group procedures, two other models 
are compared.  This includes z-orthopedic group procedures = 1Z and ownership = 1 vs. 
z-orthopedic group procedures = 0Z and ownership = 1.  The difference between these 
two models is:  
β0 + β1 + β2P + β3C + β4 + β5P + β6C + β7 
 
− β0 + β1 + β2P + β3C + β5P + β6C =10.53 – 8.272 = 2.261 
 
 
The marginal effect of the interaction term for orthopedic group procedures and 
ownership is 2.261 TATL ratio points. 
The interaction term can also be written ŷ = β0 + β1X + β4R + β7RX 
(where R = z-orthopedic group procedures and X = ownership) of which the marginal 
effect may be interpreted ∂Y/∂R = β4 + β7X (i.e., β4 at X) (Jaccard & Turrisi 2003, 
Aichen & West 1991).  The marginal effect may then be calculated -0.0779 + 2.339 (X) = 
2.261.   
It should be understood that the focal variable in this case is orthopedic group 
procedures, and the modifying variable is ownership.  In other words, the marginal effect 
is determined by the association between the TATL ratio and orthopedic group 
procedures at 1Z (one standard deviation above the mean of z = 0) when ownership is 
present (i.e., ownership = 1) (Jaccard & Turrisi 2003). 
So in general, investor owned hospitals will have TATL ratios that are 2.26 points 
higher if they perform conventional Medicare reimbursed orthopedic group procedures at 
1Z above the mean.  
 126 
Standard Error & t-Value for the Marginal Effect 
Recall from Table 25 that the parameter for interaction term XR is significant (p < 
0.0001).  But this does not necessarily mean that the marginal effect of the interaction is 
significant (Brambor Clark & Golder 2007, Jaccard & Turrisi 2003).  To determine the 
significance of the marginal effect of orthopedic group procedures on the TATL ratio 
when ownership is present, the following formula is employed.  This formula shows the 
standard error for the association between the TATL ratio and orthopedic group 
procedures when ownership = 1 (i.e., Β4 at X) (Aichen & West 1991). 
σ∂Y/∂R = [var(Β4 ) + X
2
var(Β7)+ 2Xcov(Β4 Β7)]
1/2 
The standard error formula contains variances for Β4 and Β7 and a covariance for  
(Β4 Β7) (Jaccard & Turrisi 2003).  These variances and covariance are shown in 
Appendix 7 which provides a variance-covariance matrix for Model 1-B.  The appendix 
also shows the calculations in connection with the standard error formula.  From this 
formula it is determined that the standard error for orthopedic group procedures when 
ownership = 1 is 0.1943.  It had already been determined that the marginal effect (Β4 at 
X) is 2.261.   
To determine the significance of the marginal effect a t-value is computed.   
t = (Β4 at X) / SE (Β4 at X) 
= 2.261 / 0.1943 = 11.633. 
The t-value is distributed at N – k – 1 degrees of freedom, where k is the number 
of predictor terms in the interactive model (in this case k = 7, so df = 891 – 7 –1 = 883).  
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The marginal effect of the interaction term is determined to be significant with t = 11.633 
(p-value < 0.0001) (Aiken West 1991, Jaccard & Turissi 2003).   
This indicates that investor owned hospitals that perform orthopedic group 
procedures at 1Z above the mean have, on the average, TATL ratios that are 2.261 points 
higher than investor owned hospitals that perform orthopedic group procedures at the 
mean (z = 0). 
Marginal Effects of the Interaction Term Cardiac  
Group Procedures x Ownership 
A second interaction term is now tested featuring z-cardiac group procedures x 
ownership.  Table 27 is constructed to show the marginal effects under four conditions, C 
= 1Z, X = 1, C = 0Z, X = 0, C = 1Z, X = 0, C = 0Z, X = 1 (where C = z-cardiac group 
procedures and X = ownership). 
Table 27 
Marginal Effects for the Interaction Term Cardiac Group Procedures x Ownership, 
Four Conditions 
 Variable C=1, X=1Z C=0Z, X=0 C=1Z, X=0 C=0Z, X=1 
Β0 Intercept 2.037 2.037 2.037 2.037 
Β1X Ownership 2.766   2.766 
Β2P Geographic location  0.096 0.096 0.096 0.096 
Β3C Z-Cardiac Group Procedures 0.0004  0.0004  
Β4R Z-Orthopedic Group Procedures -0.078 -0.078 -0.078 -0.078 
Β5XP Ownership x Geographic location 2.233   2.233 
Β6XC 
Ownership x  Z-Cardiac Group 
Procedures 
1.140    
Β7XR 
Ownership x Z-Orthopedic 
Procedures Group 
2.339   2.339 
 Totals 10.5334 2.0550 2.0554 9.393 
Where C =  Z-Cardiac Group Procedures and X = Ownership 
 
Marginal effects for each condition include:  C = 1Z, X = 1 = 10.533; C = 0Z, X = 
0 = 2.0550; C = 1Z, X = 0 = 2.0554; and C = 0Z, X = 1 = 9.393. 
 128 
The true difference between models where X = 1, C = 1Z and X = 0, C = 0Z is 
shown as follows. 
β0 + β1 + β2P + β3 + β4 R + β5P + β6 + β7R 
 
− β0 + β2P+ β4R = 10.5334 – 2.0550 = 8.4780 
 
The difference between the models, where z-cardiac group procedures = 1Z and 
ownership = 1 vs. z-cardiac group procedures = 0Z and ownership = 0 amounts to 8.4780 
TATL ratio points.   
Marginal Effect of Cardiac Group Procedures When Ownership = 1 
To determine the contribution of cardiac group procedures a comparison is made 
between the models where cardiac group procedures = 1Z and ownership = 1 vs. cardiac 
group procedures = 0Z and ownership = 1.  The difference between these two models is:  
β0 + β1 + β2P + β3 + β4 R + β5P + β6 + β7R 
 
− β0 + β1 + β2P + β4 R + β5P + β7R  
 
= 10.5334 – 9.3930 = 1.1404 
 
In this case, the focal variable is cardiac group procedures, so the marginal effect 
will be determined by the association between the TATL ratio and cardiac group 
procedures at 1Z (one standard deviation above the mean, z = 0) when ownership is 
present (i.e., ownership = 1).   
The interaction term is then written ŷ = β0 + β3C + β1X + β6CX (where C 
= cardiac group procedures and X = ownership) of which the marginal effect is 
interpreted ∂Y/∂C = β3 + β6X.  The marginal effect may then be calculated .0004 + 
1.40(X) = 1.1404.  This indicates that, on the average, investor owned hospitals that 
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perform cardiac group procedures at 1Z have TATL ratios that are 1.1404 points higher 
than other investor owned hospitals that perform cardiac group procedures at the mean (Z 
= 0). 
For the marginal effect for cardiac group procedures when ownership = 1 (β3 at 
X) to be meaningful a test of significance must be performed, just as it was previously for 
orthopedic group procedures when ownership = 1.  This first requires the calculation of a 
standard error for the marginal effect of which the formula is written below. 
σ∂Y/∂C = [var(Β3 ) + X
2
var(Β6)+ 2Xcov(Β3 Β6)]
1/2 
As already mentioned, Appendix 7 provides the variance-covariance matrix for 
Model 1-B and shows marginal effects and standard error calculations for ∂Y/∂C.  From 
this formula it is demonstrated that the standard error for cardiac group procedures when 
ownership = 1 is 0.1541.  The marginal effect for the interaction between cardiac group 
procedures and ownership is 1.1404.  To determine the significance of the marginal effect 
(Β3 at X = 1) a t-value distributed with N – k – 1 (883) degrees of freedom is computed.  
t = (Β3 at X) / SE (Β3 at X) 
= 1.1404 / 0.1541 = 7.4003 (p < 0.0001) 
The marginal effect of the interaction term for cardiac group procedures and 
ownership is found to be significant with t = 7.4003 (p < 0.0001).   
This indicates that investor owned hospitals that perform cardiac group 
procedures at 1Z above the mean have, on the average, TATL ratios that are 1.1404 
points higher than investor owned hospitals that perform cardiac group procedures at the 
mean level (z = 0). 
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Discussion of Findings for Part 1 
Regression is a technique used for observatory studies so causation cannot be 
established.    But positive association was demonstrated between TATL ratios and rates 
of cardiac group and orthopedic group procedures.  A positive association was also found 
for the interaction between cardiac group procedures and ownership as well as the 
interaction for orthopedic group procedures and ownership.  The model showed that the 
TATL ratio was, on the average, 1.1404 points higher when cardiac group procedures 
were administered at 1Z above the mean (Z = 0) in investor owned hospitals.  The model 
also showed that the TATL ratio was on the average 2.261 points higher when orthopedic 
group procedures were administered at a rate of 1Z higher than the mean (Z = 0) among 
investor owned hospitals. 
Testing for Unnecessary & Marginally Necessary Procedures  
Recall from the literature review the example of Tenet’s debacle due to 
unnecessary heart procedures.  One of the objectives of this investigation was to 
determine if a portion of discretionary procedures performed by profitable investor 
owned hospitals are unnecessary or marginally necessary.    However, evidence was not 
uncovered to indicate that procedures were being performed that were medically 
unwarranted.   
Investor owned hospitals with strong balance sheets (i.e., high TATL ratios) 
perform cardiac group and orthopedic group procedures at higher rates per hospital (not 
higher volumes) than not-for-profits or unprofitable investor owned hospitals.  But it was 
found in the preliminary analysis that less profitable not-for-profit hospitals carry out by 
far the highest volumes of these procedures. 
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To make inferences about the medical necessity of these procedures it would have 
to be demonstrated that profitable investor owned hospitals perform volumes of cardiac 
group and orthopedic group procedures at levels that exceed the medical needs of the 
population.  This inference cannot occur if volumes of procedures performed by investor 
owned hospitals do not exceed those of other types of hospitals. 
Gaming or Good Management  
Orthopedic and cardiac group procedures generally represent small percentages 
per hospital relative to the number of total procedures performed.  Higher TATL ratios 
may be associated to higher percentages of cardiac and orthopedic procedures, but it is 
also likely that other factors contribute to these high ratios.  But a significantly positive 
association has also been demonstrated between TATL ratios and the interacting 
variables of ownership and orthopedic group procedures and ownership and cardiac 
group procedures.  It is then likely that the performance of these procedures contribute to 
long term profitability. 
Certain examples in the literature review may point to higher percentages of 
certain types of discretionary procedures being an example of gaming Medicare, 
emphasizing certain profitable DRG codes in the patient mix while avoiding others.   
Keep in mind that investor owned hospitals tend to have fewer beds than not-for-
profits resulting in fewer total discharges for inpatient care.  This explains why certain 
investor owned hospitals that emphasize these types of discretionary procedures have 
higher rates of discretionary procedures without generating higher volumes.  But does 
this mean that many investor-owned hospitals attempt to fill their beds with patients 
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being treated with procedures represented by lucrative DRG codes, while less profitable 
patients are shifted to not-for-profits?  
The literature review also cited many researchers who contend that good 
management explains why in general investor owned hospitals are financially stronger 
than not-for-profits.  An emphasis on certain types of discretionary DRG codes may just 
reflect another example of good management practice. 
What can be rendered from this analysis is that investor owned hospitals with 
high TATL ratios tend to offer packages of discretionary cardiac and orthopedic services 
that are attractive to specialists and their patients. 
Part 1 Regression Diagnostics  
 Bagley White & Golomb (2001) have issued criticisms on numerous (peer 
reviewed) studies in the literature, some of which included no regression diagnostics or 
validation analysis, no testing for multicollinearity, and no testing for the needed 
inclusion of higher order terms. 
 Multicollinearity and specification errors (testing to include higher order terms) 
have already been discussed in connection with Model 1-B.  In addition to these 
diagnostics, other potential regression violations were also tested and included outliers 
and influential observations, other aspects of specification errors, and heteroscedasticity.   
In model development, multicollinearity was assessed and resulted in the 
transformation of observations to z-scores for cardiac group procedures and orthopedic 
group procedures.  Problems with multicollinearity have been partly addressed via the 
inclusion of VIF with each model.  In addition both adjusted and non-adjusted intercept 
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collinearity diagnostics were carried out.  The results of collinearity diagnostics in 
connection with Model 1-B using an intercept adjustment are shown in Appendix 8.  
Outliers - Press Statistic  
A good summary measure available in testing outliers and influential observations 
is the predicted residual sum of squares (PRESS). The PRESS sum of squares is the sum 
of squares of residuals using models obtained by estimating the equation with all other 
observations, i.e., (yi – ŷi-1) (Freund & Little 2000).  Table 28 provides information 
regarding the PRESS statistic. 
Table 28 
Sum of Residuals, Sum of Squared Residuals & 
PRESS for Model 1-B  
Sum of Residuals 0.0 
Sum of Squared Residuals 11,483 
Predicted Residual SS (PRESS) 11,703 
 
In diagnosing residuals using PRESS, the sum of residuals should equal zero 
which it does in Table 28.  The sum of squared residuals (SSR) should be the same as the 
Error SS in the regression output for Model 1-B.  Recall that the Error SS for Model 1-B 
is 11,483, which is equal to the sum of squared residuals in Table 28.   
The PRESS statistic should also be compared to the SSR.  When the PRESS 
statistic is appreciably larger than the SSR, there is rationale to suspect that some 
influential observations and outliers exist.  For Model 1-B the PRESS statistic is only 
slightly larger than the SSR, so it can be concluded that this test does not indicate there 
are observations that unduly influence model results.  Univariate statistics including 
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normal probability plots, box plots, and stem-leaf plots were also reviewed for potential 
anomalies and none were observed. 
Studentized Residuals & Cook’s Distance (d) 
 Additional testing for outliers began with a review of studentized residuals and 
Cook’s d statistic.  Careful scrutiny was applied to observations that exceed residual test 
thresholds.  These include studentized residuals ≤ -2.5 or ≥ 2.5 [or 5 asterisks which 
equals ≥ | 2.5 |, and Cooks d ≥ 4/n (i.e., d ≥ 4/891)].  Overall there were only around 25 
observations with residuals that exceeded either of these thresholds. There were also a 
few studenized residuals in close to proximity to -2.0 or 2.0. 
Influence Statistics  
Influence statistics are helpful because outliers are not always readily detectable 
by an examination of residuals alone.  In some cases the least squares estimation 
procedure may pull the estimated regression response toward observations that have 
extreme values in either x or y dimensions (Freund, Littell, 2000).   
Influence statistics were carried out including hat-diag, covariance ratio, DFFITS, 
and DFBETAS.  Only a very small number of observations exceeded prescribed 
thresholds, e.g. for DFFITS observations that ≥ 2 [(m + 1)/n]
1/2.    
Specification Errors 
 A specification error occurs when a specified model does not contain all of the 
essential parameters. This might occur when only linear terms are specified in the model, 
but actual associations are curvilinear.  The analysis of residuals and particularly partial 
residuals indicated no need to include one or more squared terms in the model or any 
additional interaction terms. 
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 There are, however, some concerns regarding another type of specification error 
in a model that does not include all relevant main effects variables. One of the research 
objectives in this project was to form parsimonious models.  Although this is a 
worthwhile objective, rigid adherence to parsimony should not occur at the expense of 
excluding important information.  To be assured that a specification error did not occur in 
Part 1, a technical appendix is added, Appendix 9, where regression models are set up to 
include the variables used in Part 1 plus three additional variables which include hospital 
occupancy, labor costs represented by manhours per adjusted patient day, and market 
concentration measured by the Herfindahl-Hirshman Index (HHI).   
 In the concluding remarks of Appendix 9 it is explained that model results, 
parameter estimates and marginal effects via interaction terms, are very similar in the 
expanded models shown in the technical appendix relative to the parsimonious models 
presented in the body of this document for Part 1.  This enhances confidence in model 
validity and in the findings derived from Part 1. 
Heterogeneous Variances 
 An underlying regression assumption is that all random errors have the same 
variances.   A review of residuals indicated no systematic residual patterns, such as 
nonrandom residual distributions, recognizable patterns in the magnitudes of the 
variances, or increases or decreases in variation of larger values of the outcome variable 
(Freund, Littell, 2000).   
Weaknesses of Part 1 Models 
All research projects have inherent weaknesses, and this study is no different.  
These weaknesses are described in the following paragraphs.  
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Randomly Splitting the Data to Assure Model Validity 
Many researchers will enhance confidence in the validity of their findings by first 
randomly splitting a certain portion of the data, then building the regression model on one 
split dataset and then applying the prediction equation to the other (Sincich, 2005).   
Splitting the data was not performed in this analysis chiefly because the size of the 
project with two parts 1 and 2 was getting out of hand. Additional activities would 
expand the project even further.  An examination using split data might be beneficial in a 
follow-up replication study. 
Other methods such as a thorough review of residual analysis, particularly the use 
of studentized (jackknife) residuals, and a strong knowledge of the data using extensive 
preliminary analyses were found to also be good methods for evaluating model validity. 
Grouping DRG Codes 
The models used in Part 1 featured two variables, cardiac and orthopedic group 
procedures that were comprised of grouped DRG codes.  This was a strong point of the 
investigation in that it allowed several DRG codes to be tested at one time in the models. 
It also avoided further problems with multicollinearity since many medical procedures, 
such as CABG and valve replacements, were shown to be highly correlated. 
But this was also a weakness because findings would have been more precise had 
only one DRG code or at least one surgical procedure been tested at a time. 
Procedure Volumes 
There was also a problem of different sized volumes of certain procedures within 
cardiac group and orthopedic group procedures.   Back in the preliminary analysis for 
Part 1, tables 7 & 8 provided numbers of observations for each procedure comprising 
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cardiac group and orthopedic group procedures.  Of the 185,603 discharges for cardiac 
group procedures, valve replacements and CABG procedures showed 20,551 and 50,158 
cases while PCI showed 114,894.  Findings using the cardiac group procedures variable 
would be weighted more heavily by PCI. 
There was a similar problem with orthopedic group procedures of which the total 
number of 222,525 observations was comprised in part by 136,121 major joint and limb 
reattachments (DRG 209). 
A mitigating factor is that the larger PCI and major joint and limb reattachment 
volumes are more diversely distributed in their performance across types of hospital 
ownership.  This means that bias generated by their inclusion and preponderance in 
cardiac and orthopedic group procedure variables would be toward the null hypothesis. 
County Median Income as a Proxy for Geographic location 
The proxy for geographic location in this study was Florida county median 
income levels.  Although this proxy served well in the models, it may have been 
advantageous to have used a more refined and detailed proxy (if one had been available).  
Median income levels by county planning areas (i.e., contiguous census tracts within a 
county aggregated by natural geographic boundaries or community characteristics) may 
have further elucidated investor owned hospitals’ use of discretionary procedures and 
their association with the TATL ratio.  Hospital locations within affluent planning areas 
may have generated more precise observations than hospital locations in higher income 
counties. 
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Rigid Adherence to Parsimony 
In the discussion on specification error under the subsection, Regression 
Diagnostics, there is a reference to Appendix 9, a technical appendix which presents 
models using the same variables in Part 1, with three additional variables to reflect 
patient occupancy, labor costs, and market concentration.  
It is possible that a rigid adherence to parsimony in Part 1 may have led to 
creating models that ignored variables that were both relevant to the dependent variable 
and valuable to the analysis.  If a specification error has occurred, the technical appendix 
represents an attempt to correct it.  The reader is cordially invited to review parsimonious 
models in Part 1 in the body of the document, as well as the expanded models in 
Appendix 9. 
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Chapter 8 
Model Results for Part 2 
Testing the Association between Total Charges & Ownership for CABG & Valve 
Replacement Procedures (Reimbursed by Medicare HMO) 
 
Model 2-A:  Main Effects Model  
 
Now that hypotheses have been stated based on findings in the preliminary 
analyses which helped identify and test outcome, explanatory, and control variables in 
Chapter 6, the investigation can proceed to the first main effects model in Part 2. The 
dependent variable in this model is total patient charges, which is a continuous variable, 
so an MLS regression equation is used (Mendenhall & Sincich 2003).   
The MLS equation for the main effects model in 2-A includes four terms, three of 
which include ownership, LOS, and south geographic region.   An additional term 
includes valve procedure, which is a term used to adjust for differences in charges 
between valve replacements and CABG procedures. It is coded valve procedure = 1 and 
CABG (as the base level) = 0.  
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The MLS equation for the main effects model, 2-A, is written as follows: 
Regression Equation for Model 2-A 
yCharges =  β0 + β1X + β2S + β3L  + β4V + є 
Where: 
 X = Ownership 
 S = South geographic sector 
 L = LOS 
 V = Valve procedure 
 
The regression procedure was undertaken using the prediction equation for Model 
2-A.  Findings for the main effects model are shown in Table 29. 
 
Table 29 
Model 2-A:  Main Effects Model 
Source DF Sum of 
Squares 
Mean Square F-Value Pr>F 
Model 4.0 2.87E + 13 7.17E + 12 4,101.02 <.0001 
Error 12,415 2.17E + 13 1.748E + 09   
Corrected Total 12,419 5.04E + 13    
Root MSE 41,813     
Dependent Mean 102,488  R
2
 0.5692  
CV 40.80  Adjusted  R
2
 0.5691  
 
As shown in Table 29 mean total charges (i.e., dependent mean) for all cases in 
the dataset is $102,488.  The model shows an adjusted R
2
of 0.5691 reflecting goodness of 
fit where close to 57% of the variance is explained by the model.  The model shows a CV 
of 40.80.  As discussed previously the ideal for the CV is 10.0 (Sincich 2005).  The CV 
of 40.80 in connection with Model 2-A is greater than the ideal of 10.0, but is still 
acceptable for real world data. 
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Parameter estimates for Model 2-A are shown in Table 30. 
Table 30 
Model 2-A: Main Effects Model Parameter Estimates  
Parameters Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
t-Value P > | t | VIF 
Intercept          9,585  835.24 11.48 <0.0001 0 
Ownership        43,351  810.63 53.48 <0.0001 1.00639 
South        19,714  754.94 26.11 <0.0001 1.00629 
LOS          6,219  59.37 104.75 <0.0001 1.01274 
Valve        21,174  840.75 25.18 <0.0001 1.01399 
Coding for Variables: 
 Ownership:  Investor owned hospital = 1, Not-for-Profit = 0; 
 LOS:  Continuous variable (days from admission to discharge); 
 Geographic Region:  South = 1,  North & Central = 0; 
 Valve Procedure:  Valve replacement = 1, CABG procedure = 0. 
 
Model 2-A shows the parameter estimate for ownership at $43,351 indicating 
that, on the average, investor owned hospitals assess total charges $43,351 higher than 
not-for-profits.  Total charges for each additional one day in the hospital are $6,219 as 
shown by the parameter estimate for LOS.    
Geographic region shows a beta of 19,714 for the south Florida geographic sector 
indicating that in general charges in the south sector are $19,714 greater than the base 
level northern & central Florida.  The dummy variable valve procedure yields a beta of 
21,174, representing that charges for valve replacements in general are $21,174 more 
than the base level CABG procedures.  
Model 2-B:  Interaction Model 
The main effects model demonstrated that total patient charges are significantly 
higher for investor owned hospitals relative to not-for-profits and for hospitals located in 
the southern region of Florida relative to the central and northern regions. 
Model 2-B is an interaction model that contains only one interaction term, 
ownership x south geographic region.  The necessity for including a quadratic term in 
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connection with LOS, the only continuous independent variable, was explored and was 
found unwarranted.  
The regression equation for Model 2-B is written below.   
Regression Equation for Model 2-B, Interaction Model 
yCharges =  β0 + β1X + β2S + β3L  + β4XS + β5V + є 
Where: 
 X = Ownership 
 S = South geographic region 
 L = LOS 
 XS = Ownership x south geographic region  
 V = Valve procedure 
 
Findings were derived based on the interaction model 2-B and are presented 
below in Table 31. 
Table 31 
Model 2-B: Interaction Model 
Source DF Sum of 
Squares 
Mean 
Square 
F-Value Pr>F 
Model 5 2.87E + 13 5.75E + 12 3,293.43 <0.0001 
Error 12,414 2.17E + 13 1.745E + 09   
Corrected Total 12,419 5.04E + 13    
Root MSE 41,768     
Dependent Mean 102,488  R
2
 0.5702  
CV 40.75  Adjusted  
R
2
 
0.5700  
 
 
Model 2-B shows an adjusted R
2
of 0.5700 indicating that roughly 57% of the 
variance in the data can be explained by the model.  The R
2
and CV (40.75), are close to 
the R
2
and CV in the main effects model, 2-A.   
Before proceeding with an examination of parameter estimates an F-test is carried 
out to compare the interaction model 2-B with the main effects model 2-A.  The test 
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yielded F = 17.42 (p < 0.0001) for R1
2
 = 0.5691 and R2
2 
= 0.5700 with df 1 = k2 – k1 = (5 
– 4) = 1 and df2 = N – k2 – 1 (12,420 – 5 – 1) = 12,414. 
The F test is sufficiently large enough to warrant using the interaction model, but 
it should be mentioned that the distance between the R
2 
in these two models is very close, 
and a significant F value was yielded only because of the large df2 which was due to a 
large number of observations (N = 12,420) used in models 2-A and 2-B. 
Even though the R
2
 in each model is close, the interaction model still generates 
very useful results.  It generates findings that help to address certain research questions 
and issues that had been initiated in the problem statement and literature review.  
Therefore, reporting the interaction model is consistent with the objectives of this study. 
Findings of the interaction model, 2-B, are shown in Table 32. 
Table 32 
Model 2-B:  Interaction Model Parameter Estimates 
Parameters Parameter 
Estimate 
Standard 
Error 
t-Value P > | t | VIF 
Intercept 8,478 860 9.85 <.0001 0 
Ownership 47,505 1,130 42.03 <.0001 1.9611 
South Sector 22,429 913 24.56 <.0001 1.4762 
LOS 6,214 59 104.76 <.0001 1.0130 
Ownership x South Sector -8,529 1,619 -5.27 <.0001 2.5127 
Valve 21,046 840 25.05 <.0001 1.0148 
 
As shown in Model 2-B, there is a parameter estimate for ownership of $47,505.  
Recall that ownership’s beta in Model 2-A was slightly less, $43,351.  What accounts for 
the larger beta in Model 2-B is the inclusion of the interaction term, ownership x south 
geographic sector.   
What is observed by the interaction term is that the distance in mean patient 
charges narrows between investor owned hospitals and not-for-profits in the south region.  
This indicates though investor owned hospitals generally assess higher charges than not-
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for-profits in all regions, not-for-profits in the south region charge higher than not-for-
profits in the north and central regions. 
 This finding is also consistent with the preliminary analysis shown in Figure 7 
which showed mean charges stratified by ownership and location.  This chart showed a 
narrowing of the distance of charges between investor owned and not-for-profits in the 
south region. 
Days of hospitalization are almost identical in the interaction model as the main 
effects model.  This indicates that differences in charges with respect to hospital 
ownership and geographic region are not due to disease severity, as operationalized by 
LOS. 
Interpreting Marginal Effects of Interaction Terms in Model 2-B 
 The interaction model for ownership x south geographic region is expressed as  
yCharges =  β0 + β1X + β2S + β4XS.  In this case, the focal variable is ownership and 
the modifying variable is south region.  The marginal effect is shown as ∂Y/X (β1 at S = 
β1 + β4 S) = 47,505 + (-8,529)S = 38,976.  This indicates that in general investor owned 
hospitals, located in the south region, assess charges at $38,976 higher than not-for-
profits, located in the south region (Jaccard & Turisi 2003). 
 A standard error and t-value must be computed to determine if the marginal effect 
of ownership and south region is significant.  The standard error calculation was 
performed using the formula shown below.   
The formula (Jaccard & Turisi 2003) incorporates variances for Β1 and Β4 and the 
covariance for (Β1Β4) which is derived from the variance-covariance matrix shown in 
Appendix 10.  The appendix also shows the calculations using this formula.   
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σ∂Y/∂X = [var(Β1 ) + S
2var(Β4)+ 2Scov(Β1Β4)]
1/2 
The formula for σ∂Y/∂X yields a standard error of 1,160.   To determine the 
significance of the marginal effect a t-value is computed as follows:   
t = (Β1 at S) / SE (Β1 at S) 
= 38,976. / 1,160 = 33.60 (p < 0.0001) 
 The t-value, distributed at N – k – 1 (12,420 – 5 – 1 = 12,414) degrees of 
freedom, is very high and the marginal effect is significant at p < 0.0001.   
 From this model it can be concluded that investor owned hospitals assess 
significantly higher charges under the Medicare HMO program for CABG and valve 
replacement procedures.  The interaction term ownership x south region indicates that 
although investor owned hospitals assess higher charges in the south region, the distance 
is narrowed in amounts between investor owned and not-for-profit hospitals.  Not-for-
profits are shown to accelerate charges at a higher rate (not monetary value) than investor 
owned hospitals in the south region. 
Discussion of Findings for Part 2 
 It is clear from models 2-A and 2-B that investor owned hospitals assess 
significantly higher charges than not-for-profits in the performance of CABG and valve 
replacement procedures reimbursed by Medicare HMO.  It is also unambiguous that 
investor owned and not-for-profit hospitals, located in the southern Florida region, assess 
higher charges for the same services relative to their hospital counterparts in central and 
north Florida.  In fact, though investor owned hospitals assess higher charges in all 
geographic regions, the distance between amounts of charges narrows between investor 
owned and not-for-profit hospitals in the south region. 
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It has also been established that higher charges in connection with ownership or 
geographic region are not due to increased days of hospitalization or the administration of 
more intensive medical services. 
Total Charges vs. Reimbursed Charges 
A comment was made previously in connection with Table 17 that average total 
charges for valve replacement and CABG procedures are excessively higher than what is 
actually reimbursed by Medicare HMO.   
The AHCA financial data (electronic file) provides financial data for hospitals 
according to each payment source.  Amounts are listed for inpatient and outpatient 
services in terms of total revenue, revenue deductions, and net revenue.  Percentages 
were calculated for Medicare HMO inpatient net revenue [Medicare HMO net inpatient 
revenue percentage = (Medicare HMO gross inpatient revenue – deductions from 
Medicare HMO gross inpatient revenue) / Medicare HMO gross inpatient revenue]. It 
was found that in general not-for-profit hospitals realize only around 30% of their 
Medicare HMO gross revenue, while investor owned hospitals realize, on the average, 
only 24%. 
These percentages of net revenue were calculated not for all hospitals, only the 
investor owned and not-for-profit hospitals represented in the study population for Part 2.  
In other words, these included only hospitals that performed valve replacement or CABG 
procedures reimbursed by Medicare HMO. 
Because total patient charges are much higher in investor owned hospitals it 
would be expected that percentages of reimbursements under Medicare HMO would be 
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lower than that of not-for-profits.  As already mentioned, reimbursements are, in fact, 
lower for investor owned hospitals. 
Likewise, because charges increase for both investor-owned and not-for-profit 
hospitals in the southern region of Florida, it would be anticipated that net revenue 
percentages should decrease relative to those in the north and central regions.  But this 
does not occur, as shown in Table 33. 
Table 33 
Percentage of Net Revenue for Inpatient Services, Investor Owned vs. Not-for-Profit 
Hospitals in the South Region vs. Combined North & Central Regions, 
Medicare HMO Inpatient Services, 2000-2005 
Region Investor Owned Not-for-Profit 
South  23.88% 29.86% 
North & Central  24.81% 30.84% 
Source:  AHCA (2000-2005) Financial Analysis Annual Electronic Reports  
 
The table shows that net revenue, on the average, for investor owned hospitals, 
located in the southern region, is only about one percentage point (23.88% vs. 24.81%) 
lower than net revenue in the north and central regions.  Similarly, there is only about one 
percentage point (29.86% vs. 30.84%) difference for the south vs. north & central regions 
for not-for-profit hospitals. 
One important question arises regarding the differential between total patient 
charges and reimbursements.  Data to calculate percentages of net revenue are provided 
for Medicare HMO inpatient services, not specifically for valve replacements and CABG 
procedures.  So it is not possible to determine if the average 30% and 24% levels of 
Medicare HMO reimbursement for not-for-profits and investor owned hospitals, 
respectively, apply specifically to valve replacements and CABG procedures.   
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However, if these percentages are accurate it would mean that reimbursements are 
higher in the south region irrespective of disease severity or the extent of medical 
services provided.  It would also mean that reimbursements under the Medicare HMO 
program occur with wide variability with little attention to anomalies in federal spending.   
It has been stated that one of the goals of Part 2 (Chapter 6) was to test 
Wennberg’s theory of the surgical signature.  As discussed, this theory entails geographic 
disparities in per capita rates and federal expenditures in connection with discretionary 
procedures.  The findings in Part 2 add credence to Wennberg’s surgical signature theory. 
Part 2 Regression Diagnostics  
 The same set of tools used for regression diagnostics in Part 1 (Chapter 7) are 
employed again in Part 2.  Diagnostic results provided in this section are in connection 
with Model 2-B.   
Outliers 
Part 2 begins its presentation on diagnostics with a discussion on potential 
outliers.  The PRESS statistic is used again as a summary measure.  As stated in Part 1, 
PRESS is the sum of squares of residuals using models obtained by estimating the 
equation with all other observations; that is (yi – yhati-1) (Freund, Littell 2000).  
Information on PRESS is shown in Table 34 below. 
Table 34 
Sum of Residuals, Sum of Squared Residuals & PRESS for Model 2-B 
Sum of Residuals 0.0 
Sum of Squared Residuals 21,657,280,000,000 
Predicted Residual SS (PRESS) 21,692,210,000,000 
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The sum of residuals in Table 34 should equal zero, which it does.  The sum of 
squared residuals should be the same as the Error SS in the regression output for Model 
2-B.  The Error SS under Model 2-B was 21,657,280,000,000 (2.17E+13) which equals 
the sum of squared residuals shown in the table.   
 The PRESS statistic is now compared with the sum of squared residuals, as 
influential observations and outliers would be indicated if PRESS is appreciably larger.   
But as shown in the table, PRESS is only slightly larger than the sum of squared residuals 
with a miniscule difference possibly even due to rounding.  It can be concluded that 
information derived from Table 34 does not indicate the presence of influential 
observations or outliers. 
Studentized Residuals & Cook’s Distance (d) 
 Studentized residuals and Cook’s d were also used to perform additional tests for 
outliers.   Observations in connection with Model 2-B were reviewed that exceeded 
prescribed thresholds where studentized residuals ≥ | 2.0 | (4*) or Cook’s d ≥ 4/N (i.e., 
4/12,414) (Freund, Littell 2000).   
Influence Statistics  
 Influence statistics including hat-diag, covariance ratio, DFFITS and DFBETAS 
were used to identify and examine observations that exceeded prescribed thresholds.  A 
small number of observations were identified as potentially influential, but overall no 
major problems regarding influential observations or outliers occurred. 
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Specification Errors 
 As mentioned in the regression diagnostic discussion under Part 1, a specification 
error occurs when a model lacks all essential parameters, which may occur when the true 
association is curvilinear, and the model includes only linear terms. 
 Residual analysis and in particular partial residuals were very helpful in 
determining if models contained all necessary parameters.  The incorporation of quadratic 
terms in models for Part 2 was tested and their inclusion in the final model was 
determined to be unwarranted. 
Heterogeneous Variables 
 An assessment was done to determine if random errors have equal variances.  
Charts were analyzed to detect non-random residual patterns, obvious patterns in the 
magnitudes of the variances, and increases or decreases of larger values of the outcome 
variable (Freund, Littell 2000).  Overall, no major violations of heterogeneity were 
observed. 
Multicollinearity  
 Appendix 11 presents an annotated assessment of multicollinearity in connection 
with Model 2-B.   Problems with multicollinearty have been discussed, and VIF has been 
presented with each model.  In addition, both adjusted and non-adjusted intercept 
collinearity diagnostics were performed for each model.  The collinearity diagnostics 
presented in this appendix is intercept adjusted in connection with Model 2-B.   
As discussed under Part 1 of the study, the rule-of-thumb in reducing problems of 
multicollinearity was to aim for VIF ≤ 10 and even VIF ≤ 5 if possible.  VIF was less 
than 3.0 in connection with all parameter estimates for models 2-A & 2-B. Overall, no 
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major problems with multicollinearity were detected for the main effects model 2-A or 
interaction model 2-B.   
Weaknesses of Models in Part 2 
As with Part 1, Part 2 also had certain weaknesses in analysis and model 
development.  These are described in the following paragraphs. 
Assessing Validity by Randomly Splitting the Data 
Just as it was discussed in Part 1 (Chapter 7), a good strategy to evaluate model 
validity is to randomly split the data, develop the model for one portion of the data and 
then apply the prediction equation to the other portion.  As it was mentioned under Part 1, 
this was not done because of the magnitude of this project.  Had this project been only 
one part instead of two then random splitting of the data would have been done. 
Other methods used to evaluate the validity of the model included a thorough 
review of regression diagnostics and residual analysis as well as a substantial review of 
the data preceding model development via extensive preliminary bivariate and 
nonparametric analyses. 
Total Patient Charges vs. Reimbursements 
 It has been discussed that actual amounts reimbursed for each patient was not 
reported in the AHCA Discharge dataset, only total charges.  Reimbursements are only 
known more generally in connection with Medicare HMO inpatient services, shown in 
the AHCA Financial (electronic) data.  Meaningful findings were still derived in Part 2 
especially considering wide disparities in levels of total patient charges with respect to 
ownership and geographic sector.   But more specific information about reimbursements 
at the patient level would have been helpful. 
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Chapter 9 
Conclusion 
 
It should be asseverated that this study does not take the position that there is 
anything wrong with solvency or profitability.  Financial strength in hospitals saves lives 
and aids in offering better quality of care to patients.  There are many previous studies 
with compelling findings regarding the association between healthcare quality and 
hospital profitability as well as the association with poor quality and low profitability.    
The Agency for Healthcare Research and Quality (2005) examined medical errors 
in the files of approximately one million patients who had undergone surgery in 176 
Florida hospitals between 1996 and 2000.  The study concluded that a decrease in a 
hospital’s profit margin resulted in a higher risk of errors in the treatment of patients 
before, during, and after surgery.   
It can be concluded that financially healthy hospitals make valuable 
contributions to medicine and to patients’ welfare.  There is also nothing wrong with 
making a profit with Medicare, as long as it is done within legal and ethical parameters.  
What is perplexing is that as discussed in the literature review in Chapter 2 there is a 
consensus among researchers that Medicare is not a profitable revenue source for 
hospitals.  Yet a number of profitable short term general hospitals in Florida show 
Medicare to comprise a large, even majority, percentage of their revenue base.   
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This study has attempted to shed light on two strategies certain hospitals use to 
make a profit with Medicare.  It was found in Part 1 of this study that certain investor 
owned hospitals perform significantly higher rates per hospital of certain types of 
discretionary cardiac and orthopedic group procedures, and these higher rates are 
positively associated with TATL ratios, representing long-term financial health.  Perhaps 
these investor owned hospitals are gaming conventional Medicare by emphasizing DRG 
codes that represent certain discretionary procedures.   
But there are some researchers who contend that the types of procedures 
performed in hospitals are irrelevant to solvency and profitability.  Copious citations in 
the literature review point to the association between financial strength and good 
management practices.  The most notable of these researchers, Cleverly, assets that better 
financial health in investor owned hospitals is a product exclusively of good 
management, and that it is entirely irrespective of patient mix or payer sources.   
But Part 1 of this investigation demonstrated a positive association between the 
TATL ratio and discretionary cardiac and orthopedic procedures.  So perhaps in addition 
to good management, financial health is also due to systematic targeting of the most 
profitable DRG codes.  It could also be argued that an emphasis on the most lucrative 
medical procedures is in fact good management.  Perhaps certain hospitals merely 
demonstrate the acumen to structure their patient mix to maximize volumes of DRG 
codes that are the most profitable under conventional Medicare.   
In Part 2 it was found that investor owned hospitals assess significantly higher 
total patient charges than not-for-profits for CABG and valve replacement procedures 
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under the Medicare HMO program.   Higher charges could not be explained by patient 
disease severity or the provision of more extensive medical services. 
On the flipside it was also found that the investor owned hospitals that assess 
significantly higher charges also have appreciably higher percentages of deductions from 
total revenue.  Although the deductions from revenue attenuate the argument that investor 
owned hospitals are overcharging, it does not address the question of why these charges 
are assessed so high in the first place. 
It also does not address why total patient charges accelerate for both investor 
owned and not-for-profit hospitals in the southern region of Florida.   
Evidence was not uncovered in Part 1 which might indicate that investor owned 
hospitals are performing procedures unnecessarily or at rates that exceed the medical 
needs of the Florida population.  Generating research findings that indicate unnecessary 
or marginally necessary surgical procedures are being performed in investor owned 
hospitals is an ambitious objective, one that would likely require many investigations 
before a clear image might (or might not) emerge of gaming patients’ welfare. 
But the crux of this investigation was less ambitious with the aim of identifying a 
couple of strategies hospitals, chiefly investor owned, employ to make a profit with 
Medicare.  Certain types of discretionary procedures under conventional Medicare 
increase per capita with respect to hospital ownership.  Likewise, investor owned 
hospitals and all hospitals located in the southern region of Florida assess excessive 
charges for medical services under the Medicare HMO program, irrespective of patient 
disease severity and days of hospitalization.   
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Wennberg’s (2005) surgical signature theory was described in the literature 
review and referenced several times in this document.  In the context of discretionary 
procedures, this theory refers to fluctuating levels of per capita rates and federal spending 
that are not clearly linked to the disease status of the population.  The findings in this 
investigation lend support to Wennberg’s surgical signature theory. 
Policy Recommendations 
This study would not be complete without some recommendations that may help 
to improve health policy.  This final section discusses some preemptive methods that 
could be undertaken to uncover potential gaming activities by routine monitoring and 
subsequent identification of inordinate rates of certain discretionary procedures. 
A Few Caveats on Interpretation  
It should be taken into account that this project is an observational study using 
secondary data.  Associations can be drawn, but causation cannot be established.  It 
should also be considered that this study is a pioneering effort, meaning there are very 
few prior studies dealing with gaming in this context – increasing rates of procedures and 
inflating charges.  Most studies in the literature address gaming in the context of up-
coding. 
It should also be recalled that no inferences could be demonstrated in this study to 
indicate that any unnecessary cardiac or orthopedic procedures occurred.  What was 
demonstrated was that a positive association exists between the TATL ratio and cardiac 
and orthopedic group procedures exclusively in investor owned hospitals.  It is possible 
that this association is indicative of gaming, but it is also feasible that the association has 
occurred due to very good management in certain investor owned hospitals.  
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Administrators in these hospitals have perhaps structured their patient mix to maximize 
DRG codes that tend to be profitable, while minimizing those that are not.  This reflects 
managerial acumen, and there is no legal or ethical violation unless it could be 
demonstrated that surgeries are being performed that are not clinically warranted.   
There was strong evidence that investor owned hospitals assessed higher charges 
than not-for-profits under the Medicare HMO program, and that both investor-owned 
hospitals and not-for-profits assessed higher patient charges in the southern sector of 
Florida than the other sectors. These findings raised very good questions, but it could not 
be shown definitively if higher charges were resulting in higher and unwarranted 
reimbursements.  
Recommendations to Federal Agencies 
Now that these caveats, discussed in the previous section of this chapter, have 
been taken into account, there are some practical recommendations resulting from this 
research.   
Recommendations should not only be offered to hospital administrators and 
corporate board members, but also to Medicare’s Office of the Inspector General (OIG) 
and personnel and officials involved in regulatory and oversight functions of 
conventional Medicare and Medicare HMO programs.  
Recommendations to Medicare would include routine monitoring of rates of 
certain discretionary procedures, the objective of which would be to identify anomalous 
fluctuations.  Gaming, if it occurs, may be elucidated, especially on a large scale, by 
examining per-capita rates in certain geographic areas that unexplainably exceed those of 
other areas, or that show sudden inordinate increases.  Hospitals or hospital referral 
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regions (HHRs) demonstrating appreciably higher rates than other hospitals or regions 
would be the focus of further investigation.   
Anomalies may be found not only in rates, but also in patient charges for 
discretionary procedures.  In Part 2 of the narrative, figures 5-7 provide patient charges 
for the south, central, and north geographic sectors of Florida.  These charts in 
themselves shed light on a geographic area of interest – the south sector of Florida.  
Medicare should begin examining mean patient charges and reimbursement levels by 
geographic area to determine if reimbursement amounts are warranted.  
A Brief Example of Ongoing Monitoring of Rates of  
Discretionary Procedures Reimbursed by Medicare 
 
A brief hypothetical demonstration of how Medicare could monitor rates of 
discretionary procedures using real-world data is shown in Figure 8.  This figure provides 
CABG rates per 1,000 Medicare enrollees by Florida HRR, 2005.  Each bar on the chart 
is accompanied by a vertical error bar which ranges from one standard deviation below 
the mean to one standard deviation above. 
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Figure 8 
Source: Dartmouth Atlas of Healthcare, 2005 
 
The CABG rate for the Panama City HRR, at 5.99, is the highest on the chart and 
also exceeds the upper limit (one standard deviation) of the error bar.  Perhaps further 
review of Panama City is warranted, but it would not be the most judicious use of 
investigative resources because Panama City only has 27,000 Medicare enrollees 
(Dartmouth 2005).  Therefore, priority would be given to another HRR with high CABG 
rates and with high numbers of enrollees. 
Figure 8 shows that the Orlando HRR has a CABG rate of 5.72, and the 
Jacksonville HRR shows a rate of 5.64.  As it turns out, these two HRRs have Medicare 
enrollments, respectively, of over 400,000 and almost 150,000 (Dartmouth 2005).  
Because the Orlando and Jacksonville HRRs have both high numbers of Medicare 
enrollees and high CABG rates they would have the highest priority for Medicare’s 
review.   
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At this point auditors should focus on the Orlando and Jacksonville HRRs, and 
determine which hospitals comprising these regions contribute most heavily to the high 
rate of CABG surgery.  
Recommendations to Hospital Administrators 
Recommendations extending to hospital administrators would also include a 
review of rate fluctuations of discretionary procedures.  They should be aware if rates of 
discretionary procedures at their hospital are appreciably higher than rates of these 
procedures in comparable hospitals in the region.  If rates of certain procedures are not 
excessive they would likely not be targeted by Medicare for further inquiry.  If rates of 
certain discretionary procedures are disproportionately higher than other hospitals, 
regions, or state average, administrators should understand that they may be on 
Medicare’s radar. 
Even if a hospital is potentially on Medicare’s radar due to high rates of certain 
discretionary procedures, there is no reason to reduce the performance of these 
procedures if they are financially worthwhile to the hospital.  However, administrators 
must perform their due diligence to assure that higher rates never represent unwarranted 
rates.  This would compel them to perform the same regional review as was just 
prescribed for Medicare to determine where their hospital falls in terms of numbers of 
enrollees and rates of certain discretionary procedures.   
If they are located in a region with inordinately high CABG rates they should 
determine how much their hospital contributes to that rate.  If the contribution is 
substantial then both a financial and clinical dimension should be included in their 
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internal performance audit procedures of surgical operations.  This would also entail 
convincing their board of directors that such audit standards are necessary.   
Tenet’s Rate of CABG Procedures Compared to the California State Average  
 
  In the literature review there was a lengthy discussion on Redding Medical 
Center, a subsidiary of Tenet Healthcare, Inc.  To conclude the discussion on the 
importance of monitoring rates of discretionary procedures by geographic area by both 
federal officials and hospital administrators, there is no better example to cite than Tenet.  
Monitoring rates of discretionary procedures, as it was shown in the hypothetical 
example using Figure 8, may have helped to circumvent unnecessary surgeries and other 
disreputable acts by Tenet. 
The performance of unnecessary and marginally necessary procedures at Tenet 
began to come to light when two men were diagnosed with severe life-threatening artery 
blockage by a Redding physician who recommended immediate bypass surgery.  The two 
men sought second medical opinions, and it was found that both were in good health, had 
clean arteries, and were not in need of bypass surgery (Chan 2002). 
The two men reported their suspicious diagnoses to the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation (FBI).  Results of the FBI’s investigation indicated that half of the heart 
operations performed at Redding were unnecessary.  The two men then prevailed in a 
qui-tam lawsuit filed under the False Claims Act (Chan 2002). 
Redding’s situation continued to unravel when 750 patients filed a law suit 
alleging they had undergone surgical procedures that were determined to be medically 
unnecessary, specifically CABG, valve replacements, and catheterizations (Darmiento, 
2002). 
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Although malpractice and malfeasances occurred at Redding where physicians 
and hospital administrators were directly culpable, Medicare indirectly deserves at least 
some of the blame for negligence; for not responsibly monitoring the variability of 
certain procedures by geographic region, a sin of omission.  Figure 9 compares CABG 
discharges per 1,000 Medicare enrollees for the Redding HRR, the HRR of which 
Redding Hospital was located, and the California state average, 1992-2003. 
 
 
Figure 9 
Source: Dartmouth Atlas of Healthcare: Studies of Surgical Variation, Cardiac Surgery Report, 2005  
 
 
The Redding HRR shows substantially higher rates of CABG surgery relative to 
the state average, and this disproportionate rate was largely due to activities occurring at 
Redding Medical Center.   It is reasonable to assume that Medicare should have been 
alerted of the disparities in rates as early as 1992.  By 1995 and 1996 Redding HRR’s 
rates were double that of state averages.  The rate then remained at least four points 
higher in the Redding HRR relative to the mean rate of CABG procedures occurring in 
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California.  The Redding HRR peaked in 2002 when it exceeded more than 12 CABG 
surgeries per 1,000 Medicare enrollees.  Very similar excessive rates of aortic and mitral 
valve replacements occurred at Redding in the same time period (Dartmouth, 2005).  The 
question beckons as to how Medicare missed these anomalies?   
A subsequent question is how did Redding administrators not know there were 
malfeasances occurring?  In addition to unwarranted surgeries, other violations 
uncovered at Redding Medical Center included false billings, inflated charges, and gross 
misuse of the Medicare outlier methodology (Darmiento 2002).   
Tenet’s misuse of the Medicare outlier program was first made public in a report 
issued by a UBS Warburg (investment banking and securities) analyst. The report was the 
result of rifling through Medicare records (i.e., Tenet’s policy was never to release its 
Medicare outlier data) and discovering that Tenet’s Medicare outlier payments were at 
much higher levels than those of its competitors. It was estimated that Medicare outlier 
payments comprised 16.7 percent or $418 million of Tenet’s total Medicare 
reimbursements for the year ended September 30, 2002 (Darmiento 2002).  If an 
investment and securities analyst could figure out Tenet’s violations of the outlier 
program, it is very likely upper-level Tenet administrators had full knowledge of Tenet’s 
behavior.   
It is likely that Tenet’s actions grew insidiously over time from mild abuses of 
Medicare to nefarious behaviors that entailed wholesale fraud and the endangerment of 
patients.  A corporate culture that refused to tolerate abuses of Medicare and skillful in-
house auditing of clinical and financial operations would have avoided Tenet’s debacle 
and the horrible events that led up to it. 
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Appendices 
All Florida Hospital 
Referral Regions HRR
All Surgical 
Discharges
Hip Fracture 
Repair
Resection for 
Colon Cancer
Coronary
 Angiography
CABG
Carotid 
Endarterectomy 
Cholecystectomy
Hip 
Replacement
National Average 102.12 7.53 1.76 22.77 5.18 3.02 4.29 3.18
State Average 108.56 7.46 1.77 25.64 5.42 3.6 4.44 3.27
Bradenton 115 117.94 7.71 2.14 28.13 5.49 4.87 6.6 3.75
Clearwater 116 107.44 7.47 2.09 27.38 5.04 3.54 4.03 3.18
Fort Lauderdale 118 105.83 7.54 1.66 24.6 4.95 2.96 3.67 3.91
Fort Myers 119 109.99 6.74 1.63 21.98 4.94 3.93 4.13 4.2
Gainesville 120 108.00 8.1 1.77 26.72 5.04 2.68 4.58 2.51
Hudson 122 119.24 8.07 1.81 34.2 6.15 4.87 5.78 3.14
Jacksonville 123 107.4 7.81 1.9 32.2 5.98 4.25 3.95 2.68
Lakeland 124 105.35 7.57 1.82 31.1 4.73 2.9 4.18 2.78
Miami 127 101.39 7.21 1.75 22.08 3.36 1.59 4.51 2.08
Ocala 129 110.41 6.9 1.86 27.6 5.6 4.75 4.82 3.17
Orlando 130 111.75 7.16 1.84 26.59 6.47 4.07 4.8 3.27
Ormond Beach 131 97.53 8.02 1.72 22.56 5.73 2.17 3.66 3.49
Panama City 133 126.96 9.73 1.73 36.4 7.97 3.37 5.03 3.07
Pensacola 134 122.13 8.48 1.66 26.76 5.9 3.69 4.88 2.82
Sarasota 137 103.84 7.45 1.75 18.28 5.83 3.26 3.61 4.14
St. Petersburg 139 111.09 8.09 1.97 20.72 4.48 4.9 5.58 3.19
Tallahassee 140 101.69 7.94 1.62 21.96 5.03 3.06 5 2.25
Tampa 141 104.08 7.4 1.7 26.64 5.46 3.98 4.69 2.68
Mean 109.56 7.74 1.8 26.44 5.45 3.6 4.64 3.13
Standard Deviation 7.72 0.67 0.15 4.83 0.95 0.95 0.79 0.6
Coefficient of Variation 0.07 0.09 0.08 0.18 0.17 0.26 0.17 0.19
Source:  Dartmouth Atlas of Healthcare, Data Tables, Hospital referral regions (HRRs):
             Regional markets for Tertiary Medical Care
Retrieved on September 24, 2006 from http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/
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Appendix 1
Rates of Surgical Procedures per 1,000 Medicare Enrollees, All Florida Hospital Referral Regions, 2003
Appendix 1 presents similar data from the same source as shown in Charts 
1-3 in the literature review.  Data used for Appendix 1 are from 2003 
while data from Charts 1-3 are from 2005.  It was determined that 2003 
would be appropriate for the presentation in Appendix 1 because the study 
period is 2000-2005, and 2003 occurs in the middle of the study period.
All Florida Hospital Referral 
Regions
Knee 
Replacement
Mastectomy 
for Cancer*
PCI
Lower 
Extremity 
Revascularization
Abdominal Aortic 
Aneurysm Repair
TURP 
for BPH**
Back 
Surgery
Valve 
Replacement 
National Average 6.88 1.19 11.27 1.41 0.97 5.23 4.02 1.39
State Average 6.71 1.06 12.91 1.36 1.05 4.54 4.52 1.54
Bradenton 7.51 1.12 14.46 1.22 1.11 5.72 6.7 1.28
Clearwater 6.28 1.12 17.93 1.42 1.23 3.95 3.4 2.01
Fort Lauderdale 5.62 0.73 11.51 1.21 0.92 4.42 3.76 1.73
Fort Myers 9.55 0.67 11.8 1.49 1.33 4.87 6.77 1.47
Gainesville 6.24 1.64 14.8 1.1 1.08 5 6.38 0.96
Hudson 7.38 1.11 17.87 1.13 0.93 4.39 3.83 2.06
Jacksonville 5.98 0.9 14.34 1.41 1.36 4.28 3.27 1.51
Lakeland 6.58 1.36 12.86 1.1 0.95 4.99 3.87 1.74
Miami 4.07 1.02 10.34 1.13 0.64 5.09 2.55 1.23
Ocala 6.99 1.52 14.74 1.11 1.04 3.44 5.22 1.74
Orlando 6.83 1.16 13.95 1.33 1.03 3.8 4.12 1.52
Ormond Beach 6.83 0.93 10.17 1.72 0.95 2.65 4.31 1.54
Panama City 6.8 Suppressed*** 13.06 1.33 Suppressed*** 11.51 5.19 1.72
Pensacola 8.76 1.11 14.18 2.58 1.27 4.36 6.5 1.3
Sarasota 8.12 1.21 11.59 1.64 1.04 5.4 6.2 1.72
St. Petersburg 6.59 1.45 9.84 1.8 1.14 6.82 4.44 1.61
Tallahassee 6.74 1.6 9.65 1.26 0.95 5.78 5.15 0.75
Tampa 5.72 1.22 11.32 1.42 1.08 5.28 3.77 1.28
Mean 6.81 1.17 13.02 1.41 1.06 5.1 4.75 1.51
Standard Deviation 1.22 0.28 2.49 0.36 0.18 1.86 1.31 0.34
Coefficient of Variation 0.18 0.24 0.19 0.26 0.17 0.37 0.28 0.22
* Per 1,000 Female Medicare Enrollees, ** Per 1,000 Male Medicare Enrollees, ***Suppressed indicates there is not enough data in the HRR to protect patients' identity.
Source:  Dartmouth Atlas of Healthcare, Data Tables, Hospital referral regions (HRRs):  Regional markets for Tertiary Medical Care
Retrieved on September 24, 2006 from http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/
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Rates of Surgical Procedures per 1,000 Medicare Enrollees, All Florida Hospital Referral Regions, 2003
Source:  Dartmouth Atlas of Healthcare, Data Tables, Hospital referral regions (HRRs): Regional markets for tertiary medical care.
Downloaded from the internet on September 24, 2006 at address:
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Coefficients of Variation for Certain Discretionary Procedures, 2003 
The solid horizontal line 
shows the coefficient of 
variation for the 
benchmark hip fracture 
repair at 0.09.  All other 
procedures have 
coefficients of variation 
far above the benchmark 
figure.
The chart shows a graphic 
presentation of the data 
presented on the previous 
two pages.  The chart does 
not include all medical 
procedures shown in 
Appendix 1, only those that 
are discussed further in the 
investigation.
City Name HRR
Reimbursements 
2000
Reimbursements 
2005
%Change
 2000-2005
Z-Score
Reimbursements
2000
Z-Score
Reimbursements
2005
Z-Score
%Change
 2000-2005
Bradenton 115 2,350 2,110 -10.2% (0.41) (1.19) (0.95)
Clearwater 116 2,503 2,824 12.8% (0.02) 0.37 0.44
Fort Lauderdale 118 2,710 2,687 -0.8% 0.50 0.07 (0.39)
Fort Myers 119 2,261 2,328 3.0% (0.64) (0.71) (0.16)
Gainesville 120 2,744 2,989 9.0% 0.59 0.73 0.20
Hudson 122 2,533 2,431 -4.0% 0.05 (0.49) (0.58)
Jacksonville 123 2,765 2,956 6.9% 0.64 0.66 0.08
Lakeland 124 2,272 2,758 21.4% (0.61) 0.23 0.95
Miami 127 3,688 3,905 5.9% 3.00 2.74 0.02
Ocala 129 2,220 2,411 8.6% (0.75) (0.53) 0.18
Orlando 130 2,492 2,900 16.4% (0.05) 0.54 0.65
Ormond Beach 131 2,011 2,428 20.7% (1.28) (0.49) 0.91
Panama City 133 3,030 3,007 -0.8% 1.32 0.77 (0.38)
Pensacola 134 2,359 2,491 5.6% (0.39) (0.35) 0.00
Sarasota 137 2,128 1,720 -19.2% (0.98) (2.04) (1.49)
St. Petersburg 139 2,386 2,707 13.5% (0.32) 0.12 0.47
Tallahassee 140 2,154 2,351 9.2% (0.91) (0.66) 0.21
Tampa 141 2,617 2,756 5.3% 0.27 0.22 (0.02)
Adjusted State Average 2,578 2,743 6.4%
Unadjusted State Mean Avg 2,512 2,653 5.6%
Standard Deviation 392 458 16.6%
Coefficient of Variation 0.156 0.172 10.4%
Source:   http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/ 187
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Appendix 2
Medicare Reimbursements for Inpatient Short Stays per Enrollee, Florida HRR's, 2000-2005
Source:   http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/
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Medicare Reimbursements for Inpatient Short Stays per Enrollee
Percentage Change, 2000-2005
The five-year percentage change between 2000 & 2005 for Medicare reimbursements for inpatient short-term stays per enrollee show
substantial fluctuation between Hospital Referral Regions.  Growth is higher than 20% in Lakeland and Ormond Beach.   St Petersburg and 
Clearwater show close to 15%.  Sarasota shows a decline of almost 20%.  Hudson also shows a decline but by less than 5%.
Lakeland & 
Ormond Beach 
show 
percentage 
growth in 
excess of 20% 
between 2000 & 
2005
Appendix 2
Medicare Reimbursements for Inpatient Short Stays per Enrollee, Florida HRR's, 2000-2005
Source:   http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/
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Medicare Reimbursements for Inpatient Short Stays per Enrollee
Z-Scores per HRR, 2000
This chart shows Medicare reimbursements for short-term hospital stays for each HRR in Florida converted to z-scores, 2000.  The chart shows 
that Miami is 3 standard deviations above the mean with Panama City almost 1.5 standard deviations.  Fort Lauderdale, Gainesville, and 
Jacksonville are each around 0.50 standard deviations above the mean.  Ormond Beach is close to 1.5 standard deviations below the mean with 
Sarasota at almost 1 standard deviation below.  The chart shows much fluctuation between Florida HRR's with respect to short term inpatient 
Medicare reimbursement per enrollee in 2000.
Miami is 3 and 
Panama City is 
almost 1.5 
standard 
deviations 
above the 
mean.
Appendix 2
Medicare Reimbursements for Inpatient Short Stays per Enrollee, Florida HRR's, 2000-2005
Source:   http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/
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Medicare Reimbursements for Inpatient Short Stays per Enrollee
Z-Scores per HRR, 2005
This chart shows Medicare reimbursements for short-term hospital stays for each HRR in Florida converted to z-scores, 2005.  Just 
like the 2000 chart Miami is close to 3 standard deviations above the mean with Panama City almost 1.0 standard deviations above.  
Sarasota is more than 2 standard deviations below the mean.  Although there is still wide fluctuation in the 2005 chart, it doesn't 
show the extent of variation as was seen in the 2000 chart.
Miami is again shown 
to have the highest 
standard deviation 
above the mean.
Sarasota shows that it 
is a little more than 2 
standard deviations 
below the mean.
Source:   http://www.dartmouthatlas.org
TATL CABG% PCI% Valve Repl.% Fusion%
Hip & 
Femur%
Joint & 
Limb%
Knee Proc%
Mastec
tomy%
Prostate 
Proc%
TATL 1 0.21904 0.22828 0.20818 0.25655 0.20145 0.19437 0.10465 0.16364 0.22529
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0018 <.0001 <.0001
CABG% 0.21904 1 0.68367 0.93267 0.26449 0.04595 0.13811 0.025 0.14222 0.10612
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.1706 <.0001 0.4561 <.0001 0.0015
PCI% 0.22828 0.68367 1 0.65751 0.26299 0.0348 0.13333 0.1094 0.07686 0.06435
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.2994 <.0001 0.0011 0.0218 0.0548
Valve Repl.% 0.20818 0.93267 0.65751 1 0.25317 0.04819 0.14192 0.03011 0.14089 0.10773
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.1506 <.0001 0.3694 <.0001 0.0013
Fusion% 0.25655 0.26449 0.26299 0.25317 1 0.39632 0.50064 0.27941 0.33878 0.29032
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
Hip & Femur% 0.20145 0.04595 0.0348 0.04819 0.39632 1 0.75331 0.28689 0.51225 0.42486
<.0001 0.1706 0.2994 0.1506 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
Joint & Limb% 0.19437 0.13811 0.13333 0.14192 0.50064 0.75331 1 0.36702 0.42016 0.41234
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
Knee Proc% 0.10465 0.025 0.1094 0.03011 0.27941 0.28689 0.36702 1 0.08723 0.07706
0.0018 0.4561 0.0011 0.3694 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0092 0.0214
Mastectomy% 0.16364 0.14222 0.07686 0.14089 0.33878 0.51225 0.42016 0.08723 1 0.46431
<.0001 <.0001 0.0218 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0092 <.0001
Prostate Proc% 0.22529 0.10612 0.06435 0.10773 0.29032 0.42486 0.41234 0.07706 0.46431 1
<.0001 0.0015 0.0548 0.0013 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0214 <.0001
191
Appendix 3
Correlation Matrices, TATL Ratio & Selected Discretionary Procedures
Pearson Correlation Coefficients, N = 891 (Prob > | r | under H0: Rho=0)
High Pearson correlation coefficients are seen between valve replacement and CABG at 0.93.  A high correlation is also observed between valve 
replacement and PCI at 0.66 and between CABG and PCI at 0.68.   High Pearson correlation coefficients are also observed between hip & femur 
and joint and limb at 0.75 and between joint & limb and fusion at 0.50.
TATL CABG% PCI% Valve Repl.% Fusion%
Hip & 
Femur%
Joint & 
Limb%
Knee Proc% Mastectomy%
Prostate 
Proc%
TATL 1 0.22896 0.2186 0.22776 0.25362 0.18534 0.24102 0.21276 0.14491 0.23637
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
CABG% 0.22896 1 0.88233 0.95561 0.44184 -0.01802 0.18476 0.15605 0.13957 0.19681
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.591 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
PCI% 0.2186 0.88233 1 0.87223 0.5214 0.05011 0.25493 0.21158 0.17048 0.20759
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.135 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
Valve Repl.% 0.22776 0.95561 0.87223 1 0.45688 -0.00474 0.19277 0.15479 0.15283 0.20332
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.8877 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
Fusion% 0.25362 0.44184 0.5214 0.45688 1 0.4336 0.62188 0.42865 0.39627 0.42466
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
Hip & Femur% 0.18534 -0.01802 0.05011 -0.00474 0.4336 1 0.80528 0.46811 0.54058 0.5056
<.0001 0.591 0.135 0.8877 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
Joint & Limb% 0.24102 0.18476 0.25493 0.19277 0.62188 0.80528 1 0.55669 0.5752 0.5526
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
Knee Proc% 0.21276 0.15605 0.21158 0.15479 0.42865 0.46811 0.55669 1 0.32861 0.34445
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
Mastectomy% 0.14491 0.13957 0.17048 0.15283 0.39627 0.54058 0.5752 0.32861 1 0.56564
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
Prostate Proc% 0.23637 0.19681 0.20759 0.20332 0.42466 0.5056 0.5526 0.34445 0.56564 1
<.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001
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Correlation Matrices, TATL Ratio & Selected Discretionary Procedures
Spearman Correlation Coefficients, N = 891 (Prob > | r | under H0: Rho=0)
Appendix 3
High Spearman correlation coefficients are shown between valve replacement and CABG at 0.96.  A high Spearman coefficient is also 
shown between valve replacement and PCI at 0.87 and between CABG and PCI at 0.88.   High Pearson correlation coefficients are also 
observed between hip & femur and joint and limb at 0.81 and between joint & limb and fusion at 0.62.
Quartile 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
1 $35,200 $36,950 $38,050 $39,100 $41,000 $41,000 
2 $42,600 $44,100 $46,300 $46,600 $48,600 $48,650 
3 $48,500 $50,550 $52,650 $52,600 $54,300 $55,000 
4 $59,100 $65,000 $69,800 $61,400 $63,300 $63,300 
5/8Q $45,550 $47,325 $49,475 $49,600 $51,450 $51,825 
Mean $42,034 $43,846 $45,716 $45,500 $47,397 $48,011 
St Dev $7,672 $8,284 $8,910 $7,548 $7,543 $7,594 
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Source:  U.S. Dept. of Housing & Urban Development
Appendix 4
HUD Prescribed Median Income Levels by Quartiles for Total (67) Florida Counties
Shown above are quartiles for the distribution of median income 
limits for all counties in Florida for each year, 2000-2005.  
Quartiles listed include 1st-4th quartiles and also the 5/8 quartile 
which is half the distance between the 2nd & 3rd quartile.  The 5/8 
quartile is listed in addition to the other four quartiles because it is 
used as a breakpoint in the analysis.
Geographic Location in Part 1 was operationalized by using 
median income per Florida County as a proxy.  In model 
development, plant location was used as a categorical variable with 
the breakpoint defined at 5/8Q.
Florida county median income levels, 2000-2005, were obtained 
from the U.S. Dept. of Housing & Urban Development 
(www.hud.gov).
Quartil
e
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
1 48,543 55,095 66,257 72,440 87,090 98,255
2 63,491 72,415 90,931 105,210 124,680 135,127
3 87,247 99,596 124,383 149,477 173,892 180,904
4 356,229 783,196 573,612 648,020 731,168 913,265
5/8Q 75,369 86,006 107,657 127,343 149,286 158,015
Mean 74,143 84,343 104,781 121,816 141,848 153,562
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Appendix 5
Total Medicare HMO Patient Charges,
Valve Replacement & CABG Procedures, Mean Charges by Quartile,  2000-2005
Total charges was used as both a continuous and categorical variable.  
For categorical analysis, total charges was converted to a dichotomy. 
The breakpoint to define high vs. low total charges was at 5/8Q.
A special provision was used for Total Charges in categorical analysis 
because charges increase appreciably each year.  To adjust for these 
increases the 5/8Q breakpoint was annualized, where the 5/8Q 
breakpoint equals $75,369 for year 2000, 86,006 in 2001, 107,657 in 
2002, etc.
Sector Inspection
Region
North 1
2
3
4
Central 5
6
7
South 8
9
10
11
Source:  http://ahcaxnet.fdhc.state.fl.us/nhcguide/static/state_inspection.html
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Indian River, Martin, Okeechobee, Palm Beach, St. Lucie
Broward
Dade, Monroe
Baker, Clay, Duval, Flagler, Nassau, St. Johns, Volusia
Pasco, Pinellas
Hardee, Highlands, Hillsborough, Manatee, Polk
Brevard, Orange, Osceola, Seminole
Charlotte, Collier, De Soto, Glades, Hendry, Lee, Sarasota
Escambia, Okaloosa, Santa Rosa, Walton
Bay, Calhoun, Franklin, Gadsden, Gulf, Holms, Jackson, Jefferson, 
Leon, Liberty, Madison, Taylor, Wakulla, Washington
Alachua, Bradford, Citrus, Columbia, Dixie, Gilchrist, Hamilton, 
Hernando, Lafayette, Lake, Levy, Marion, Putnam, Sumter, 
Suwannee, Union
Florida Counties
Appendix 6
AHCA 11 Inspection Regions by Florida Geographic Sector
The north geographic sector is comprised of inspection regions 1-4 which are comprised 
of 41 Florida counties.  Inspection areas 5-7 comprise the central geographic sector 
which contains 11 Florida counties.  The south sector is comprised of inspection areas 8-
11 and include 15 Florida counties.
Β0 Β 1 X Β 2 P Β 3 C Β 4 R Β 5 XP Β 6 XC Β 7 XR
Variables
Intercept Ownership Plant Location Z-Cardiac Grp Z-Orth Grp
Ownership x 
Plant Location
Ownership 
x Z-Cardiac Grp
Ownership 
x Z-Orth Grp
Parameter Estimates 2.03691 2.76579 0.09568 0.000404 -0.077899 2.23255 1.14022 2.33852
Β0 Intercept 0.0647 -0.0647 -0.06683 0.006073 0.007504 0.06683 -0.00607 -0.0075
Β 1 X Ownership -0.0647 0.1475 0.06683 -0.006073 -0.007504 -0.15118 0.00708 0.01687
Β 2 P Plant Location -0.06683 0.06683 0.11686 -0.00629 -0.014402 -0.11686 0.00629 0.0144
Β 3 C Z-Cardiac Group 0.00607 -0.00607 -0.00629 0.042503 -0.004756 0.00629 -0.0425 0.00476
Β 4 R Z-Orth Group 0.0075 -0.0075 -0.0144 -0.004756 0.027478 0.0144 0.00476 -0.02748
Β 5 XP Ownership x Plant Location 0.06683 -0.15118 -0.11686 0.00629 0.014402 0.25943 -0.01098 -0.02836
Β 6 XC Ownership x Z-Cardiac Group -0.00607 0.00708 0.00629 -0.042503 0.004756 -0.01098 0.06626 -0.00953
Β 7 XR Ownership x Z-Orth Group -0.0075 0.01687 0.0144 0.004756 -0.027478 -0.02836 -0.00953 0.06524
Marginal Effects & Standard Errors for Orthopedic Group Procedures x Ownership
Orthopedic Group Procedures when Ownership = 1
Marginal Effect (Β4  when X = 1) = -0.077899 + X(2.33852) = 2.2606
σ ∂Y/∂Z  = [var(Β 4 ) + X
2
var(Β 7 )+ 2Xcov(Β 4 Β 7 X)]
1/2
 = √0.027478 + X
2
(0.06524) + 2X(-0.027478) = 0.1943
       t = 2.2606 / 0.1943 = 11.6332
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Appendix 7
Variance-Covariance Matrix - Model 1-B
Appendix 7
Variance-Covariance Matrix - Model 1-B
Marginal Effects & Standard Errors for Cardiac Group Procedures x Ownership
Cardiac Group Procedures when Ownership = 1
Marginal Effect (Β3  when X = 1) = -0.000404 + X(1.14022) = 1.1406
σ ∂Y/∂C  = [var(Β 3 ) + X
2
var(Β 6 )+ 2Xcov(Β 3 Β 6 X)]
1/2
   = √0.042503 + X
2
(0.06626) + 2X(-0.042503)  = 0.1541
   t = 1.1406 / 0.1541 = 7.4003
Marginal Effects & Standard Errors for Geographic Location x Ownership
Plant Location when Ownership = 1
Marginal Effect (Β2  when X = 1) = 0.09568 + X(2.2326) = 2.3283
σ ∂Y/∂C  = [var(Β 2 ) + X
2
var(Β 5 )+ 2Xcov(Β 2 Β 5 X)]
1/2
   = √0.11686 + X
2
(0.25943) + 2X(-0.11686)  = 0.3776
   t = 2.3283 / 0.3776 = 6.166
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Proportion of Variation
 No.  Eigen value  Condition 
Index 
 Ownership  Plant
Location 
 Z-CGP*  Z-OGP*  Ownership x 
Plant
Location 
 Ownership 
x Z-CGP* 
 Ownership 
x Z-OGP* 
1 2.27838 1 0.01059 0.02675 0.02887 0.0327 0.02124 0.02737 0.03349
2 1.64416 1.17717 0.07403 0.01788 0.02302 0.01423 0.05671 0.02454 0.015
3 1.44932 1.25381 0.01042 0.01248 0.04609 0.10339 0.00030739 0.04872 0.09102
4 0.91108 1.58138 0.11975 0.34395 0.00053634 0.01353 0.00028198 2.57E-07 0.05398
5 0.37885 2.45232 0.05096 0.00115 0.03311 0.61607 0.03346 0.02533 0.57571
6 0.1876 3.48496 0.01665 0.01478 0.79894 0.13953 0.02604 0.80264 0.13621
7 0.15061 3.8894 0.7176 0.58301 0.06943 0.08056 0.86196 0.07141 0.09458
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Appendix 8
Part 1, Model 1-B - Collinearity Diagnostics (Intercept Adjusted)
Eigen values close to zero signify serious problems of multicollinearity.  But no Eigen values shown in 
this matrix appear to be close to zero. 
As a rule of thumb a condition index > 30 indicates serious problems of multicollinearity.  None of the 
condition index values are even above 3.9. 
*CGP:  Cardiac Group Procedures 
*OGP:  Orthopedic Group Procedures
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Appendix 9 
 
Technical Appendix  
Circumventing a Possible Specification Error 
Supplement to Part 1, Models 1-A & 1-B 
 
 
Introduction 
In the Regression Diagnostics section under Part 1 (Chapter 7), specifically under 
the discussion on Specification Error (page 134) a reference is made to Appendix 9.  This 
is a technical appendix that is added to the analysis to help avoid the possibility of a 
specification error in this project.  
A specification error occurs in a model that does not include a certain variable(s) 
when its presence is warranted.   Specification errors are often discussed in the context of 
incorporating a higher order term(s) when there is a curvilinear, as opposed to a linear, 
association.  Higher order terms may also refer to interacting variables that should have 
been placed in the model.    
Another type of specification error may occur when certain variables are not 
included, but are theoretically grounded and conceptually relevant to the model.  
Excluding one or more of these variables may result in a specification error as well as 
attenuated confidence in the model’s validity.  
One of the objectives in this project has been to formulate parsimonious models; 
to create efficient models using only a few variables that directly contribute to the model 
and address hypotheses.  This objective was carried out in the development of models 1-
A and 1-B in Part 1 of the narrative (Chapter 7).  But the enforcement of objectives for 
parsimony and model efficiency should not occur at the price of foregoing otherwise 
valuable information, especially when an expanded model may include additional 
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variables of which theory and prior research has established their association with the 
dependent variable. 
If a specification error occurred in models 1-A and 1-B in Part 1 due to the 
exclusion of important variables, then an important question arises in connection with 
these models:  can similar results be obtained with additional, relevant variables entered 
into the model, or will an expanded model provide new information that may alter 
conclusions reached earlier in Part 1?  This question will be addressed via two additional 
models, entitled Model 1-C and Model 1-D in this appendix. 
If the inclusion of additional variables results in, for example, lower betas or 
perhaps even insignificant p-values for the association between the total assets/total 
liabilities (TATL) ratio and cardiac and orthopedic group procedures,  then it may be 
concluded that the models in Part 1 are less reliable than initially imagined.  On the other 
hand, if the associations between the TATL ratio and cardiac and orthopedic group 
procedures are similar in the presence of these additional variables, then greater 
confidence can be placed in these associations, evidenced by both parsimonious and 
expanded models. 
Adding this technical appendix which tests Part 1 models using three additional 
and very relevant variables is an important endeavor. These three additional variables 
will reflect labor costs, hospital occupancy, and market conditions. Without this appendix 
questions may arise as to whether the analysis was incomplete and if model validity and 
results could be fully trusted.   
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Recap of Part 1 Variables 
Before these three additional variables are presented, it is necessary to provide a 
recap of the variables that were already used in models 1-A and 1-B in Part 1 of the 
narrative.  These original variables included the dependent variable TATL ratio, and 
independent variables ownership, geographic location, cardiac group procedures, and 
orthopedic group procedures.  A brief summary of these variables are restated in the next 
few brief paragraphs.   
The TATL ratio (total assets ÷ total liabilities) is the reciprocal of the debt ratio, 
(total liabilities ÷ total assets).  Total liabilities include current and long-term liabilities, 
and total assets include current and fixed assets as well as other assets such as goodwill if 
relevant.   
As the inverse to the debt ratio, the TATL ratio is an indicator of liquidity vs. 
leverage and is a measure of both cash-flow and balance sheet solvency.  Essentially, it is 
a measure of long-term financial health and stability. 
Cardiac group procedures represent a set of DRG codes under Major Diagnostic 
Category (MDC) 5 and include valve replacements, coronary artery bypass grafts 
(CABG), and percutanious coronary interventions (PCI).  Orthopedic group procedures 
represent DRG codes under MDC 8 and include major joint & limb reattachment, hip & 
femur procedures, spinal fusions, and knee procedures.  A full listing of these procedures 
with corresponding DRG codes can be found on Table 6 in Chapter 3 of the narrative. 
Both cardiac and orthopedic group procedure variables are expressed as 
percentages which are calculated for each hospital via cardiac procedures reimbursed by 
conventional Medicare ÷ total procedures including all payers.  Percentages of orthopedic 
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group procedures are calculated in the same fashion for each hospital via orthopedic 
group procedures reimbursed by conventional Medicare ÷ total procedures including all 
payers. 
Ownership is a dummy variable to contrast investor owned from not-for-profit 
hospitals with not-for-profits as the base level.  Geographic location is a dummy variable 
to contrast hospitals located in higher income vs. lower income counties with hospitals in 
lower income counties as the base level.  The breakpoint to determine higher income 
counties is the ≥ ⅝ median income quartile for the median income distribution for all 
Florida counties. 
Three Additional Variables 
As mentioned in the Introduction of this appendix, there are three additional 
dimensions that could be explored in connection with models in Part 1.  These include 
labor costs, market conditions, and facility sizing.  These three dimensions will be 
operationalized by three different continuous variables.  Labor costs will be measured by 
the variable manhours per adjusted patient day for each hospital.  Market conditions will 
be measured by the Herfindahl-Hirshman Index (HHI) for HMOs for each county, and 
facility sizing will be measured by hospital occupancy percentage for each hospital.  
These three variables will be discussed more fully in the following three subsections. 
Labor Costs – Manhours per Adjusted Patient Day 
There are lengthy discussions regarding labor costs and the efficient use of 
resources in hospitals in the literature review in Chapter 2 of the narrative.  These 
discussions provide much information on the association between a strong balance sheet, 
reflected in a high TATL ratio, and labor costs. 
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Several variables were explored which represent labor costs and include hospital 
average annual LOS, salary per adjusted admission, full-time-equivalency (FTE), and 
salary per FTE.  However, the best variable that was found to reflect labor costs was 
manhours per adjusted patient day.  This variable is a ratio represented as follows. 
Manhours per adjusted patient day 
= Manhours ÷ {(Total of acute and intensive care patient days)  
÷ [(Total inpatient revenue – Inpatient sub-acute revenue) ÷ Gross revenue]} 
 
Manhours are defined as one work year, which is 2080 hours for one full time 
employee multiplied by the number of fulltime equivalent employees.  Adjusted patient 
days are the sum of acute patient days and intensive care patient days divided by the ratio 
of inpatient revenues generated from acute, intensive, ambulatory, and ancillary patient 
services to gross revenue (AHCA 2005). 
It is intuitive that measures of hospital profitability would be inversely related to 
labor costs, and evidence supporting this supposition is replete in the literature.    It was 
also surmised that investor owned hospitals would have fewer mean average manhours 
per adjusted day relative to not-for-profits.  An examination of the AHCA financial 
dataset, 2000-2005, revealed that investor owned hospitals have a mean average of 22.90 
manhours per adjusted patient day with a standard deviation of 10.98.  Not-for-profits, on 
the other hand, show a mean average of 26.36 manhours per adjusted patient day with a 
standard deviation of 10.27.   
These differences between investor owned and not-for-profit hospitals were 
supported by Sear (1991) who found that hospital profitability and solvency are 
associated with reduced manhours per adjusted patient day.  Sear examined 50 investor 
owned and 60 not-for-profit hospitals in Florida for the period from 1982 through 1988.  
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The results indicated that “investor-owned hospitals used significantly fewer FTE staff 
per bed, had significantly fewer manhours per adjusted patient day, and paid significantly 
less in wages and had significantly higher operating margins (profit) than did the not-for-
profit institutions.” 
Observing mean differences between investor owned and not-for-profit hospitals 
with respect to mean average man-hours per adjusted day, and noting Sear’s findings, in 
the model development phase of the analysis it was conjectured that interaction may exist 
between ownership and manhours per adjusted patient day.   Tests showed that the 
variable, manhours per adjusted patient day, was a good control variable in that it had a 
strong inverse correlation with the TATL ratio.  However, interaction was not found for 
ownership x adjusted manhours per patient day. 
Facility Sizing – Patient Occupancy 
It is advantageous for a hospital to be of optimum size, not to contain more beds 
than are necessary, but just enough beds to meet patient demand.  “The nontrivial costs of 
building, staffing, and maintaining unused beds are unnecessary and are ultimately borne 
by the health care consumer….considerable savings are possible by eliminating beds in 
an over-bedded hospital (saving variable costs) and by preventing the construction of 
unneeded beds (saving both fixed and variable costs)” (Hancock, Magerlein, Storer, et al 
1978).   
A good measure for optimum facility size is hospital occupancy.  Even if a 
hospital performs procedures that are very profitable in terms of DRG reimbursement, 
profitability will still be enervated if patient occupancy is low.   
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Patient occupancy is a calculation used to show the actual utilization of an 
inpatient health facility for a given period of time.  “Occupancy rate and average length 
of stay are common measures of efficiency which provide a rough measurement of how 
well hospitals are utilizing their primary resource; bed capacity” (Plante 2009).  
Occupancy rate is available in the AHCA financial data as an annual adjusted 
mean percentage of occupancy for licensed staffed acute beds during a reporting period 
(e.g., one year) (AHCA 2005).   The formula for occupancy is shown as follows: 
Number of total inpatient service days 
÷ Bed days available 
Total inpatient service days (i.e., days of care) are the sum of each daily inpatient 
census for the reporting period.  Bed days available are equal to the number of staffed 
beds multiplied by the number of days in the reporting period.  For example, a hospital 
with 50 beds would have an annual 18,250 bed days available (50 x 365) (Pennsylvania 
DOH 2001). 
In addition to facility sizing there is another reason why occupancy is important in 
the development of models in Part 1 and in this appendix.  Recall that in the narrative it 
was discussed that investor owned hospitals, on the average, have fewer beds than not-
for-profit hospitals.  The AHCA financial dataset, 2000-2005, shows that the mean 
average for beds in investor owned hospitals is 207 with a standard deviation of 120 and 
a maximum of 531.  In contrast, not-for-profits, which included religious and other not-
for-profit and hospital district hospitals, showed a mean average of 301 beds with a 
standard deviation of 230 and a maximum of 955. 
Since investor owned hospitals have fewer beds, averaging a hundred beds less 
than not-for-profits, then by performing higher rates of certain discretionary procedures, 
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certain investor owned hospitals not only fill their beds with more profitable DRG codes, 
but also use fewer beds for less profitable codes.   
What was surprising in examining the AHCA financial data was that not-for-
profits showed slightly higher occupancy rates than investor owned hospitals.  It was 
expected that the mean occupancy rate in investor owned hospitals would exceed that of 
not-for-profits. The mean occupancy rate for all hospitals in the study, 2000-2005, was 
46.19 percent, while not-for-profits showed 47.10 percent, and investor owned hospitals 
showed only 44.83 percent. 
The difference in occupancy rate changes when the analysis is stratified not only 
by ownership, but also by TATL ratio levels.  Recall that in the narrative the TATL ratio 
distribution was segmented into quartiles.  When occupancy is reviewed to only include 
investor owned hospitals with TATL ratios equal to or exceeding the ⅝ TATL ratio 
quartile then mean occupancy jumps up to 49.27 percent.  Occupancy was then examined 
to include only investor owned hospitals with TATL ratios equal to or exceeding the third 
TATL ratio quartile and the mean rate jumped again to 50.58 percent.  
Based on a review of occupancy rates stratified by ownership and TATL ratio it 
was determined that interaction existed between ownership and occupancy in their 
association with the dependent variable.  This is discussed further in the Preliminary 
Analyses and Model Development sections in this appendix. 
Occupancy, as reported in the AHCA financial data, 2000-2005, was determined 
to be a useful control variable with a positive association between it and the TATL ratio. 
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Market Concentration – HMO Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI) 
The models presented in this technical appendix attempt to adjust for market 
conditions by incorporating an additional variable, the HMO HHI.  Market conditions in 
the context of HMO markets refer to the number of health plans competing with each 
other in a geographic area.  Fewer available health plans reduce a hospital’s flexibility 
and negotiating leverage, leading to lower reimbursement, while a broad selection of 
plans gives a hospital a bargaining advantage. 
As will be discussed subsequent to the Model Development section, the inclusion 
of the HMO HHI is only one aspect of market conditions.  In future research there should 
also be consideration in using the hospital HHI in addition to the HMO HHI. 
A Brief Discussion of the HHI 
Before proceeding with the analysis, a brief discussion of the HHI is presented.  
The HHI, attributed to economists Orris C. Herfindahl and Albert O. Hirschman, has 
been applied in research on market competition, technology management, and antitrust 
law (Szpiro 1987, The Brandes Institute 2004).  “The HHI is one of the most commonly 
used indicators to detect anticompetitive behavior in industries.  In fact, an increase in the 
value of the index is usually interpreted as an indicator of actions which may lessen 
competition or even create a monopoly” (Matsumoto, Merlone, Sxidarovsky). 
A low HHI indicates that market concentration is low which indicates vigorous 
competition reflecting that a large number of firms are operating with small market 
shares.  In contrast, a high HHI indicates greater market concentration where economic 
output is carried out by a small number of firms resulting in weak competition (Rhoades 
1993).  
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The HHI has been used in previous research in measuring horizontal integration 
of healthcare markets.  Horizontal integration often raises antitrust concerns because a 
newly combined firm will have a larger market share than either firm did before merging 
(Whinston 2006). 
From an economic and sometimes legal perspective, a high degree of 
concentration reflecting a lack of competition may be evidence of an industry’s antitrust 
concerns.  In general the HHI can be a warning signal of possible antitrust problems as 
well as the emergence of a monopoly or oligopolies within an industry (Zimmerman 
2009).  For this reason the HHI is used by the federal government to monitor the effects 
on markets due to mergers and acquisitions. “Transactions that increase the HHI by more 
than 100 points in concentrated markets presumptively raise antitrust concerns under the 
Horizontal Merger Guidelines issued by the U.S. Department of Justice and the Federal 
Trade Commission” (www.justice.gov). 
Calculating the HHI 
 
The HHI is written as follows: 
 
   N 
HHI = ∑ (MSi)2 
  i = 1 
 
MS is the market share of firm i in the market, and N is the number of firms 
(Rhodes 1993).  An example of the HHI calculation would be if a market had only two 
firms, and each had 50 percent market share.  The HHI would equal 0.50
2 
+ 0.50
2 
= 0.50 
(Pogodzinski 2010, Pilsbury & Meaney 2009).  
Depending on the preference of the researcher, HHI observations may be 
expressed as a decimal or as a whole number.  When whole numbers are used 10,000 
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represents the maximum value, representing the existence of a monopoly in which one 
firm has 100 percent of the market, that is, the HHI = (100)
2
 = 10,000.  Conversely, the 
HHI takes on a very small value theoretically approaching zero if the market is purely 
competitive where there are many firms with small market shares.  For example, in a 
market with 100 firms where each have a one percent share of the market the HHI = (11) 
+ (11) . . . (1100) = 100 (Rhoades 1993). 
When expressed as a decimal the HHI ranges from 0 to 1.0 representing a 
continuum of market concentration which progresses from a large number of very small 
firms to a single monopolistic firm.  As the HHI approaches zero it is an indication of 
perfect competition, and as an HHI approaches 1.0 it indicates market domination by an 
oligopoly or monopoly.  Increases in the HHI indicate an increase in market power and a 
decrease in competition.  Conversely, a decrease in the HHI represents decreasing market 
power and an increase in competition (Pogodzinski 2010).  
Market concentration is often represented by HHI intervals.  It is usually 
considered that an HHI below 0.01 (or 100 when using whole numbers) represents a 
highly competitive market.  An HHI below 0.1 (1,000) represents a non-concentrated 
index.  An HHI between 0.1 and 0.18 (1,000 to 1,800) indicates moderate concentration, 
and an HHI above 0.18 (> 1,800) indicates high market concentration (Pogodzinski 2010, 
National Grid 2009), and perhaps market domination by a monopoly or oligopoly 
(Powell 2007, U.S. DOJ & Federal Trade Commission 1997). 
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The HHI and Healthcare Markets 
The interpretation of the HHI, discussed above, is not totally consistent with 
hospital and HMO markets.  Healthcare, specifically HMO, markets tend to show higher 
HHIs per city or county.  For example, an examination of the HMO HHI data for all 
counties in Florida, 2000-2004, reveals a mean of   0.2982 (or 2,982).   This is consistent 
with average HHIs in many other parts of the nation.  Table 1 provides a breakdown of 
HMO/PPO HHIs for 2008 and Hospital Discharge HHIs for 2007 by several cities and 
states across the country.  
 
Table 1 
A Delineation of HMO/PPO HHI, 2008 & Hospital System Discharge HHI, 2007 
A Survey of Various Cities Across the Nation 
City/State HMO/PPO  
HHI, 2008 
Hospital System  
Discharge HHI, 2007 
Sarasota, FL 1,734 2,436 
Honolulu, HI 6,357 1,349 
Boise, ID 3,159 2,740 
Grand Rapids, MI 4,299 2,623 
Knoxville, TN 2,221 1,483 
New Port News, VA 1,844 2,302 
Fresno, CA 2,260 1,318 
San Francisco, CA 2,024 1,659 
Fort Wayne, IN 3,112 2,236 
Macon, GA 5,507 1,555 
Lafayette, LA 4,045 1,014 
Beaumont, TX 3,289 2,884 
Corpus Christi, TX 2,678 3,226 
Source:  Pyenson, B., Kosuke, I., Goldberg, S. et al (March 2010) “High Value for Hospital Care:  High 
Value for All,” National Business Group on Health 
 
As shown in Table 1, none of the HMO/PPO HHIs listed show an HHI less than 
1,800, a threshold which denotes a monopoly or oligopoly in many other industries.  
Healthcare markets behave somewhat differently than many other markets. 
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HHI’s Usefulness as a Control Variable 
 As already mentioned, the HHI is useful as a control variable because it reflects 
healthcare market concentration, the tendency of a market to be dominated (the extent to 
which price and output are controlled) by a few large firms.  In this case the HMO HHI is 
a useful control variable reflecting market penetration of HMO plans and their tendency 
of controlling contract terms and reimbursement levels to hospitals.  Therefore, it was 
anticipated that there would be an inverse association between hospitals’ TATL ratio and 
market concentration.   
Although an inverse association between the TATL ratio and the HMO HHI was 
anticipated, a positive, albeit weak, association is what was found.  This anomaly was 
investigated, and reasons why this unexpected association may have occurred is further 
discussed following the Model Development section. 
Data Integrity:  Three Caveats 
Before proceeding with model development a few caveats regarding the dataset 
should be disclosed.  First, an HMO HHI was available for each county in Florida, but 
only for years 2000-2004; data for 2005 was unavailable.  But keep in mind that there is 
not considerable variation by county in the HHI from year to year.  Since the HMO HHI 
is not available for 2005, using 2004’s HHI for both 2004 and 2005 would be acceptable. 
The second caveat is that there are three missing values for hospital occupancy.  
Data entry for this variable was done manually by the author, and occupancy could be 
identified for all but three hospitals.  This means that the dataset is reduced from 891 to 
888 observations.  Considering that occupancy is an important variable, and since lost 
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data only represents three observations, it was determined to keep occupancy in the 
model.  
Preliminary Analyses 
 
Descriptive Statistics 
 The preliminary analysis begins with a presentation of some descriptive statistics, 
shown in Table 2, for the three additional variables, manhours per adjusted patient day, 
occupancy, and HMO HHI. Certain types of descriptive statistics have already been 
provided regarding these three variables, but they are aggregated below so they can be 
viewed simultaneously in one table.  These statistics are presented for total hospitals and 
hospitals stratified by ownership.  
Table 2 
Descriptive Statistics for Manhours per Adjusted Patient Day, Occupancy & HMO HHI, 
Total, Investor Owned & Not-for-Profit Hospitals, 2000-2005 
Variables All Hospitals Investor Owned Not-for-Profits 
Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev Mean Std Dev 
Manhours per Adjusted 
Patient Day 
24.84 10.70 22.96 10.93 26.36 10.27 
Occupancy 0.4619 0.2592 0.4494 0.2642 0.4719 0.2549 
HMO HHI 0.2982 0.2191 0.3201 0.2409 0.2805 0.1983 
 
 An important element in this table is the standard deviation for each variable.  As 
will be discussed, continuous variables in these models are expressed as z-scores.  Using 
the association between the TATL ratio and occupancy percentage as an example, a 
change in the TATL ratio would not correspond to a one percent change in occupancy.  
Instead, correct interpretation would be a change in the TATL ratio corresponding to a 
change in occupancy by one standard deviation, 0.2592. 
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Preliminary Tests 
A number of preliminary tests, many similar to those performed in Part 1 of the 
narrative, were completed for the analysis presented in this appendix.   One of these tests 
included the calculation of correlation coefficients for the TATL ratio, HMO HHI, 
occupancy, and manhours per adjusted day, which is shown in tables 3 & 4.  These tables 
provide measures of association using the Pearson correlation test for linear dependence 
and the Spearman test of ordinal rankings. 
Since other variables used in this appendix, such as cardiac and orthopedic group 
procedures, were already tested under Part 1 of the narrative, they are not presented in 
tables 3 & 4.   
Tests of Association Using Pearson & Spearman Correlation Coefficients 
Table 3 presents a correlation matrix using Pearson coefficients for the TATL 
ratio, HMO HHI, occupancy, and manhours per adjusted patient day. 
Table 3 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients for TATL, HMO HHI, Occupancy & Manhours per 
Adj. Day, All Hospitals, 2000-2005 
Variables TATL HMO HHI Occupancy 
Manhours per 
Adj. Day 
TATL 1 0.07042 0.06643 -0.14506 
  (0.0356) (0.0477) (<.0001) 
HMO HHI 0.07485 1 -0.13257 0.07718 
 (0.0255)  (<.0001) (0.0213) 
Occupancy 0.06643 -0.13257 1 -0.0624 
 (0.0477) (<.0001)  (0.0631) 
Manhours per Adj. Day -0.14506 0.07718 -0.0624 1 
 (<.0001) (0.0213) (0.0631)  
 
As shown in Table 3 all correlation coefficients between the TATL ratio and 
HMO HHI, occupancy, and manhours per adjusted patient day are significant (p < 0.05) 
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but not very high.  The highest negative coefficient, demonstrating an inverse association, 
is between the TATL ratio and manhours per adjusted day at -0.145 (p < 0.0001).    
 It was anticipated that a negative correlation coefficient, reflecting an inverse 
association, would be found between the TATL ratio and HMO HHI, but the table shows 
a significantly positive, albeit very low coefficient.  There is also an expected negative 
coefficient shown between the HMO HHI and occupancy at -0.133 (p < 0.0001).   
A high negative coefficient, indicating an inverse association, was expected to be 
found between occupancy and manhours per adjusted day.  The supposition was that 
higher occupancy would result in greater efficiency in labor costs.  But the correlation 
coefficient between occupancy and manhours per adjusted patient day was non-
significant (p = 0.0631).  
Table 4 shows the same analysis as in Table 3, but using Spearman correlation 
coefficients. 
 
Table 4 
Spearman Correlation Coefficients for TATL, HMO HHI, Occupancy & Manhours per 
Adj. Day, Total Hospitals, 2000-2005 
Variables TATL HMO HHI Occupancy 
Manhours per 
Adj.  Day 
TATL 1 0.03063 0.12737 -0.26856 
  (0.361) (0.0001) (<.0001) 
HMO HHI 0.03161 1 -0.13975 0.0961 
 (0.3460)  (<.0001) (0.0041) 
Occupancy 0.12737 -0.13975 1 -0.09831 
 (<0.0001) (<.0001)  (0.0034) 
Manhours per Adj. Day -0.26856 0.0961 -0.09831 1 
 (<.0001) (0.0041) (0.0034)  
 
 
The Spearman coefficient is higher than the Pearson for the associations between 
the TATL ratio and occupancy at 0.127 (p < 0.0001).   A higher negative coefficient is 
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found between the TATL ratio and manhours per adjusted patient day at -0.269 (p < 
0.0001).  An anticipated inverse association between the TATL ratio and the HMO HHI 
was again left unsubstantiated with a positive non-significant coefficient of 0.0316 (p = 
0.3460).  An inverse association was found again, as it was using the Pearson coefficient, 
between the HMO HHI and occupancy with a coefficient of -0.1398 (p < 0.0001). 
Tests of Association Exclusively for Investor Owned Hospitals 
 Tests of association, stratified by ownership, were also performed.  Tables 5 and 6 
provide findings using both the Pearson and Spearman correlation coefficients applied 
exclusively to investor owned hospitals.   
Table 5 
Pearson Correlation Coefficients for TATL, HMO HHI, Occupancy & Manhours per 
Adj. Day, Exclusively for Investor Owned Hospitals, 2000-2005  
Variables TATL HMO HHI Occupancy 
Manhours per 
Adj.  Day 
TATL 1 0.0243 0.1571 -0.1147 
  (0.6295) (0.0017) (0.0225) 
HMO HHI 0.03474 1 -0.1267 0.1725 
 (0.4901)  (0.0116) (0.0006) 
Occupancy 0.1571 -0.1267 1 -0.1209 
 (0.0017) (0.0116)  (0.0162) 
Manhours per Adj. Day -0.1147 0.1725 -0.1209 1 
 (0.0225) (0.0006) (0.0162)  
 
 
Pearson coefficients show a non-significant association between the TATL ratio 
and the HMO HHI when the analysis is stratified to include only investor owned 
hospitals.   The coefficient between the TATL ratio and occupancy is significantly 
positive with a coefficient of 0.1571, and the coefficient between the TATL ratio and 
manhours per adjusted patient day is significantly negative, -0.1147 (p = 0.0225) 
reflecting an inverse association.   
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The matrix also shows an expected negative coefficient of -0.1267 (p = 0.0116) 
between manhours per adjusted patient day and occupancy.  This reflects that as 
occupancy increases so does efficiency in the use of personnel.  There is also a positive 
coefficient between the HMO HHI and manhours per adjusted patient day.  This reflects 
that as market concentration increases labor efficiency, in turn, decreases. 
Table 6 now shows Spearman rank order correlation coefficients exclusively for 
investor owned hospitals.   
Table 6 
Spearman Correlation Coefficients for TATL, HMO HHI, Occupancy & Manhours per 
Adj. Day, Exclusively for Investor Owned Hospitals, 2000-2005  
Variables TATL HMO HHI Occupancy 
Manhours per 
Adj.  Day 
TATL 1 -0.0191 0.2254 -0.2231 
  (0.7046) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
HMO HHI -0.0191 1 -0.1518 0.2474 
 (0.7046)  (0.0025) (0.0001) 
Occupancy 0.2254 -0.1518 1 -0.2532 
 (0.0001) (0.0025)  (0.0001) 
Manhours per Adj. Day -0.2231 0.2474 -0.2532 1 
 (0.0001) (0.0001) (0.0001)  
 
The findings in Table 6 using Spearman coefficients are consistent with respect to 
the association between the TATL ratio and occupancy, except the Spearman coefficient 
shows greater magnitude between the two variables with a coefficient of 0.2254 (p < 
0.0001).  
The association between the TATL ratio and manhours per adjusted patient day 
also shows greater magnitude using the Spearman coefficient at -0.2231 (p < 0.0001).  
The coefficient between the TATL ratio and the HMO HHI was found to be 
negative, indicating the anticipated inverse association, but with a high p-value (0.7046). 
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Because of a large magnitude of difference in association between the TATL ratio 
and occupancy when stratified by ownership interaction was tested and found between 
these two variables.  This is discussed further in the Model Development section. 
Assessment of Control Variables 
 Manhours per adjusted patient day performed best in the preliminary analyses in 
its inverse association with the TATL ratio.  This was demonstrated by Pearson and 
Spearman correlation coefficients shown in tables 3-6, as well as other preliminary tests 
carried out in preparation of this appendix.  These tests also revealed a positive 
association between the TATL ratio and occupancy, as well as elucidated the presence of 
interaction between ownership and occupancy in their association with the TATL ratio. 
The HMO HHI variable did not perform well in preliminary analyses. Association 
between the TATL ratio and the HMO HHI, depending on the test that was used, was 
shown to be either non-significant or very small.  The positive association between 
profitability or solvency and the HMO HHI, which was found using the Pearson 
coefficient in Table 3, is also inconsistent with theory, as there should be an inverse 
association between the TATL ratio and the HMO HHI.  Lower hospital TATL ratios 
should correspond to higher HMO HHI concentration.  
The inability of preliminary tests to show a strong inverse association between the 
TATL ratio and the HMO HHI does not always mean that an association fails to exist.  It 
is just not demonstrated in the tests employed perhaps due to anomalies in the data or 
other reasons. Therefore, it was determined for the HMO HHI to remain in the models.   
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Further discussion will be provided regarding the unanticipated lack of inverse 
association between the TATL ratio and the HMO HHI following the presentation of the 
regression models in the Model Development section. 
Model Development 
As mentioned earlier, under Part1 in the narrative (Chapter 7) there were a main 
effects and an interaction model, labeled, respectively, Model 1-A and Model 1-B.  
Because this appendix is technically a continuation of Part 1 the main effects and 
interaction model will be entitled Model 1-C and Model 1-D.  Keep in mind that models 
1-C and 1-D are expanded models that include three additional variables representing 
labor costs per hospital, patient occupancy per hospital, and market concentration per 
county for all counties in Florida. 
As discussed in the narrative, multicollinearity often accompanies interaction 
terms.  Since Model 1-D is an interaction model, steps were taken to manage variance 
inflation which included the transformation of continuous variables to z-scores.  
Although no problems with multicollinearity were anticipated with the main effects 
model, 1-C, z-scores were also used for continuous variables in this model, so that 
comparisons could be made readily between models 1-C and 1-D. 
Now that additional variables have been identified and tested, they can be used in 
a main effects model. 
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Model 1-C:  Expanded Main Effects Model  
 Model 1-C is an expanded main effects model that includes the TATL ratio as the 
dependent variable and seven independent variables.  The regression equation for Model 
1-C is written below.  
ŷTATL =  β0 + β1X  + β2P + β3C + β4R   + β5H  + β6O  + β7M + є 
Where:  X = Ownership 
  P = Geographic Location 
  C = Z-Cardiac Group Procedures  
  R = Z-Orthopedic Group Procedures  
  O = Z-Occupancy  
H = Z-HMO HHI 
M = Z-Manhours per Adj. Patient Day  
 
 
The results of the regression model, 1-C, are shown in Table 7. 
 
Table 7 
Model 1-C  Main Effects Model 
Source DF 
Sum of 
Squares 
Mean 
Square 
F Value Pr > F 
Model 7 6,020.18 860.026 56.88 <.0001 
Error 880      13,305 15.119   
Corrected Total 887 19,325    
Root MSE 3.888  R
2
 0.3115  
Dependent Mean 3.97  
Adjusted 
R
2
 
0.3061  
Coefficient 
of Variation 
98.747    
 
Table 7 reports a significant F-value in connection with Model 1-C, indicating 
that at least one variable in the model is significant.  A coefficient of variation of 98.747 
is also reported which is much higher than the ideal coefficient of 10.0.   
220 
The model shows an adjusted R2 of 0.3061.  This is slightly higher than the 
adjusted R2 that was found for the main effects Model 1-A in the narrative.  But the 
higher R2could be due simply to a greater number of variables in the model.   
The parameter estimates are now presented for Model 1-C and are shown in Table 
8 below. 
Table 8 
Model 1-C – Expanded Main Effects Model, Parameter Estimates  
 
Variable 
Parameter 
Estimate  
Standard 
Error 
t-Value Pr > |t| VIF 
β0 Intercept 1.517 0.237 6.39 <.0001 0 
β1X Ownership 3.839 0.269 14.26 <.0001 1.052 
β2P Geographic Location 1.224 0.283 4.32 <.0001 1.148 
β3C Z-Cardiac Group Procedures 0.839 0.134 6.26 <.0001 1.057 
β4R Z-Orthopedic Group Procedures 0.789 0.137 5.76 <.0001 1.100 
β5H Z-HHI HMO 0.424 0.138 3.06 0.0022 1.120 
β6O Z-Occupancy  0.331 0.133 2.50 0.0126 1.0278 
β7M 
Z-Manhours per Adj. Patient 
Day 
-0.462 0.134 -3.43 0.0006 1.049 
 
All variables in the model are found to be significant and, with the exception of 
the HMO HHI, are found in directions and magnitudes that were anticipated.  The VIF on 
the table indicates no problems with multicollinearity in the model. 
 The parameter estimate for ownership is 3.84 indicating that, on the average, the 
TATL ratio is 3.84 points higher in investor owned hospitals relative to not-for-profits.  
For geographic location it is found that hospitals located in higher income counties have 
TATL ratios that are 1.2 points higher than those located in lower income counties.   
 Hospitals located in counties with an HMO HHI at 1Z have TATL ratios that are 
4/5 of a point higher than those with an HMO HHI at the mean.  As already discussed, 
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the directional aberration between the TATL ratio and the HMO HHI will be covered 
more fully subsequent to the Model Development section.  
Hospitals with annual average percentages of occupancy at 1Z have TATL ratios 
that are about one-third of a point higher than hospitals with percentages of occupancy at 
the mean (Z = 0).  As expected, hospitals with manhours per adjusted day at 1Z show 
TATL ratios at almost a half a point below those with manhours per adjusted patient day 
at the mean (Z = 0).  
 Betas for cardiac group and orthopedic group procedure percentages show similar 
results that were shown in Model 1-A under Part 1.  In general, hospitals performing 
cardiac group procedures at 1Z show a TATL ratio of more than 4/5 of a point higher 
than those that carry out cardiac group procedures at the mean (Z = 0).  Likewise, 
hospitals that perform orthopedic group procedures at 1Z show in general TATL ratios 
that are more than three quarters of a point higher than hospitals that carry out these 
procedures at the mean (Z = 0). 
In addition to the preliminary tests, the main effects model further demonstrated 
the statistical usefulness of the variables employed.  The analysis now proceeds to the 
interaction model which uses these same variables.   
Model 1-D: Expanded Interaction Model 
The presence of interaction was tested in Model 1-C for all variables in the model, 
but was found only for ownership x geographic location, ownership x z-cardiac group 
procedures, ownership x z-orthopedic group procedures, and ownership x z-occupancy.     
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The regression equation is written as follows: 
Regression Equation for Model 1-D 
ŷTATL = β0 + β1X  + β2P + β3C + β4R   + β5H  + β6O  + β7M  
+ β8XP + β9XC + β10XR+ β11XO + є 
Where:  X = Ownership 
  P = Geographic Location 
  C = Z-Cardiac Group Procedures  
  R = Z-Orthopedic Group Procedures  
O = Z-Occupancy  
H = Z-HMO HHI  
M = Z-Manhours per Adj. Patient Day    
 
The results of the interaction model are shown below in Table 9. 
 
 
Table 9 
Model 1-D  Interaction Model 
Source DF 
Sum of 
Squares 
Mean 
Square 
F Value Pr > F 
Model 11 8,265.62 751.42 59.52 <.0001 
Error 876 11,059 12.625     
Corrected Total 887 19,325       
Root MSE 3.553     R
2
 0.4277 
Dependent Mean 3.938     
Adjusted 
R
2
 
0.4205 
Coefficient   
of  Variation 
  90.234       
 
 Results of Model 1-D show a dependent mean (i.e., the mean of the TATL ratio) 
of 3.94.  The model also shows a high CV at 90.23, which, just like the main effects 
model, is far above the ideal CV of 10.0.  Other items listed in Table 9, such as the SSR 
and SSE will be examined later when the PRESS statistic is presented at the conclusion 
of Model 1-D. 
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 Table 9 shows a higher adjusted R
2
of 0.421 which is higher than the adjusted R
2
 
in the main effects model which was 0.3061.   
Before proceeding to Model 1-D’s parameter estimates, it is advisable to test the 
significance of the interaction model relative to the main effects model with an F-test.   
The F-test was calculated and yielded a high F value of 46.53 (p < 0.0001) with 
R1
2 
= 0.3061 and R2
2 
= 0.4205; df1 = k2 – k1 (11 – 7) = 4 and df2 = N – k2 – 1 (888 – 11 – 
1) = 876.  This test indicates that the interaction model is significant relative to the main 
effects model. 
Now that the F-test has indicated that the interaction model is significant 
compared to the main effects model, the parameter estimates for Model 1-D are shown in 
Table 10. 
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Table 10 
Model 1-D – Interaction Model, Parameter Estimates 
 
Variable 
Par. 
Est. 
Std. 
Error 
t- 
Value 
Pr > |t|   VIF 
Β0 Intercept 1.959 0.254 7.7 <.0001 0 
β1X Ownership 2.701 0.382 7.07 <.0001 2.535 
β2P Geographic Location 0.370 0.347 1.06 0.2872 2.064 
β3C 
Z-Cardiac Group 
Procedures 
0.032 0.205 0.16 0.8746 2.970 
β4R 
Z-Orthopedic Group 
Procedures 
-0.119 0.164 -0.73 0.4673 1.891 
β5H Z-HMO HHI 0.425 0.127 3.34 0.0009 1.131 
β6O Z-Occupancy 0.024 0.164 0.15 0.8836 1.887 
β7M 
Z- Manhours per Adj. 
Patient Day 
-0.255 0.124 -2.06 0.04 1.070 
β8XP 
Ownership x Geographic 
Location 
2.124 0.504 4.21 <.0001 3.466 
β9XC 
Ownership x Z-Cardiac 
Group Procedures 
1.111 0.256 4.33 <.0001 2.966 
β10XR 
Ownership x Z-Orthopedic 
Group Procedures 
2.313 0.253 9.15 <.0001 1.859 
β11XO Ownership x Occupancy 0.752 0.241 3.12 0.0019 1.873 
 
 VIF is higher in the interaction model relative to the main effects model, but all 
terms show VIF < 4.0 which is acceptable and far below the general conservative (rule of 
thumb) threshold for VIF of 5.0.  The use of z-scores in these models has been very 
effective in managing problems of multicollinearity. 
The beta for the HMO HHI is almost unchanged in the interaction model relative 
to the main effects model.  The parameter estimate in the interaction model is 0.425 while 
it was 0.424 in the main effects model, indicating that hospitals located in counties with 
HMO HHI at 1Z show TATL ratios that are 0.425 points higher than hospitals located in 
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counties with HMO HHI at the mean (Z = 0).  As it has been discussed already, an 
inverse association between the TATL ratio and the HMO HHI had been anticipated.  
The unexpected positive association between the TATL ratio and the HMO HHI is more 
fully discussed following the Model Development section. 
 Although there is almost no change in the HMO HHI, there is considerable 
change in manhours per adjusted day.  The main effects model showed a parameter 
estimate for this variable at -0.462.  The interaction model shows a beta of -0.255.  
Model 1-D: Marginal Effects of Interaction Terms 
As already mentioned, four interaction terms were found in the model.  The 
marginal effects for each interaction term are shown below. 
Occupancy was not used as a variable in models 1-A and 1-B.  Therefore, it 
seems fitting to examine the marginal effect of ownership x occupancy first and in 
greatest detail among the interaction terms in Model 1-D. 
The interaction term for ownership x occupancy can be written ŷ = β0 + β1X 
+ β6O + β11XO (where O = occupancy and X = ownership) of which the marginal 
effect may be interpreted ∂Y/∂O = β6 + β11X (i.e., β6 at X) (Jaccard & Turrisi 2003, 
Aichen & West 1991).  The marginal effect may then be calculated 0.024 + 0.752(X) = 
0.776.   
The focal variable for this interaction term is occupancy, and the modifying 
variable is ownership.  The marginal effect is determined by the association between the 
TATL ratio and occupancy at 1Z (one standard deviation above the mean of z = 0) when 
ownership (investor owned hospital) is present (i.e., ownership = 1) (Jaccard & Turrisi 
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2003).  Under these conditions it is found that the TATL ratio is 0.776, indicating that in 
general investor owned hospitals with occupancy percentages at 1-Z have TATL ratios 
that are 0.776 points higher than investor owned hospitals with occupancy percentages at 
the mean (Z = 0). 
Three other interaction terms were identified in Model 1-D including ownership x 
geographic location, ownership x cardiac group procedures, and ownership x orthopedic 
group procedures.  Table 11 provides marginal effects for each of the interaction terms. 
Table 11 
Delineation of Interaction Terms & Marginal Effects in Connection with Model 1-D 
Interaction Terms Marginal Effects 
Ownership 
x Occupancy β1X  + β6O  + β11XO Β6 + β11X 0.024 + 0.752(X) = 0.776 
Ownership 
x Geographic 
Location 
Β1X  + β2P  + β8XP Β2 + β8X 0.370 + 2.124(X) = 2.494 
Ownership x 
Cardiac Group 
Procedures 
Β1X  + β3C  + β9XC Β3 + β9X 0.032 + 1.111(X) = 1.143 
Ownership x 
Orthopedic Group 
Procedures 
Β1X  + β4R  + β10XR Β4 + β10X -0.119 + 2.313(X) = 2.194 
 
The interaction between ownership and occupancy has already been discussed.  
The following paragraphs provide brief discussions on each of the other interacting 
terms.  
For each interaction term listed in Table 11 the modifying variable is ownership.   
The focal variables include geographic location, cardiac group procedures, and 
orthopedic group procedures 
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For the interaction term of ownership x geographic location, the focal variable is 
geographic location.  The marginal effect indicates that investor owned hospitals located 
in higher income counties have TATL ratios that are, on the average, 2.49 points higher 
than investor owned hospitals in lower income counties. 
Investor owned hospitals that perform orthopedic group procedures at 1Z have 
TATL ratios that in general are 2.19  points higher than investor owned hospitals that 
carry out these procedures at the mean (Z = 0).  Likewise, investor owned hospitals that 
perform cardiac group procedures at 1Z have TATL ratios that in general are 1.14 points 
higher than investor owned hospitals that carry out orthopedic group procedures at the 
mean (Z = 0). 
Model 1-D: Standard Errors Calculated for Marginal Effects of Interaction Terms 
 
Standard errors are now calculated for each marginal effect shown in Table 11 to 
determine if they are significant.  The marginal effect for the interaction term, ownership x 
occupancy will again be used as an example in applying the standard error formula, while results 
for the remaining interaction terms are shown in Table 12.  The formula to determine the standard 
error is written below.  The variances and covariance used in the formula were extracted from a 
variance-covariance matrix generated in connection with the model.   
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σ∂Y/∂O = [var(Β6 ) + X
2
var(Β11) + 2Xcov(Β6 Β11X)]
1/2
 
σ∂Y/∂O =[0.0269 + X
2
(0.0580) + 2X(-0.0267)]
1/2 
= 0.1778 
t = (Β6 at X) / se (Β6 at X) 
t = 0.7756 / 0.0.1778 = 4.3619  
p < 0.0001 
The t-value indicates that the interaction term, ownership x z-occupancy, is 
significant.  Marginal effects, standard errors, t-values and p-values are shown in Table 
12. 
Table 12 
Marginal Effects & Significance in Connection with Model 1-D  
Interaction Terms 
Marginal 
Effects 
Standard 
Errors 
t-Values 
 
p-Values 
 
Ownership x Geographic 
Location 
2.4935 0.3763 6.6269 < 0.0001 
Ownership  
x Z-Cardiac Group Procedures 
1.1432 0.1533 7.4588 < 0.0001 
Ownership  
x Z-Orthopedic Group Procedures 
2.1939 0.1930 11.3687 < 0.0001 
Ownership x Occupancy 0.7756 0.1778 4.3619 < 0.0001 
 
A high t-value and low p-value (< 0.0001) are observed for each interaction term 
used in Model 1-D.  This indicates that all interaction terms used in Model 1-D are 
significant. 
As will be discussed in the Concluding Remarks to this appendix, parameter 
estimates and marginal effects for original variables, geographic location, cardiac group 
229 
procedures, and orthopedic group procedures, showed only minimal changes in models 
that included the new variables representing labor costs, occupancy, and market 
concentration.  This exercise with the inclusion of additional variables was necessary to 
assure that all relevant dimensions in association with the dependent variable were 
represented in the model.  Hopefully, as a result of models 1-C and 1-D greater 
confidence can be placed in the validity of Part 1 models (1-A–1-D), and in the findings 
of this study. 
The Unexpected Positive Association between the TATL Ratio and the HMO HHI  
It has already been explained that an inverse association was anticipated, but was 
not found between the TATL ratio and the HMO HHI variable.  Higher concentrations of 
HMO dominance (i.e., control of price and output) should result in lower profitability for 
hospitals which should lead to attenuated bargaining leverage, lower reimbursements, 
lower profitability, and subsequently a weaker balance sheet, reflected by a lower TATL 
ratio.  
Conversely, hospitals in areas with lower concentrations of HMO HHI will 
encounter a much larger selection of health plans.  Hospitals that can exercise greater 
market control will be better able to secure more desirable agreements with HMOs which 
should result in higher reimbursements.  Ultimately, these hospitals should have stronger 
balance sheets, represented by a higher TATL ratio.  
This scenario begs the question, why does the data reveal a positive rather than an 
inverse association between the TATL ratio and the HMO HHI? 
This analysis has included only the HMO HHI as a measure of market 
concentration, but there are more variables than just the HMO HHI that could be applied 
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to healthcare markets, one of which being the hospital HHI.  Therefore, one possible 
explanation why the TATL ratio has a positive association with the HMO HHI is that 
perhaps in certain counties where the HMO HHI is high the hospital HHI may be high 
also.  If this supposition is accurate, the inclusion of the hospital HHI would be very 
useful in subsequent research. 
There are multiple aspects of market concentration.   HMOs have the advantage if 
health plans are few in number limiting a hospital’s selection.  On the other hand, a 
hospital with extensive market share may have greater leverage in negotiating managed 
care contracts despite a limited selection of plans.  Since health care markets tend to be 
regional, if a hospital, for example, controls 85% of the acute care capacity in the region, 
every health plan would be required to include the hospital in its network (Cleverly & 
Cameron 2002).  Even if only one or a small number of health plans were available in an 
area, a hospital with a substantial market share may still experience a puissant negotiating 
advantage. 
Regression Diagnostics for Model 1-D 
A full set of regression diagnostic tools used in parts 1 and 2 in the narrative 
(chapters 7 & 8) were applied to the main effects and interaction models, 1-C and 1-D, in 
this appendix. 
Outliers - Press Statistic  
As explained in the narrative, a very good summary measure for testing outliers 
and influential observations is the predicted residual sum of squares (PRESS).  The 
PRESS statistic in connection with Model 1-D is presented in Table 13. 
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Table 13 
Sum of Residuals, Sum of Squared Residuals & PRESS 
for Model 1-D  
Sum of Residuals 0.0 
Sum of Squared Residuals 11,059 
Predicted Residual SS (PRESS) 11,380 
 
The diagnosis in Table 13 shows that the sum of residuals equals zero which it 
should.  The sum of squared residuals (SSR) of 11,059 should also be equal to the Error 
SS in the regression output for Model 1-D, which it is.   
If the PRESS statistic is substantially larger than the SSR it would indicate a 
reason to suspect the existence of certain outliers and influential observations in 
connection with Model 1-D.  However, the comparison shows that PRESS is only 
slightly greater than the SSR.  PRESS shows 11,380 while the SSR shows 11,059.  This 
indicates no rationale to be wary of outliers or influential observations (Freund, Littell 
2000).   
In addition to PRESS, additional diagnostics were performed to detect potential 
anomalies which included univariate statistics, specifically normal probability plots, box 
plots, and stem-leaf plots. As a result no potential aberrations were observed. 
Influence Statistics  
Influence diagnostics were also performed which included hat-diag., covariance 
ratio, DFFITS, and DFBETAS.  Just as had been the case with Model 1-B in Part 1 of the 
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narrative, only a small number of observations were found to exceed prescribed 
thresholds.    
Studentized Residuals & Cook’s Distance (d) 
 Additional testing for outliers began with a review of studentized residuals and 
Cook’s d statistic.  Careful observation was focused on observations that exceed residual 
test thresholds.  These include studentized residuals ≤ -2.5 or ≥ 2.5 [or 5 asterisks which 
equals ≥ | 2.5 |, and Cooks d ≥ 4/n (i.e., d ≥ 4/888)].  There were 47 observations with 
residuals that exceeded either of these thresholds. All but 13 showed studentized 
residuals that remained within the ≤ -2.5 or ≥ 2.5 threshold.   
Heterogeneous Variances 
 An examination of residuals was carried out to assess homoscedasticity.  There 
were no observations of systematic residual patterns, nonrandom residual distributions, 
recognizable patterns in the magnitudes of the variances, or increases or decreases in 
variation of larger values of the outcome variable (Freund, Littell 2000).   
Multicollinearity 
 
Multicollinearity was tested and has already been discussed using VIF for models 
1-C and 1-D. Some researchers prescribe a rule-of-thumb that VIF should not exceed 5.0, 
while others recommend 10.0 as a VIF threshold.  VIF corresponding to all parameter 
estimates in Model 1-D were well below the lower threshold of 5.0, so VIF levels 
indicated no detection of multicollinearity. 
In addition to VIF both adjusted and non-adjusted intercept collinearity 
diagnostics were performed, and there was no evidence of problems with 
multicollinearity in the models.   
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Specification Errors 
 Additional interaction terms or other higher order terms, such as the inclusion of a 
quadratic term, were found to be unwarranted in the models.   
This appendix was added to the dissertation to help assure that another type of 
specification error, failure to include other dimensions that may be associated to the 
TATL ratio, did not occur.  This was the rationale for including three additional 
variables, manhours per adjusted patient day, occupancy, and the HMO HHI.  This 
strategy to avoid a specification error in this context is discussed further in Concluding 
Remarks to this appendix.  
Concluding Remarks 
 The preceding discussion on regression diagnostics ended with a brief statement 
regarding testing for specification errors in the models.  As stated in the introduction to 
this appendix, specification errors are most often discussed in the context of interaction 
terms that should have been included, or when squared terms should be incorporated in 
the model because the association is curvilinear as opposed to linear.  But this appendix 
has been included to address an additional type of specification error.  These types of 
errors may also occur when certain variables are not included in the model, but have a 
theoretical association and/or have been determined to be associated with the dependent 
variable in prior research.  
 Models 1-A and 1-B presented in Part 1 of the narrative (Chapter 7) included the 
independent variables ownership, geographic location, cardiac group procedures, and 
orthopedic group procedures.  An association was determined between the dependent 
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variable, the TATL ratio, and each of the independent variables.  Additional variables 
included in models, 1-C and 1-D, have also shown an association to the TATL ratio. 
 The most important outcome from the models, 1-C and 1-D, in this appendix is 
that variables were incorporated in the models from several relevant theoretical and prior-
tested dimensions representing labor costs, occupancy, and market concentration.  The 
inclusion of these variables adds rigor and engenders greater confidence in the findings. 
With the inclusion of these additional variables the betas for cardiac group 
procedures and orthopedic group procedures changed only slightly.  Furthermore, there 
was little change in the marginal effects of ownership x cardiac group procedures and 
ownership x orthopedic group procedures.    The association between the TATL ratio and 
cardiac group procedures performed in investor owned hospitals (i.e., when ownership = 
1) was almost the same in the presence of additional independent variables HMO HHI, 
occupancy, and manhours per adjusted day in the model.  The same is true for the 
association between the TATL ratio and orthopedic group procedures when ownership = 
1.  
Findings gleaned from expanded models 1-C and 1-D, which add three critical 
variables, buttress the findings in models 1-A and 1-B in the narrative.  This instills 
greater confidence in the findings from all of the models in connection with Part 1, 1-A 
through 1-D.  It also enhances credibility in the conclusions drawn from this study. 
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Β0 Β 1 X Β 2 S Β 3 L Β 4 XS Β 6 V
Variables Intercept Ownership South LOS
Ownership x 
South
Valve
Parameter Estimates                 8,478               47,505             22,429               6,214 (8,529)                        21,046 
Β0 Intercept             740,272 (351,146)          (339,258)        (33,724)                    340,208 (138,763)        
Β 1 X Ownership (351,146)                   1,277,769           366,334 (1,741)            (1,277,125)                 10,030 
Β 2 S South (339,258)                      366,334           834,299 (1,790)            (834,493)        (32,045)          
Β 3 L LOS (33,724)            (1,741)              (1,790)                          3,518               1,496 (5,239)            
Β 4 XS Ownership x South             340,208 (1,277,125)       (834,493)                      1,496        2,622,028             39,414 
Β 6 V Valve (138,763)                        10,030 (32,045)          (5,239)                        39,414           705,934 
* South = South Geographic Sector
Marginal Effects & Standard Errors for Geographic Location x Ownership
Ownership when South Geographic Sector = 1
Marginal Effect (Β4  when X = 1) = 47,505 + S(-8,529) = 38,976
σ ∂Y/∂S  = [var(Β 1 ) + S
2
var(Β 4 )+ 2Scov(Β 1 Β 4 X)]
1/2
       = √1,277,769 + S
2
(2,622,028) - 2X(-1,277,125) = 1,160        
       t = 38,976 / 1,160 = 33.60         
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Appendix 10
Variance-Covariance Matrix - Model 2-B
Ownership LOS South
Ownership 
x South
Valve
1 2.82046 1 0.03122 0.03682 0.03676 0.0271 0.03104
2 0.99034 1.68759 0.05962 0.06172 0.00097473 0.09676 0.33767
3 0.55546 2.25338 0.19821 0.0213 0.40225 0.0004599 0.26779
4 0.45541 2.48863 0.06487 0.53462 0.07253 0.09636 0.36206
5 0.17834 3.97684 0.64609 0.34553 0.48748 0.77932 0.00145
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Appendix 11
Part 2, Model 2-C - Collinearity Diagnostics (Intercept Adjusted)
Collinearity Diagnostics
Number Eigen value
Proportion of Variation
Condition
Index
Eigen values close to zero signify serious problems of multicollinearity.  An example could be 
an Eigen value at 0.09 or below.  None of the Eigen values in connection with Model 1-B were 
close to zero.  
As a rule of thumb a condition index > 30 indicates serious problems of multicollinearity.  None 
of the condition index values are even as high as 4.0. 
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